

# Jokowi's Powers and Shadow Party for Political Dynasty: A Socio-Political Studies in Indonesian Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

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## Abstract

This research analyzes President Joko Widodo's (Jokowi) political power and the role of a shadow party in establishing a political dynasty during the 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. The study employs a qualitative method using a phenomenological approach. Data is categorized into primary and secondary sources. Primary data includes interviews and observations, while secondary data comprises legal documents and literature relevant to the study's focus. Data analysis is conducted using George Soros' Shadow Party theory. The findings are drawn through an inductive approach, utilizing generalization and simplification. The study reveals that Jokowi strategically leveraged his authority as the President of Indonesia (2014–2019 and 2019–2024) to support his son Gibran's candidacy in the 2024 elections. He established a shadow party, Projo (Pro Jokowi), and orchestrated a multi-party coalition that evolved from the Indonesian Forward Coalition (KIM). Jokowi's influence as the incumbent president enabled him to garner support from key political figures, including Gerindra Party Chairman Prabowo Subianto and Golkar Party Chairman Airlangga Hartarto, both of whom served in his cabinet. Jokowi's popular image as a humble and

approachable leader contributed to associating Gibran with similar traits. However, this coalition has resulted in two significant implications: the emergence of charismatic authoritarian leadership and internal conflicts among coalition parties.

**Keywords**

Political Powers, Shadow Party, Political Dynasty, Elections

## อำนาจของโจโกวีและพระคเงาเพื่อตระกูลการเมือง: การศึกษาด้านสังคมและการเมืองในการเลือกตั้ง ประธานาธิบดีและรองประธานาธิบดีของอินโดนีเซีย

พิกรี กาลี เพอร์นันโด โยลกี และ อาวัน เซเทีย ดาร์มาวัน  
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### บทคัดย่อ

งานวิจัยนี้วิเคราะห์อำนาจทางการเมืองของประธานาธิบดีโจโกวี โดโนดี (โจโกวี) และบทบาทของพระคเงาในการสร้างตระกูลการเมืองในระหว่างการเลือกตั้งประธานาธิบดีและรองประธานาธิบดีปี 2024 การศึกษานี้ใช้วิธีวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยใช้แนวทางแบบประภากลการณ์วิทยา ข้อมูลในการวิจัยแบ่งออกเป็นข้อมูลปฐมภูมิและทุติภูมิ โดยข้อมูลปฐมภูมิได้จากการสัมภาษณ์และการสังเกตุขณะที่ข้อมูลทุติภูมิประกอบด้วยเอกสารทางกฎหมายและวรรณกรรมที่เกี่ยวข้องกับหัวข้อการศึกษา การวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลใช้ทฤษฎีพระคเงาของจอร์จ ไซรัส และข้อสรุปได้มาจากการใช้แนวคิดแบบอุปนัยผ่านการสรุปทั่วไปและการย่อความผลการศึกษาซึ่งให้เห็นว่า โจโกวีใช้อำนาจของตนอย่างมีกลยุทธ์เพื่อสนับสนุนลูกชายของเขามี คือ กิบราวน์ในการเลือกตั้งปี 2024 โดยใช้อำนาจของตนในฐานะประธานาธิบดี (พ.ศ. 2557 - 2562 และ 2562 - 2567) ในการจัดตั้งพระคเงาซึ่งว่า 'โปรโจ' (Pro Jokowi) และสร้างแนวร่วมหิลัยพระคเงาซึ่งเริ่มต้นจากแนวร่วมอินโดนีเซียก้าวหน้า (KIM) อิทธิพลของโจโกวีในฐานะประธานาธิบดีทำให้เขารับการสนับสนุนจากผู้นำพระคเงาเมืองหลัก เช่น พลเอกปราบิวโชเบียนโนต หัวหน้าพระคเงากรอินดรา และแอร์ลังกา ยาร์ตาโต หัวหน้าพระค

โกลการ ซึ่งทั้งสองดำเนินการตามเงื่อนไขที่ระบุไว้ในคณะรัฐมนตรีของเข้า ภาคลักษณ์ ที่เรียบง่ายและเป็นที่นิยมของโง่โกวิทำให้กิบราวนถูกเชื่อมโยงในลักษณะเดียวกัน แนวร่วมดังกล่าวส่งผลให้เกิดประเด็นสำคัญสองประการ ได้แก่ การเกิดขึ้นของผู้นำเผด็จการที่มีเสน่ห์และความขัดแย้งภายในประเทศร่วม

## คำสำคัญ

## อำนาจทางการเมือง, พระค์เงา, ตระกูลการเมือง, การเลือกตั้ง

## Introduction

The Presidential Election in 2024 in Indonesia will have as many as 3 (three) candidates for President and Vice President candidates for the 2024-2029 period. The candidates have several names, namely the pair number (01) Anies Baswedan and Muhamimin Iskandar, number (02) Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, and number (03) Ganjar Panowo and Mohamad Mahfud. Based on the three candidates, the number pair (02), namely Prabowo-Gibran, contains a vision and mission with the narrative of "sustainability," meaning directly carrying out the programs carried out by the incumbent President, Joko Widodo (Jokowi).

