

สงครามอัฟกานิสถาน (2001): ลัทธิแอตแลนติก ใน นโยบายต่างประเทศของสหราชอาณาจักร

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จุดประสงค์ ของบทความชิ้นนี้โดยหลัก คือการเสนอภาพของนโยบายต่างประเทศของรัฐบาลโทนี่ แบลร์ (Tony Blair) ซึ่งมีเป็นส่วนสำคัญในการร่วมมือกันด้วยความเต็มใจ (coalition of the willing) กับสหรัฐอเมริกาในสงครามอัฟกานิสถานเมื่อตุลาคม 2001 บทความชิ้นนี้ยังเน้นหนักเรื่องลัทธิแอตแลนติก คือความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างสหรัฐฯ กับยุโรป (Atlanticism) โดยมีสหราชอาณาจักรเป็นสะพานเชื่อมระหว่างสองฝั่งมหาสมุทรแอตแลนติก

“ความสัมพันธ์แบบพิเศษ” ระหว่างสหราชอาณาจักรกับสหรัฐฯ นี้ รู้จักกันดีในอีกคำหนึ่งก็คือ “สัมพันธภาพเชิงต่อรอง” (bargain relationship) สหราชอาณาจักรผูกความสัมพันธ์กับสหรัฐฯ เพื่อจุดประสงค์ที่ตนเองจะมีอิทธิพลต่อนโยบายต่างประเทศสหรัฐฯ ในลักษณะพหุภาคี และสหรัฐฯ เองก็ถือว่าเป็นผู้เริ่มต้นที่จะสร้างความร่วมมือระหว่างตนเองกับยุโรป อันเป็นส่วนสำคัญเพื่อได้ชัยชนะในสงครามต่อต้านการก่อการร้าย

AFGHANISTAN WAR (2001): ATLANTICISM IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States declared a war against terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. On 7th October 2001, the United States, with international support, started its "*war on terrorism*" campaign in Afghanistan. The officially stated purpose of the invasion was to target Al Qaeda members and to punish the Taliban government, which had provided support and haven to Al Qaeda.¹

The United Kingdom declared its commitment to play a major role in a "*coalition of the willing*" with the United States in the war on terrorism. As

¹ '2001: US launches air strikes against Taleban'. *BBC*, 7 October 2001.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/7/newsid-2519000/2519353.stm>, viewed 16 June 2006.

Blair said, "we therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world."² This commitment became apparent when the United Kingdom engaged in a round of shuttle diplomacy to help form and maintain a coalition prior to the attack on Afghanistan and sent British troops to participate in the Afghanistan war.³

Critics say that Blair's political agenda has been dominated by the United States. Because of Blair's close co-operation with the United States on the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United Kingdom contributed by far the greatest degree of military support for the United States-led invasions, he has been called "Bush's poodle,"⁴ "Governor of the 51st state,"⁵ and, by Nelson Mandela, former President of South Africa, "the United States foreign minister."⁶ An interesting question is why Blair loyally followed Bush into the Afghanistan war.

This paper identifies key contributory factors in driving the British government in its involvement in the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

² G Jones, 'We will help hunt down evil culprits, say Blair', *Telegraph*, 12 September 2001, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.html?xml=/news/2001/09/12/nblur12.xml>, viewed 14 June 2006.

³ GP Herd, 'The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq', Conflict Studies Research Center, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2004, <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/middle-east/04%2822%29-GPH.pdf>, viewed 14 June 2006.

⁴ LD Freedman, 'The Special Relationship, Then and Now', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, issue 3, pp.61-73.

⁵ S Naysmith & J John, 'Millions tell Blair: not in our name', *Sunday Herald*, 16 February 2006, <http://www.sundayherald.com/print31480>, viewed 16 June 2006.

⁶ 'Mandela condemns US stance on Iraq', *BBC*, 30 January 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2710181.stm>, viewed 16 June 2006.

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The Blair Administration realises that winning this war will be difficult and complicated. They need to spend a lot of time and money. Moreover, no one knows the timeframe of when the mission will be completed.⁷ The key question is why the Blair Administration involved itself in this war. What did the British anticipate from this problematical warfare?

