The Relationship of Ownership Structure, Board Structure, Auditor Choice and Corporate Governance Ratings of Thai Listed Companies
Keywords:
Ownership structure, Board structure, , Auditor choice, Corporate governance ratings, Thai listed companiesAbstract
This research examined the relationship among ownership structures, board structure, auditor choice, and corporate governance ratings of Thai listed companies. Three variables such as ownership structure, board structures, and auditor’s choice were used as independent variables. The two variables used as a representation of ownership structures consist of the proportion of major shareholders and the proportion of minority shareholders. Two variables such as the proportion of independent directors on board and the control of administrative powers were used to represent the board structure. Auditor choice was measured by audit firm size (Big 4, or non-Big 4). The dependent variable is corporate governance ratings, which is measured by the CG score. The sample was collected from the annual reports of 669 firms and the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission Thailand (SEC) in 2021. The statistics in data analysis were descriptive and multiple regression analysis. The results showed that the proportion of minority shareholders, the proportion of independent directors on board and auditor choice were positively associated with corporate governance ratings. In addition, the control of administrative powers was negatively associated with corporate governance ratings. However, the proportion of major shareholders was not associated with relationship corporate governance ratings. This study adds to the literature by giving empirical data on board structure, auditor selection, and corporate governance ratings of Thai listed companies.
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