The KPU (General Election Commission) of Indonesia announced the results of the votes obtained by the three candidate pairs and showed that Prabowo-Gibran received 58% of the votes, Anies-Muhamimin 24% of the votes, and Ganjar-Mahfud 16% of the votes (Muliawati, 2024). However, the results of this presidential election reaped several negative statements to President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), which were validated as a term "political dynasty" that had the potential to undermine the democratic order in Indonesia. The reason is that Gibran Rakabuming Raka is the biological son of the incumbent President (Joko Widodo) (Sitoningrum, 2023).

As a democratic country, Indonesia needs to verify the existence of political parties to maintain the pillars of democracy or the implementation of the essence of people's sovereignty. This can be done through general elections as a mechanism to achieve national leadership positions in a system of government. In general, the role of political parties is vital to a country's democratic system. Political parties connect the aspirations of the people and the government (Purnamawati, 2020).

The application of democratic principles in Indonesia must be in line with the 1945 Constitution. This makes the Constitution a reference in the process of forming public norms. The essence of democracy itself is an agenda that creates broad public involvement and gives legislative activity authority to the community. By the legal substance, structure, and culture (Peturun, 2021). The

constitution of a democratic country must be carried out actively; a democratic state is a representation of civil power created based on the authority and decisions formed by the people; it is through direct democracy (Haliim, 2016).

One of the countries that implements the principle of democracy in its government is Indonesia. However, Indonesia has actualized the concept of democracy, which is constantly evolving. Some of the evolution of democracy in Indonesia is motivated by change and adaptation (Prasisko, 2019). At the beginning of independence, Indonesia had various challenges that included Dutch efforts to regain power, economy, ideological conflicts, and rebellion. The minutes at the BPUPKI (Indonesian Independence Preparatory Business Investigation Agency), indicate the commitment given by the nation's founder to create democratic politics in Indonesia (Putri, 2022).

The first is parliamentary democracy; in parliamentary democracy, all functions carried out by political parties play an important role in the power of the State. The Prime Minister occupies the head of government, so the President and Vice President are symbols (Nurdamarsah, 2018). However, in this era, the position of parliament is so strong that it becomes the background for strengthening political parties. Thus, a product of state law needs to be more capable of absorbing the critical actions of parliamentarians. This happens in forums and individually (Purnamawati, 2020).

Second, guided democracy, which can be interpreted as a democracy based on family, intends to eliminate anarchism, liberalism, and dictatorship. Guided democracy bases its thinking on deliberation in one leader who is not referred to as a dictator (Fadli, 2020). Guided democracy is a political system that had a favorable climate during the time of Soekarno and Nasution when they tended to exercise their respective authorities and respect their prerogatives. The third is Pancasila democracy, a concept of democracy that rests on kinship and cooperation and is oriented to create community welfare, consisting of elements of love, religion, and sustainability. In addition, the state system is carried out through a community participatory approach or community verification. Individual

freedom is not final, but it needs to be relevant to social responsibility (Yunus, 2015).

Fourth, reform democracy. Indonesia's democracy in the reform era emphasizes a solid foundation for implementing the concept of democracy in Indonesia. Thus, it contains references to its achievement through indicators in applying the meaning of democracy. That includes freedom of the press that is used freely in the public sphere of the state and the enactment of a multiparty system; this enactment appeared in the 1999 General Election. As well as the opportunity for the community to gather, associate, and express their opinions on their political ideology (Jadidah, 2020). Democracy can be actualized through various means. Thus, at this time, democracy is synonymous with the mechanism of political deliberation in forming a public policy. Emphasis on joint decisions and covering the aspirations of the community at large (Matravers & Pike, 2003). The principle of democracy is constructed broadly, focusing on general elections (Khairazi, 2015).

Indonesia experienced political development starting from 1945 until now. From a historical view, political construction itself is a concept created in the United Kingdom of America (United Kingdom) and all its allies, namely Britain and France during World War II. The fundamental orientation of political development is a strategic step in stimulating economic expansion and political stability in countries that are vulnerable to contamination of communist ideology. So, the impact of communism can be avoided, so that this implication can be eliminated, the USA, its allies, and the World Bank (IMF) International Monetary Fund provide assistance and authority to developing countries. Through this strategy, the USA succeeded in creating a new understanding based on capitalism, hence the term development emerged as a practice of human civilization (Smith, 2013; William, 2013).

To provide certainty as an effort for political development to be able to evolve in developing countries, the USA imposes the implementation of a democratic political system through institutions or institutions that hold free elections in electing representatives of the people and the freedom to express opinions, politics, etc. This coercion was aimed at the United States and its allies based on its

anti-communist strategy. So that developing countries do not follow the communist system. In addition, the United States and its allies are also trying to transform the autocratic system into a democracy to eliminate the involvement of the apparatus in politics. Political development in developing countries aims to create modernization, economic development, social stability, bureaucracy, and political stability (Skowronek & Orren, 2004).

Political development raises two aspects of fundamental change, namely differentiation and secularism. Differentiation refers to the structure of differentiation, namely the dichotomy of executive, legislative, and judicial roles and functions in the government system. This separation of powers is a vital instrument in the political development of a country. This is the basis for minimizing and eliminating acts of abuse of power (Almond & Powell, 1966).

Before the rise of political dynasties, Jokowi was identified with the issue of 3 (three) terms of office of the President and Vice President. This issue appears 4 (four) times. The issue of 3 (three) periods was raised by several political elites and ministers in the Jokowi government's cabinet. Namely Airlangga Hartanto as the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs and Chairman of the Golkar Party and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan as the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment. However, in response to this matter, Jokowi stated that the 3 (three) period discourse cannot be ignored because it is part of democracy (Farisa, 2022) This statement is, of course, very contrary to the provisions in Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution as a *staatsfundamentalnorm*, which states that the positions of President and Vice President are for two periods.