The opening section of this paper gives a brief history of the Afghanistan war from the period of the Cold War to the 2001 United States-led invasion. The following part looks at the primary goals of the United Kingdom in the Afghanistan war: to transform a "failed state" into a democratic state; to destroy the terrorism threat. The Blair Administration has informed that they have already won the first stage of this war. Is the United Kingdom achieving its goals? The final part describes the key contributory factors in driving the British government's involvement in the Afghanistan war.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA

During the latter part of the 20th century, Afghanistan was wracked by political instability, civil conflict and outside intervention. Soviet forces occupied the country in 1979, but failed to defeat a determined

⁷ PJ Middlebrook & SM Miller, 'Living on a Life Support Machine: The Challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan', *Foreign Policy In Focus*, 27 January 2006, <http://www.fpiif.org/fpifxt/3093>, viewed 16 June 2006.

insurgency by *Mujaheddin* fighters and eventually withdrew in 1989. Throughout the period of the invasion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden, became known as part of a fighting movement against Soviet.⁸

After the Soviet withdrawal, the conflict degenerated into civil war, as rival ethnic, political and economic interests splintered the Mujaheddin coalition into competing factions.⁹ Popular frustration at the lawlessness and corruption and the absence of peace allowed a new militant Islamist movement known as the Taliban to emerge in the south of the country. The Taliban effectively ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001. It gained diplomatic recognition from only three States: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰

The Al Qaeda group had supplied armed forces and financial support for the Taliban. In return the Taliban allowed Al Qaeda to locate their camps used for training terrorists in Afghanistan. Between 1997 and 2001, Bin Laden was able to integrate an alliance between the Taliban and his Al

⁸ *The Causes and Effects of Terrorism in Afghanistan*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, 2003, <http://www.afghanistan-mfa.net/pressrelease/statementSeptember222003.html>, viewed 10 May 2006.

⁹ A Davis, 'How the Taliban became a military force', in W Maley (ed), *Fundamentalism reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban*, Hurst & Co., London, 1998, pp.43-50.

¹⁰ MJ Gohari, *The Taliban: ascent to power*, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2000.

Qaeda group. It is estimated that about 2,000 armed forces were trained every year and supported by Bin Laden.¹¹

In 1998 Bin Laden and his armed force were charged with the bomb attacks of the United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. In the aftermath of the embassy bombings, international pressure on the Taliban began to increase. In 1999 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1267, calling on the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden for trial. For two years the Taliban had rejected the Resolution to surrender Bin Laden and his members to justice.¹²

THE FALL OF TALIBAN

Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were identified as the culprits for the attacks in the United States on 11th September 2001, among other crimes. Following 11th September, the demand that the Taliban submit Bin Laden to justice was reiterated by the United States.¹³ On 20th September 2001, Bush made a five point ultimatum to the Taliban: (1) Deliver to the United States all

¹¹ *11 September 2001: the response*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

¹² *Resolution 1267 (1999)*, Security Council, the United Nations, 1999.
<http://www.un.int/usa/sres1267.htm>, viewed 14 June 2006.

¹³ T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

of the leaders of Al Qaeda: (2) Release all imprisoned foreign nationals: (3) Close immediately every terrorist training camp: (4) Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities: (5) Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection. Bush insisted that these demands were not open to negotiation or discussion and the Taliban needed to respond immediately.¹⁴ However, the Taliban rejected this ultimatum on 21st September 2001, stating there was no evidence in their possession linking Bin Laden to the September 11 attacks.¹⁵

Before the United States invaded Afghanistan, the Taliban offered to turn over Bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the United States would provide sufficient evidence of Bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. However, Bush responded by saying "We know he is guilty. Turn him over"¹⁶, and soon thereafter the United States invaded Afghanistan and deposed the Taliban government.¹⁷

The war on terrorism began in October 2001. The United States, aided by the United Kingdom and supported by a coalition of other countries

¹⁴ 'Transcript of President Bush's address', CNN, 21 September 2001.

<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>, viewed 17 June 2006.

¹⁵ 'Taliban Won't Turn Over Bin Laden', CBS, 21 September 2001.

