The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Audit Fees of Listed Companies on the Market for Alternative Investment (mai)
Keywords:
Ownership Structure, Audit Fees, Market for Alternative Investment (mai), Corporate GovernanceAbstract
This research aimed to study the relationship between ownership structure and audit fees of listed companies in the Market for Alternative Investment (mai) by collecting data from 122 sample groups during 2020-2023, totaling 488 firm-year observation, and analyzing them using multiple regression analysis. The results of the research found that foreign ownership had a statistically significant positive
relationship with audit fees, indicating that foreign ownership may require stricter auditing to reduce the risk of information asymmetry. In contrast, institutional ownership had a statistically significant negative relationship with audit fees, which may be a result of institutional investors’ expertise in corporate governance that reduces audit risks. However, the results of the research did not find a relationship between ownership concentration and family ownership and audit fees. For the control variables, it was found that the size of the business, the number of subsidiaries, the use of Big 4 auditors, the revenue growth rate, and the presence of operating losses were all positively and statistically significant with audit fees. In addition, there were differences in audit fees between industry groups, reflecting differences in business complexity and risks. The results of this research are useful for stakeholders in understanding the factors affecting audit fees in the context of emerging markets and can be applied to develop appropriate corporate governance
mechanisms for companies with different ownership structures. It also serves as a guideline for auditors in
determining appropriate audit fees.
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