Democracy in a country is required to internalize legal aspects (Mahadevan & Shenoy, 2023). Although the implementation of democracy through general elections, the general election process needs to obey the applicable law. One concept of actualizing democratic principles is through the election mechanism. The general election is a reflection of the values of Pancasila in Indonesia. From a macro perspective, general elections can be identified as a fundamental aspect of a democratic country. General elections are a form of representation of political space for society as

a whole (Fatiha & Soeharjoto, 2022). Legal awareness is vital in general elections considering the principle of Indonesia elections (LUBERJURDIL), which means direct, public, free, confidential, honest, and fair. So, the low legal awareness of state administrators can hinder the realization of the aspired general election and the embodiment of democracy in Indonesia (Patricia & Yapin, 2019).

General elections in Indonesia have been analyzed for decades. Elections are fundamentally oriented to represent the values of Pancasila and democracy in Indonesia. This condition impacts the government's increasing number of experiences, so it is beneficial in maintaining the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia. The general election makes it a form of indicator of the performance of state administrators in the democratic aspect. Success in the general election plays a strategic role as an agenda in maintaining the country's integrity (Fatiha et al., 2022). One form of general election in Indonesia is the presidential election. The election of the President is a procedure in the principles of practical democracy, namely through a direct presidential election, which is applied at a vulnerable time of 5 (five) years or 1 (one) period (Soebakir et al., 2020).

President is a designation given to heads of state and heads of government in Indonesia. This is due to the Indonesian government system in the form of a Presidency. In a Presidential country, the President is a symbol verified by law. The Vice President will accompany the President in a government cabinet, and the Minister will assist. Historically, the President and Vice President have been referred to as essential instruments in Indonesia's history. This critical role is identical to the proclamation of August 17, 1945, in which Indonesia did not have a government system. Indonesia only has a Constitution, namely the 1945 Constitution, which is a reference or guideline for implementing the wheels of government (Supriyadi, 2018).

The previous research in this study is. First, research conducted by Mendoza et al. (2016) with the title "Political dynasties and poverty: measurement and evidence of linkages in the Philippines" mentions that the isolation of more remote provinces gives political dynasties some measure of isolation from political and

economic competition and thus allows them to consolidate power and ensure their sustainable survival without having to promote desirable and inclusive economic outcomes. As a result, the results hint at a process that supports uneven development patterns in the Philippines. Second, research conducted by Ruud & Islam (2016) with the title "Political Dynasty Formation in Bangladesh" states that dynastic politics at the national level is not found in Bangladesh but that the Dynasty is alive and well at the regional level. Individual leaders may have sentimental reasons for handing the baton to a son or daughter.

Third, research conducted by Thananithichot & Satidporn (2016) with the title "Political Dynasties in Thailand: The Recent Picture after the 2011 General Election" states that political dynasties such as the Shinawatra in the *Phue Thai Party*, Silapa-archa (*Chartthaipattana Party*), Schidchob (*Bhumjaithai Party*), and Khunpleum (*Phalang Chon Party*) represent that the political family influences the development of Thailand's democracy. Fourth, research conducted by Wardani & Subekti (2021) in The paper "Political Dynasties and Women Candidates in Indonesia's 2019 Election" stated that the composition of women who have relations with dynasties has escalated.

Thus, the reanalysis of political dynasties is increasing rather than decreasing. The difference between this study and previous studies is that this study comprehensively discusses the Jokowi regime's political dynasties. This research also contains an analysis of Jokowi's strategy in realizing his political dynasty; the difference between this research and previous research is related to the theory used. This study uses more than one theory to integrate an inherent analysis of the political dynastic strategy of the Jokowi regime. This research is considered necessary because the Constitution prohibits this kind of strategy. Thus, this research can open the alibi carried out by the Jokowi administration regime to create a political dynasty in Indonesia.

## Research Objectives

This research analyzes Jokowi's Political Powers and Shadow Party for the Political Dynasty. More specifics related to

1) Jokowi's Political Powers for Gibran's Verification in the 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections.

2) Jokowi's Shadow Party in the 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections.

3) Jokowi's Role in Prabowo-Gibran Victory in the 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections.

This research is essential, considering the absence of previous studies that discuss political dynasties, including political dynastic strategies, in detail, using George Soros' shadow party, Antonio Gramsci's hegemony, and Max Weber's charismatic leadership. This approach is useful in developing shadow parties, hegemony, and charismatic leadership that focus on political strategy.

## Political Dynasty

A political dynasty is a form of action that can threaten the democratic order. This political system creates a form of relationship that is carried out to bring victory to every politician (Hess, 2018). Politicians should always be required to guarantee constitutional rights in a democratic system of government (Regilme, 2021). Meanwhile, the political dynasty itself is an action carried out by the ruler to give a position to the "family bond," which is expressly prohibited by law. This prohibition was motivated by the intervention of the ruling family, "*cawe-cawe*," forming a difference in status and political power. Indications of "*cawe-cawe*" or interference carried out by the ruling party in the presidential election can cause a lousy stigma, which further leads to the political dynasty of the Joko Widodo Government (Syanur et al., 2023).