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/09/11/world/main310852.shtml>, viewed 17 June 2006.

¹⁶ 'Bush Rejects Taliban's Offer to Turn Over bin Laden to Third Party', *CNN*, 14 October 2001.

<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/14/sun.03.html>, viewed 23 May 2006.

¹⁷ GP Herd, 'The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq', Conflict Studies Research Center, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2004.

<http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/middle-east/04%2822%29-GPH.pdf>, viewed 14 June 2006.

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including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance, opened an invasion of Afghanistan, under the codename "Operation Enduring Freedom."¹⁸ The United States and the United Kingdom made the necessary notifications to the United Nations Security Council that they went to war in self-defense.¹⁹ This statement was used to defend the legitimacy of their actions in the international community.²⁰ Due to a reasonably substantive connection between Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, the invasion of Afghanistan had overwhelming international support.²¹

A phase of bombing in Afghanistan followed for about a month. As a result of this invasion, Taliban training camps were destroyed and much of the alleged existing operating structure of Al Qaeda was disrupted. In November 2001, the last Taliban-held city in the north was captured. Nearly all of the Taliban escaped to Pakistan. On 7th December 2001, most of the surviving Taliban in Kandahar, a center city of jihad and Mujaheddin activity,

¹⁸ *Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan*, GlobalSecurity.org, 2005.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm>, viewed 13 May 2006.

¹⁹ T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

²⁰ B Keach, 'International law: Illusion and reality', *International Socialist Review*, issue 27, 2003.

<http://www.isreview.org/issues/27/international-law.shtml>, viewed 14 June 2006.

²¹ 'Bush: Afghanistan is a victory over terrorism', *CNN*, 15 June 2004.

<http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/06/15/karzai/>, viewed 16 June 2006.

surrendered.²² On 2nd May 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced the end of Afghan combat.²³ However, Bin Laden still has not been caught. The American government has claimed that the Al Qaeda network and its Taliban allies are not yet defeated and battles between the United States forces, the Taliban and Al Qaeda continue.²⁴

THE POST-AFGHANISTAN WAR

Following the collapse of the Taliban, the international community pledged support for its stabilisation and reconstruction. The United Nations stepped up its efforts to sponsor a conference on post-Taliban Afghanistan. All of the four key Afghan groupings agreed to attend the Bonn summit in Germany on 27th November 2001. After week-long negotiations, the Bonn agreement was published, and provided the road

²² T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

²³ V Loeb, 'Rumsfeld Announces End of Afghan Combat', *Washington Post*, 2 May 2003, p.A16.

²⁴ C Amanpour, 'For U.S. forces, war in Afghanistan heats up', *CNN*, 9 September 2003. <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/09/afghanistan.1/index.html>, viewed 14 June 2006.

map for the transformation of the Afghan state.²⁵ The Afghan parties agreed for the development of an interim government, led by Hamid Karzai.²⁶

The current president Hamid Karzai became the first ever democratically elected head of state in Afghanistan in late 2004. The current parliament was elected in 2005. Among the elected officials were former mujahadeen, Taliban fighters, communists, reformists, and Islamic fundamentalists.²⁷ The Afghan people have a constitution guaranteeing their rights and freedoms and freely participate in the democratic process, economic growth, and human rights.²⁸ In addition, woman's rights have been improved. According to a report on Afghanistan's parliamentary elections, the first for 30 years, in 25% of the 34 provinces, female candidates were elected above male candidates.²⁹ Ironically, this made Afghanistan, long known under

²⁵ T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

²⁶ *ibid*

²⁷ S Kolhatkar & J Ingalls, 'Giving Democracy a Bad Name: Afghanistan's Parliament Election', *Foreign Policy In Focus*, 16 September 2005, <http://www.fpiif.org/fpiifxt/647>, viewed 17 June 2006.

²⁸ *The Causes and Effects of Terrorism in Afghanistan*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, 2003, <http://www.afghanistan-mfa.net/pressrelease/statementSeptember222003.html>, viewed 10 May 2006.

