Nuclear Problems on the Korean Peninsula


  • พัณณ์อร เภาเจริญ คณะรัฐศาสตร์และนิติศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยบูรพา


North Korea, North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Nuclear weapons state, The six-party talks


          Among problems causing tension in the Northeast Asian region is North Korea’s nuclear development programme. It is believed that North Korea began a nuclear development programme in the 1950s, and soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it became a threat to world community peace and security. Since the early 1990s, tensions on the Korean peninsula caused by the nuclear development programme elevated into two crises. Efforts to resolve the crises through bilateral and multilateral negotiations failed to convince North Korea to denuclearize. Negotiations made North Korea feel insecure about national security in addition to maintaining the threat perception of North Korea. Therefore, despite negotiations, North Korea continued to advance its nuclear development programme and eventually declared itself to be a nuclear state in 2012.


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How to Cite

เภาเจริญ พ. (2022). Nuclear Problems on the Korean Peninsula. Thai Journal of East Asian Studies, 26(1), 63–85. Retrieved from



Research Article