Political dynasties are contrary to the concept of general elections, which are carried out through a formal legal procedural mechanism for the people to represent a form of democracy by electing their representatives who are intended to enter a system of government oriented to defend and implement the principle of

people's sovereignty (Arniti, 2020). Political dynasties can shape inequality in social status and the political power of other candidates who contest in the presidential election (Syanur et al., 2023). Thus, political dynasties implicitly limit the freedom of people's rights to participate as voters to presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The pair of candidates with a familial attachment to the ruler can mobilize the masses, make excessive financial contributions, and gain popularity. Thus, it will be easier to win the general election (Gunanto, 2020).

### **Shadow Party**

The idea of the shadow party is a concept or thought from George Soros. In this case, the shadow party is a connection made by a private organization with a significant contribution and influence. Shadow parties operate in secret. This runs behind the American Democratic Party. Shadow parties are not solely political parties in general; shadow parties are organizations that move outside the government system and use strategies to realize goals not described in the public space. In America, shadow parties do not operate as political parties as they generally do. Shadow parties cannot function as ordinary political parties, and when that happens, it creates a hostile climate. So indirectly, if the American people know the purpose of the shadow party, then they will refuse. Thus, shadow parties' relations and connections are carried out secretly or behind closed doors. The shadow party uses secret missions to achieve victory. He is always deceptive, secretive, and extra-constitutional to achieve his goals. In its strategy, even though shadow parties are not in the government environment, they need to enter the realm of government and manipulate the press. Shadow parties use a systematic way of influencing public opinion through academic people or "non-partisan" public services (David Horowitz, 2006).

George Soros was in line with Lenin, who was identical to promoting the revolution by manipulating the political economy aspect. It is identified as a strength of high expertise. Not only in the aspect of political economy, Soros and Lenin are also the same in the context of cultivating using the power of the inferior group. It has various layers similar to Soros's idea of a shadow party. He is a recognizable figure in public (David Horowitz, 2006). However, Soros denied that the Shadow Party was created to contribute to politics. George Soros individually formed and coordinated the shadow party. For example, in 1993, he hired Aryeh Neir and Morton Halperin in 2002. Soros coordinates and creates a team using collective skills. One of his performances was political activities that manipulated America's defeat by Vietnam. Shadow parties play alliances or street activist groups in carrying out their mission. He says such an alliance effectively carries out political engineering (David Horowitz, 2006).

### **Hegemony**

Hegemony refers to a condition in which a social group, such as oligarchs and capitalists, holds power. However, this power does not use physical violence through repressive police or the military. Rather, it comes from the hegemonic control that these groups have. In Gramsci's understanding, hegemony is understood as a way for a social group to gain influence (power) through persuasion, by leading other social groups (the controlled) to act by their wishes - as if without coercion. Gramsci's theory of hegemony is a macro theory that analyzes the relationship between the economic system of production, the state (political society), and civil society (civil society). The relationship that becomes the point of analysis is the relationship of power and domination achieved through the consensus mechanism of various socio-political forces in society, using political leadership, and intellectual and moral revolutions. Gramsci, in discussing his theory, puts the power of ideas (ideology) and collective consciousness as a driver of social change, so it can be said that the scope of social reality studied in Gramsci's theory of hegemony is macro-subjective (Suseno, 2003).

## Charismatic Leadership

Charisma is one of the central concepts in Max Weber's leadership theory, and its important role in shaping effective leaders is particularly relevant in the context of education management. Charisma is a personal characteristic that makes a leader stand out and can influence others. In the context of leadership, charisma refers to a leader's magnetism that makes others want to follow and support his or her vision and goals. Charismatic leaders have traits that make them stand out, such as high self-confidence, strong communication skills, and the ability to inspire others. They can create an emotional bond with others and make them feel personally connected to the leader's vision and mission (Sawir, 2020).

## Methodology

This study uses a qualitative analytical approach with the type of phenomenology. According to John W. Creswell, the qualitative research approach is an identification technique to construct social or human problems based on forming holistic images that are triggered as a way of collecting data and information that is organized, comprehensive, detailed, and complex. This includes studies (Samsu, 2017). The data in the study were classified into primary data and secondary data. Data consists of primary interviews and observations. Secondary data in this study use legal and other relevant literature. The purposive sampling method is used to determine the subject of the study. Political Experts (Lecturers) such as the initials FA, BS, and GG. Which focuses on political and legal issues in Indonesia and political NGO's in Indonesia (Perludem). The data collected in this study are open interviews related to the condition of democracy in Indonesia. Researchers in this case cannot make observations because the range is too macro. So the researcher decided to conduct interviews and analysis through a review of applicable laws. The data validity technique is carried out through source triangulation. In addition, the researcher also uses data analysis and theoretical analysis. Data analysis includes data reduction, data presentation, and conclusions drawn. Meanwhile, the

theoretical analysis uses the Shadow Party of George Soros. In the last stage, the researcher concludes by using an inductive pattern or generalization.

## Results

Jokowi, through Gibran, outlined programs in the previous government's performance before he stepped down from the presidency to maintain his existence and political legacy. Jokowi, through Gibran, outlined programs in the last government's performance before he stepped down from the presidency to maintain his existence and political legacy. Jokowi's image as a humanist leader has attracted the attention of politicians and political parties. To dominate, the ruler does not have to intimidate the moral values of the rule. Instead, it is based on approval intended as a domination scheme implemented through ethical and scientific leadership as a form of superficial supremacy over the inferior. Jokowi does this through his power as president, head of state, and head of government in Indonesia. To promote Gibran as his biological son and as a candidate for vice president, Jokowi included Gibran in the Golkar Party. Until the Golkar Party declared Gibran as a candidate for vice president, as promoted by Golkar. This can happen because the Chairman of Golkar is Jokowi's subordinate in his 2019-2024 government Cabinet. Thus, Golkar made Gibran a candidate for Vice President and was paired with Prabowo Subianto as Chairman of the Gerindra Party and Jokowi's subordinates in his government cabinet.

