Is Corporate Governance a Pre-Warning Sign of Firms’ Problems? : An Investigation of Companies Listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand
คำสำคัญ:
pre-warning sign, corporate governance, firms’ problemsบทคัดย่อ
The purpose of this research was to determine whether corporate governance is a pre-warning sign in the prediction of firms’ problems. This study focused on the board structure, including size, independence, diversity, CEO duality, frequency of the board meeting, and CEO remuneration as proxies for corporate governance. The samples included firms’ problems, companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand that were marked the warning signals comprising SP (trading suspension), C (caution), NP (notice pending), and NC (non-compliance). Data were collected from match-pair samples of 232 firms with and without problems during the year of 2013-2019. Descriptive statistics and logistic regression analysis were employed for data analysis at a statistically significant level of 0.05. The results showed that the pre-warning sign from corporate governance could classify firms into firms with and without problems. The independent variables of corporate governance were board size, board independence, age, board meeting frequency, and director’s fee. This study had an overall forecast accuracy of 66.2% in the 3-year, 64.8% in the 2-year, and 64.3% in the 1-year before the sign of C, NC, SP, and NP.
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