²⁹ T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

the Taliban for its oppression of women, one of the leading countries in terms of female representation.³⁰

On the other hand, following the conflict in Afghanistan, political violence continues to be a problem. In September 2002, the Taliban attempted to assassinate President Hamid Karzai, but it was unsuccessful.³¹ Serious problems developed in the first term of the new administration, particularly building the Afghan stability.³²

RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN

Under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 of 20th December 2001 a 5,000-strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was mandated to establish peace and security in Afghanistan. The role of the lead nation in ISAF initially fell to the United Kingdom, followed by Turkey. Since August 2003 the force has come under the command of

³⁰ ibid

³¹ GJ Gilmore, 'Karzai Escapes Assassination Attempt, Downtown Kabul Bombed', United States Department of Defense, 5 September 2002. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2002/n09052002-200209051.html>, viewed 17 June 2006.

³² S Kolhatkar & J Ingalls, 'Giving Democracy a Bad Name: Afghanistan's Parliament Election', *Foreign Policy In Focus*, 16 September 2005, <http://www.fpiif.org/fpiftxt/647>, viewed 17 June 2006.

NATO.³³ It is the first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area in NATO's history. There are 36 nations contributing more than 600 soldiers to be stationed in Afghanistan.³⁴

About 1,500 Britain military troops play the role of "peace keeper" in Afghanistan. Major General John McColl, a British soldier, has been positioned in command of the peace-keeping force.³⁵ By the end of 2006, about 3,300 British forces will take the United States positions in Afghanistan. The deployment is anticipated to let the United States scale back its fighting troops and assist the Afghanistan government in maintaining security.³⁶

THE LONG WAR

After a successful invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban government, some people believe that the threat of Taliban attacks has been

³³ T Youngs. *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*. International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

³⁴ *ISAF Structure*, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 2006.
<http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure-structure.htm>, viewed 13 May 2006.

³⁵ 'Afghanistan: The shape of things to come?', *BBC*,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in-depth/uk-politics/2001/open-politics/foreign-policy/afghanistan.stm>, viewed 11 May 2006.

³⁶ D Walsh, '3,300 soldiers and a briefcase of grand plans but is it mission impossible?', *The Guardian*, 15 May 2006. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,,1774778,00.html>, viewed 14 June 2006.

dismissed. Nevertheless, the Taliban has not disappeared and still mounts a resistance. A United States-led operation in the Afghanistan war seems to have had only minimum impact on the Taliban.³⁷ The violent situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated increasingly.³⁸ Bombing continues in Kabul, targeting the international peacekeepers of the ISAF.³⁹ Consequently, in August 2004 the United Nations staff union requested that the United Nations withdraw all international employees from the country. In January 2006, more than 30 people died in a series of suicide attacks. From January to March 2006, there were 31 coalition fatalities and 270 members of the Taliban killed.⁴⁰ In May 2006 another bomber blew himself up at an Afghan army base. As a result, more than 100 people died.⁴¹

The Taliban claimed responsibility for this surge in attacks. These attacks took place after the Blair Administration had planned to deploy 2,000 crack British troops to the uncontrolled southern province of Helmand, and another 2,000 in Kabul, as part of the peacekeeping operation. The plan will

³⁷ 'Stronger and more deadly, the terror of the Taliban is back', *The Observer*, 16 November 2003, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1086409,00.html>, viewed 17 May 2006.

³⁸ M Sedra, 'Afghanistan: Democracy before Peace?' *Foreign Policy In Focus*, September 2004, <http://www.fpiif.org/papers/2004afghandem.html>, viewed 14 May 2006.

³⁹ *ibid*

⁴⁰ 'Timeline: Afghanistan', *BBC*, 4 February 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/1162108.stm>, viewed 12 May 2006.