### **Jokowi's Political Power in Gibran's Verification in the Indonesian 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections**

Gibran is Jokowi's biological son the President of Indonesia who has reached the age of 36 years. In Law Number 17 of 2017 concerning general elections, it is specifically regulated that the age limit for presidential and vice-presidential candidates of Indonesia must be at least 40 years old. However, Gibran can run as a vice-presidential candidate in the 2024 political contest. The existence of

Joko Widodo as President of Indonesia is problematic because Gibran, through the Golkar party, is being promoted as a vice-presidential candidate from Prabowo. Through his coalition, Gibran was verified as a candidate for Vice President by the KPU based on the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023, which is considered legally flawed because it changes the rules in Article 169 letter q of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections through judicial review. This is a problem because the Constitutional Court violated its authority, which does not follow Article 24 C of the 1945 Constitution. The formation of legal norms should be an "open legal policy," namely within the power of the legislative body of the House of Representatives Council (Muliawati, 2023).

*"The government's political strategy uses the concept of "Shadow Party", Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023, and "Pork Barrel Politics" carried out by the Regime. (Inf. FA. Interview, 2024)*

The Constitutional Court's Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023 was stipulated as a consequence of judicial review in Article 169 letter q of Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections, which caused a problem. In this case, the Constitutional Court judge decided case 90 with a progressive nature. Constitutional Court judges created a new norm in Article 169 Letter Q of the Election Law. The problem with the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023 lies in the functions and authorities of the Constitutional Court based on Article 24C of the 1945 Constitution as a *staatsfundamentalnorm*; there are at least four authorities of the Constitutional Court, namely examining the law against the Constitution, election disputes, dissolution of political parties, and disputes over the authority of state institutions.

*“Variants of misuse of state resources. The potential for misuse of state resources has been identified in several aspects, namely, the mobilization of apparatus, financial assistance, changes in the Chief of Police, changes in the Acting Regional Heads, ASN, utilizing the Regent/Mayor program very massively carried out as an effort to win candidates.”*  
(Inf. FA, Interview, 2024).

After the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, new conditions were created related to the constitutional system in Indonesia. The reform of the 1945 Constitution has implications for the formation of a state institution, namely the Constitutional Court (MK). Judicial review or testing of the Constitution as one of the powers of the Constitutional Court (MK) is the existence of constitutional principles or principles of law (Constitutionality of Law) that can ensure that rules or norms initiated by the legislative institution (DPR) do not contradict the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court, through judicial review, only has the authority to state that the norms of the law are contrary to the Constitution or that the law does not have permanent legal force.

*“The House of Representatives has the authority to form laws, but has problems in its formation, this is related to good procedures in forming bills. (Inf. BS. Interview, 2024)*

The revision of the law remains the authority of the legislative institution "open legal policy." Thus, the Constitutional Court is only verified as a "negative legislature." Because fundamentally in Article 20 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 43 paragraph (3) of Law Number 12 of 2011 In 2011 concerning the Establishment of Laws and Regulations or P3, the DPR, the President, and the DPD have the authority to form legal norms. So, the House of Representatives is called a "positive legislature" or approving legislative authority. Thus, the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023, which adds a new norm to Article a quo,

the Constitutional Court as a "negative legislature," violates the authority of the House of Representatives as a "positive legislature" (Holqi et al., 2024).

*"The problem in the formulation of the law in the House of Representatives is caused by the composition of the legislative institution consisting of various factions so that the product of political decisions contained in the law is the interests of political groups or political parties."* (Inf. BS. Interview, 2024).

Further referring to the provisions of Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning the Formation of Laws and Regulations or P3 states that the follow-up of the Constitutional Court Decision contained in Article 10 paragraph (1) letter is carried out by the House of Representatives and the President. Thus, it requires the Perppu set by the President to fill the legal vacuum, which will later be carried out by the "legislative review" mechanism of the House of Representatives, as well as the functions and authorities of the House of Representatives. Furthermore, referring to Article 22 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, when the DPR approves the Perppu, the Perppu will be made into law. However, in this case, the follow-up to the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023 carried out by the KPU is only through the KPU Circular Letter listed in KPU Circular Letter Number 1145/PL.01.4SD/05/2023 which was later ratified in PKPU Number 19 of 2023 which in Article 13 paragraph (1) letter d states that the minimum age is 40 (forty) years old or has been/is occupying a position that elected through General Elections including Regional Head Elections. Thus, PKPU Number 19 of 2023 violates the provisions of Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 12 of 2011 concerning P3, which requires the follow-up of the Constitutional Court's Decision to be verified by the President and the House of Representatives through the Regulation and "legislative review."

## **Jokowi's Shadow Party in the Indonesian 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections**

The first step taken by Jokowi is to create a shadow party to mobilize the masses. In this case, Joko Widodo, often referred to as Jokowi, is a figure who has success in his political career. One of the aspects behind Jokowi's victory in political contestation is branding and image identical to Jokowi (Ridwan et al., 2020). Jokowi's political image has always been considered a simple and popular politician. It was proven in 2014 that it was circulated massively in the mass media (Lestari, 2022).

