Determinants of Financial Stability in Market for Alternative Investment (MAI)
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Abstract
This research responses the critical need to identify and analyze factors influencing financial stability within the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) in Thailand. Given the unique dynamics and challenges faced by companies listed on the MAI, understanding these determinants is vital for investors, policymakers, and the companies themselves. By focusing on this specific segment of the Thai financial market, the research aims to shed light on the underlying elements that contribute to financial robustness, providing valuable insights for enhancing financial health and strategic planning in the context of emerging markets. This investigation not only contributes to the academic discourse on financial stability but also offers practical implications for stakeholders seeking to navigate the complexities of the MAI. The study investigates the impact of five distinct dimensions of corporate governance on financial stability: board size, the proportion of independent directors, the duality of CEO and board chair roles, shareholder concentration, and the proportion of institutional investors' shareholding. The analysis conducted at a 0.05 level of statistical significance reveals that these five independent variables do not exert an influence on financial stability. The findings also, reveal that financial stability does not have an influence on the stock returns of companies listed on the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI) at a 0.05 level of statistical significance. This result suggests that, within the examined context, the degree of financial stability of these firms does not significantly affect their stock market performance. The characteristics of the company listed on the MAI as well as the unique regulatory and market environment of the MAI may be the cause of this.
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เนื้อหาและข้อมูลในบทความที่ลงตีพิมพ์ในวารสารสภาวิชาชีพบัญชี ถือเป็นข้อคิดเห็นและความรับผิดชอบของผู้เขียนบทความโดยตรงซึ่งกองบรรณาธิการวารสารไม่จำเป็นต้องเห็นด้วยหรือร่วมรับผิดชอบใด ๆ
บทความ ข้อมูล เนื้อหา รูปภาพ ฯลฯ ที่ได้รับการตีพิมพ์ในวารสารสภาวิชาชีพบัญชี ถือเป็นลิขสิทธิ์ของวารสารสภาวิชาชีพบัญชี หากบุคคลหรือหน่วยงานใดต้องการนำข้อมูลทั้งหมดหรือบางส่วนไปเผยแพร่ต่อหรือเพื่อกระทำการใดๆ จะต้องได้รับอนุญาตเป็นลายลักษณ์อักษรจากวารสารสภาวิชาชีพบัญชี ก่อนเท่านั้น
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