⁴¹ 'Battle, bombs kill more than 100 in Afghanistan', *azdailysun.com*, 19 May 2006, <http://www.azdailysun.com/articles/2006/05/19/news/world/20060519-world-news-60.txt>, viewed 20 May 2006.

increase the number of British troops in Afghanistan to about 4,800, while a trend of the tenuous stability in the country is expected to continue.⁴²

Mohammad Hanif Sherzad, a key member of the Taliban leadership, stated that the British forces' mission to enforce security over Afghanistan would end in failure. As he said, "our activity will increase day by day. We now have the confidence to fight face-to-face and we have all the ammunition we need." On a satellite telephone he told *The Times*, a newspaper in Britain, "we will turn Afghanistan into a river of blood for the British...we have beaten them before and we will beat them again".⁴³ It is clear that many thousand of new Taliban fighters have been mobilised in the Taliban-controlled areas. The new followers of Taliban have been rearmed and recruited. They are preparing to attack the 8,000 forces of NATO.⁴⁴

Graeme P. Herd, a research associate at Conflict Studies Research Centre, indicated that the threat of the return of neo-Taliban forces would have an intense impact. "It would promote *spill-over* into the whole region of the weakness, bloodshed, boost transnational terrorist groups, and raise the number and violence of mass casualty attacks," he stated.⁴⁵

⁴² T Albone, 'Taleban tell British to expect a river of blood', *The Times*, 5 May 2006, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2165731,00.html>, viewed 14 May 2006.

⁴³ *ibid*

⁴⁴ T Albone, 'Taleban tell British to expect a river of blood', *The Times*, 5 May 2006, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2165731,00.html>, viewed 14 May 2006.

⁴⁵ GP, Herd, 'The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq', Conflict Studies Research Center, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2004, <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/middle-east/04%2822%29-GPH.pdf>, viewed 14 June 2006.

An article in the British paper, *The Independent*, describes the war in Afghanistan as “the war with no end.”⁴⁶ A reporter quoted in the article that “It could take longer to crack than Iraq. It could take ten years.” John Reid, the Secretary of State for Defence, also warned that Britain faced a “prolonged” involvement in the country.⁴⁷ Alastair Leithead, correspondent of *BBC*, said that there is no doubt that the strength of the Taliban insurgents has been increasing and the thousands of British and international troops moving into the south will have their hands full.⁴⁸

An article written by Richard Beeston, a diplomatic editor of *The Times*, reports that Kabul appears pretty peaceful after successful ousting the Taliban, however, there has been little change in much of the rest of Afghanistan, especially the situation in the southern province of Helmand, which is known as the a Taliban stronghold. As Beeston cited,

There are still huge obstacles to sort out here and the fact remains that, far from being a beaten force, the Taliban appears to be resurgent... The number of attacks,• suicide bombings, roadside bombs and the campaign of intimidation against schools,

⁴⁶ J Huggler, 'Afghanistan: The war with no end', *The Independent*, 15 November 2005, <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article327097.ece>, viewed 17 June 2006.

⁴⁷ Cited in J Huggler, 'Afghanistan: The war with no end', *The Independent*, 15 November 2005, <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/asia/article327097.ece>, viewed 17 June 2006.

⁴⁸ 'Top Taleban commander arrested', *BBC*, 19 May 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/4997548.stm>, viewed 20 May 2006.

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government officials and so on. All that is rising. This battle is by no means finished yet.⁴⁹

The United States and British governments have repeatedly insisted that the war against terrorism is a long war. Even if they can capture Bin Laden, the war on terrorism will not end.⁵⁰ At the moment the United Kingdom soldiers from inside the battlefield are facing a series of suicide bombings and an Afghanistan firefight against hundreds of Taliban. Blair admitted Afghanistan had seen an increasing degree of violence. However, he argued that the situation was "difficult to judge, but the medium to long-term prospects are good rather than bad."⁵¹

Certainly, the victories in beating the Taliban regime and setting up of the democratised government might be considered a strategic success of the United States and United Kingdom. However, it is still unclear whether or not building a democratic state can combat terrorism.⁵² Since the United States and its alliance have intervened in Afghanistan, the situation in Afghanistan remains very doubtful and uncertain, with bombing and ground

⁴⁹ R Beeston, 'On the spot: outside Kabul the Government's writ does not run', *The Times*, 1 March 2006. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2064351,00.html>, viewed 14 May 2006.

⁵⁰ 'Is the long war already lost?', *New Statesman*, vol. 130, 15 October 2001, pp.4.

⁵¹ 'Blair defends UK foreign policy', *politics.co.uk*, 22 November 2005.

<http://www.politics.co.uk/foreign-policy/blair-defends-uk-foreign-policy-15096820.htm>, viewed 14 May 2006.