Until the survey in 2021, it was also stated that the level of public trust in Jokowi continues to increase. Based on data from Indonesia's Political Indicators, June 2021 reached a percentage of 59%, while December 2021 reached a presentation of 71% (Zulfikar, 2022). The positive image possessed by politicians is fundamentally and simultaneously instilled in the public's minds (Susila et al., 2020). Lakoff and Mark Johnson stated that image is an unconscious mental construction carried out continuously to create charisma in a politician (Pich & Dean, 2015).

Weber's leadership concept shows a framework that can support leaders to achieve goals (Suprayitno et al., 2020). Weber's emphasis on leadership requires a focus on charismatic authority oriented toward influencing others. In this case, charisma is vital as a foundation for goals and overcoming problems in achieving the leader's vision and mission (Helbing et al., 2023).

Charisma can be interpreted as a leader's character that makes him more prominent because of his ability to influence others. In leadership, charisma refers to the personal attractiveness of the leader who can make others desire to follow and support his goals (Sawir, 2020). So, leaders with charismatic types with charisma can make themselves the center of attention and able to influence others easily. One of the factors in the creation of charismatic leaders is a condition where a leader can inspire others to follow the vision and mission of the leader. This type of leader can also create emotional bonds with his followers and shape followers to be explicitly connected to their goals (Firdaus et al., 2023).

*"The post-truth phase of society, which can have implications on electoral conditions. Thus being able to eliminate substantial democracy in Indonesia."*

(Inf. GG. Interview, 2024)

Historically, in 2004, Joko Widodo began to join PDIP (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle). Jokowi initially joined PDIP when he created a consensus with the DPC of PDIP Brengasan Purwosari, Solo (Andika, 2024). Jokowi's political activities began in 2005 when Jokowi and Rudyatmo became Candidates for Mayor of Surakarta. At the same time, Jokowi-Rudyatmo is encouraged by PDIP and its coalition. Jokowi's success as Mayor of Surakarta gives an image as a humanist leader (people) and has succeeded in attracting the attention of politicians and political parties. Until Jokowi advanced in the 2012 Jakarta (Special Capital Region) regional head election. Jokowi, whom PDIP supports, is paired with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), whom the Gerindra Party supports. After winning the DKI Jakarta regional head election, Jokowi was again endorsed by PDIP to become a presidential candidate in 2014-2019 and successfully served for 2 (two). The period is 2014-2019 to 2019-2024 (Andika, 2024).

Before the political dynamics in 2024, Jokowi was a member of PDIP. As a PDIP member, Jokowi should participate in welcoming Ganjar Pranowo as a Candidate for President of Indonesia promoted by PDIP in 2024. However, Jokowi implicitly always carries out political maneuvers by giving a code of support to Prabowo-Gibran and coordinating with *Projo* volunteers (Pro Jokowi) to create a multi-party coalition for Prabowo-Gibran's victory. This coalition is promoted by the Gerindra Party, PAN, and the Golkar Party (Mantalean, 2023). *Projo* (Pro Jokowi), a volunteer fanatic of Jokowi, decided to support Pabowo-Gibran. *Projo*'s decision indeed cannot be separated from Jokowi's relationship. So indirectly, the *Projo* movement and Jokowi's volunteers oppose and open PDIP by supporting Prabowo-Gibran (Farisa, 2023).

*Projo* is a community organization that is passionate about Jokowi. *Projo* has an official status and is a legal entity. Historically,

*Projo* can be identified as Jokowi's volunteer movement. However, *Projo* evolved into a community organization. It is based on the first Kogres *Projo* held on August 23, 2013, before the 2014 Presidential Election. The orientation of the formation of the *Projo* is an effort to support Jokowi in the 2014 Presidential Election. Before declaring PDIP as a Presidential Candidate, *Projo* stated that most PDIP members on a regional scale recommended Jokowi to be a Presidential Candidate and not a Vice Presidential Candidate.

*Projo*'s role was to project Jokowi's victory until PDIP approved him. *Projo* carried out this with a strategy of moving through the PDIP DPCs to seek Jokowi's support from Megawati as the Chairperson of PDIP. After Jokowi's victory as President in 2014, *Projo* did not disband. *Projo*, in this case, always assists in escorting the Jokowi government. In the 2024 presidential election, *Projo* carried out political maneuvers by agreeing to support Prabowo-Gibran rather than the presidential candidate carried by PDIP (Meliana, 2023). *Projo* conveyed this support after the National Coordination Meeting (*Rakernas*) of *Projo* in Indonesia (Ardito Ramadhan, 2023).

### **Jokowi's Role in Prabowo-Gibran Victory in the Indonesian 2024 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections**


The dynamics in the Jokowi administration internalize a complex component. The option to play the concept of a multi-party coalition in the government is based on the amendment of the 1945 Constitution to create contradictory consequences between the executive and legislative institutions. The relationship between the executive and the legislature explicitly justifies the power system leading to the legislature. The idea of reform to ensure the presidential system in Indonesia after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution was not able to eliminate the characteristics of the parliamentary system formed in the presidential system in Indonesia (Efriza, 2018). This is emphasized by the extreme multi-party party system that contributes to the failure of Indonesia's presidential system. Thus, all government policy decisions focus more on the legislature (Huda & Nasef, 2017).

The multi-party condition in the Indonesian parliament always makes it the basis for the President by carrying out a multi-party coalition, especially in the parliament. This was done as an effort to strengthen the support base for the executive. However, allying with the presidential system takes time and effort. Thus, there are political dynamics. Agus Riwanto (Agus, 2016) stated that this political dynamic occurs in the presidential system as the president can choose cabinet members from both opposition parties and supporting parties as well as professional actors.

*“Political parties at this time are only concerned with quantity, not quality. So that it emphasizes the selection of candidates on electoral conditions or electability.”* (Inf. GG. Interview, 2024)


Consequently, party members in the government cabinet admitted to supporting the President. In addition, the formation of the government cabinet is more inclined to accommodate all the interests of the political elite. Thus, the President's view is how to meet the needs of the interests of the political elite, not the interests of the party as a whole. Second, in the presidential system, the president, in forming his cabinet, is much more likely to accommodate elite individuals of political parties. Based on Jokowi's description as president and executive, he seeks to shift the role of critical political parties to that of executive supporters. This is a condition of political dynamics that cannot be avoided.

This view became known as the modern party term "call all party," relevant to the perception initiated by Otto Kircheimer in the 1960s (Amal, 1996). In line with these conditions, after the completion of the colonialism and imperialism period, this time entered the stage of the neo-colonialism and imperialism period. The oppression of superiors is not always implemented by applying an authoritarian model but implements ideological intimidation (Houssay-Holzschuch, 2019).



**Figure 1 The Phase of Forming Superior Political Actors in the multi-party coalition, Author 2024**


Based on Figure 1, to dominate, the ruling does not have to intimidate the moral values of the ruled. Instead, it is based on consent (Riley, 2011). In other words, it is a domination scheme implemented through moral and scientific leadership as a form of superiority supremacy over the inferior. Political power is not solely based on domination and coercion. One should not rely exclusively on the power and material power given by the position to use political leadership or hegemony (Deni, 2020).



**Figure 2 Political Power Downstream Phase, Author 2024**

Based on Figure 2, the government coalition formed was based on the pragmatic views of the political elite. Thus, political dynamics in parliament need to appear more competitively and eliminate the ideological identity of political parties. However, this strategy is Jokowi's decision as an agenda to get political support, not only electoral support. The multi-party coalition occurred continuously from SBY's leadership to Jokowi's leadership (Efriza, 2018). The evolution of Indonesia's politics in the 2024 Presidential Election provides political opportunities (Hidayat, 2023).

The act of party reconciliation in the national political contest (presidential election) is a strategic form of political party (Syarif et al., 2020). Reflecting on the political context of the past few years, the political dynamics after the reform related to the formation of the cabinet's composition are an ordinary discourse. Political discourse on the composition of the cabinet and party coalition is carried out directly during political contestation (Romli, 2018). Until now, in the 2024 presidential election, Prabowo, through the Gerindra party, created KIM (Advanced Indonesia Coalition) accompanied by the negation of the "sustainability" of Jokowi's program for 2 (two) terms as President.



**Figure 3 The Phase of the Formation of the Political Circle of Death, Author 2024**

Based on Figure 3, not only accompanied by the narrative of Jokowi's "sustainability" program, KIM also collaborated with Jokowi's biological son, who was carried out through the Golkar Party. KIM was identified as a powerful reconciliation. This is not only based on the composition of political parties but also because of the power in the government, namely Prabowo, who is active as Minister of Defense, and Gibran, who serves as the Mayor of Surakarta as well as Jokowi's biological son as the President of Indonesia (Hamdi, 2024). The following is the composition of the coalition map for the pair of presidential candidates and vice-presidential candidates of Indonesia in 2024;

**Table 1. Coalition Party Candidates (01)**

No	Party	Coalition	Parliament Seats
1	PKB	Anies-Muhaimin	58 (9,69%)
2	PKS	Anies-Muhaimin	50 (8,21%)
3	NasDem Party	Anies-Muhaimin	59 (9,05%)

Note. News article from [www.cnbcindonesia.com](http://www.cnbcindonesia.com), Anam, (2023)

Based on table 1, the coalition map of the pair of presidential candidates and vice-presidential candidates number (01), namely Anies Baswedan and Muhammin Iskandar, is carried by 3 (three) political parties. The political parties include the National Awakening Party (PKB), with 58 parliamentary seats or a percentage of 9.69%. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has 50 parliamentary seats or a percentage of 8.21%. The National Democratic Party (NasDem) has 59 parliamentary seats or a percentage of 9.05%.

**Table 2. Coalition Party Candidates (02)**

No	Party	Coalition	Parliament Seats
1	Gerindra Party	Prabowo-Gibran	78 (12,57%)
2	Golkar Party	Prabowo-Gibran	85 (12,31%)
3	Demokrat Party	Prabowo-Gibran	54 (7,77%)
4	PAN	Prabowo-Gibran	44 (6,84%)
5	PSI	Prabowo-Gibran	Did not enter Parliament
6	PBB	Prabowo-Gibran	Did not enter Parliament
7	Gelora Party	Prabowo-Gibran	Did not enter Parliament
8	Prima Party	Prabowo-Gibran	Did not enter Parliament
9	Garuda Party	Prabowo-Gibran	Did not enter Parliament

Note. News article from [www.cnbcindonesia.com](http://www.cnbcindonesia.com), Anam, (2023)

Based on table 2, the coalition map of the pair of presidential candidates and vice-presidential candidates' number (02), namely Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is carried by 9 (nine) political parties. The political parties include the Gerindra Party, which has 78 parliamentary seats, or a percentage of


12.57%. The Golkar Party has 85 parliamentary seats or a percentage of 12.31%. The Democratic Party has 54 parliamentary seats or 7.77%. PAN with 44 parliamentary seats or a percentage of 6.84%. As well as other political parties that do not enter parliament.

**Table 3. Coalition Party Candidates (03)**

No	Party	Coalition	Parliament Seats
1	PDIP	Ganjar-Mahfud	128 (19,33%)
2	PPP	Ganjar-Mahfud	19 (4,52%)
3	Perindo Party	Ganjar-Mahfud	Did not enter Parliament
4	Hanura Party	Ganjar-Mahfud	Did not enter Parliament

Note. News article from [www.cnbcindonesia.com](http://www.cnbcindonesia.com), Anam, (2023)

Based on table 3, the coalition map of the pair of presidential candidates and vice-presidential candidates number (03), namely Ganjar Pranowo and Mohammad Mahfud, is carried by 9 (nine) political parties. These political parties include the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), which has 128 parliamentary seats, or a percentage of 19.33%. The United Development Party (PPP) has 19 parliamentary seats or 4.52%—and other political parties that do not enter parliament. Based on the three comparative data of the coalition map of the three pairs of presidential and vice presidential candidates, it can be seen that the Anies-Muhammin pair is supported by a total of 167 parliamentarians, or a percentage of 26.95%. The Prabowo-Gibran pair is supported by 261 lawmakers, or a percentage of 39.49%. The Ganjar-Mahfud pair is supported by a total of 147 parliamentarians or a percentage of 23.85%. This shows that the composition of the Prabowo-Gibran coalition is compelling. Powerful parties in parliament fill KIM (Advanced Indonesia Coalition).



**Figure 4 Hegemonic Phase and Operation in Political Circle of Death, Author 2024**

Before the reform era, precisely during the New Order period, the political dynamics in the parliamentary realm were closed and seemed monotonous. This is based on the authoritarian New Order government regime. Thus, the opposition party is very minimal. The coalition forces of the New Order government initiated the low function and duties of opposition political parties in the New Order era, which succeeded in intimidating and silencing their opposition parties. Thus, the system of government is implemented authoritarian (Busahwi, 2021). This authoritarianism has climactic consequences on the abuse of power, therefore giving implications for the destruction of the political and economic order (Regilme, 2021).

## Conclusion

Based on the results of the above analysis, the researcher concluded that Jokowi's role in winning Prabowo-Gibran as an effort to practice political dynasties is very vital. In the early stages, Jokowi used his power as president, head of state, and head of government to change the provisions of regulations in the law. This is oriented so that Gibran, as his biological son, can register as a candidate for Vice President of Indonesia in the political contest for the 2024 presidential election through the Constitutional Court, which Jokowi's brother-in-law also chairs. Then, after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 90/PUU-XII/2023, Gibran was successfully verified by the KPU (General Election Commission) of Indonesia as a candidate for Vice President. Jokowi's strategic move to win the 2024 Presidential Election political contest utilizes Projo (Pro Jokowi), a passionate Jokowi volunteer. Like George Soros' Shadow Party, Projo is Jokowi's shadow party, which he uses to guard his leadership era. However, Projo is not a kind of George Soros' idea that applies in a non-partisan manner; Projo is a partisan of Jokowi, a legal entity. Projo does not operate secretly, but it explicitly gives an open statement to the public. Of course, it differs from the George Soros' Shadow Party concept. So Prabowo-Gibran's victory contributes to these two components: Jokowi and Projo's role. Jokowi strategically leverages his widely recognized political image, associating it with Gibran to influence public perception next researcher should continue this research using Erving Goffman's dramaturgy theory approach. This indirectly confirms that Gibran is a representation of Jokowi.

Until creating a multi-party coalition supported by nine political parties with a total of 261 parliamentarians or a percentage of 39.49%, this kind of concept is then referred to by researchers as the "death circle of politics." A political actor acts based on power and image (charisma) to dominate political power by creating a deadly political circle supported by a shadow component. The concept of the "death circle of politics" applies continuously until one of the components in the circle, or even all of them, dies. This will create conflict consequences through the

dualism of interests. That is the interests of individuals and the interests of political parties. This strategy has a terrible impact on the democratic order because it eliminates the principle of checks and balances and gives rise to the authoritarian nature of the government. This coalition has two opposite implications, namely charismatic authoritarian actors and conflicts between coalition parties.

Future research should explore this topic using Erving Goffman's dramaturgy theory approach. This is recommended because it relates to the case of political dynasties. Jokowi is still a member of PDIP. This contains a formulation of the problem of whether the Shadow Party is a strategy used by PDIP and Jokowi to bring down their political opponents, namely Anies Baswedan and Muhamin Iskandar.

As for the scientific recommendation, the researcher suggested carrying out legal reform in Indonesia, especially in one of the judicial institutions in the judicial commission, namely the Constitutional Court. This is based on the starting point of the 2024 election problem which starts with the Court. This reform needs to change the role of the Constitutional Court from a positive legislature to a negative legislature. There needs to be a constitutional amendment that explicitly separates the function of the constitutional court in conducting a judicial review to add or remove normative provisions in the law.

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