⁵² T Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2003, pp. 84-97.

fighting still unending. No one can guarantee when the war will end. Critics say that these outcomes have proved that the United Kingdom foreign policy attempts have been unsuccessful.⁵³

Blair argues that if military action in Afghanistan achieves the aim of making it a stable, democratic state, the world would be safer. "There are always difficulties when creating the transition from a dictatorship, but the only way we are going to get long-term stability is on the basis of democracy," he said.⁵⁴ "Terrorism is not going to go away until we uproot it in every way... In the end even if you eliminate Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan...it would come down to the way of life we have here and the way of life they want to oppose," he declared.⁵⁵

As decisions are made regarding Afghanistan and its future, the United Kingdom insists that it will not run away, and it must win the peace as well as the war.⁵⁶ In July 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair met with President Hamid Karzai in London and discussed the long-term co-operation between the United Kingdom and Afghanistan. They signed *the Enduring Relationship declaration* as the framework for bilateral relations. The Declaration sets out

⁵³ M Sedra, 'Afghanistan: Democracy before Peace?', *Foreign Policy in Focus*, September 2004, <http://www.fpif.org/papers/2004afghandem.html>, viewed 14 May 2006

⁵⁴ 'Blair defends UK foreign policy', *politics.co.uk*, 22 November 2005, <http://www.politics.co.uk/foreign-policy/blair-defends-uk-foreign-policy-515096820.htm>, viewed 14 May 2006.

⁵⁵ *ibid*

⁵⁶ 'Blair on the war: the Observer interview in full', *The Observer*, 14 October 2001, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/0,1373,573849,00.html>, viewed 17 May 2006.

their common interests and strong friendship, and highlights the United Kingdom's long-term commitment to Afghanistan.⁵⁷

It is clear that the Blair Administration actively involved itself in the Afghanistan war. The following is a discussion of key contributory factors in driving the Blair Administration's involvement in Afghanistan.

GLOBAL TERRORISM TREAT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Global terrorism has been mentioned as the key problem facing the British security. It was found that the United Kingdom has already become one of the potential targets of the Al Qaeda attacks. There have been reports that Al Qaeda planned to attack the House of Parliament and the Tower Bridge.⁵⁸ In addition, it is conceivable that Al Qaeda has made greater progress in acquiring a so-called "dirty bomb." The BBC reported that a previous Al Qaeda safe house contained essential strategies for building a rudimentary nuclear device and description of how to make various poisons.⁵⁹

When the Bush Administration started its war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Blair strongly supported the United States by sending British

⁵⁷ 'Joint declaration of an enduring relationship between the UK and Afghanistan', *10 Downing Street*, 19 July 2005, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7951.asp>, viewed 17 June 2006.

⁵⁸ 'Al-Qaeda 'planned more attacks'', *BBC*, 6 December 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south-asia/1694918.stm>, viewed 12 May 2006.

⁵⁹ *ibid*

troops to participate in Afghanistan. Blair realised that he would have to tackle a growing rebellion in the British people, some anti-American and some against all wars. However, Blair pointed out two main objectives of the war against the Taliban to clarify his rational judgment.

Firstly, the United Kingdom needed to track down Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network. Blair warned that if Bin Laden and Al Qaeda were not stopped, there was a threat they could acquire chemical, biological, even *weapons of mass destruction (WMD)*. As Blair said, "If they are allowed to carry on doing this, our world will be an insecure, unsafe place and there will be no corner of the world, particularly not a place like Britain, that will be untouched by that".⁶⁰ Therefore, Blair declared that the United Kingdom would use its assets and influence to be "a force for good" in the world.⁶¹ As Blair stated, "the global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it".⁶²

Secondly, the objective of the United Kingdom government's campaign against the Taliban is concerned with building up the stability of the "failed states," in which central authorities provide a base or sponsor for

⁶⁰ 'Blair outlines UK troop decision' *BBC*, 26 October, 2001.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/1621252.stm>, viewed 12 May 2006.

⁶¹ 'Can Britain be a force for good?', *BBC*, 8 January 2002.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking-point/1742841.stm>, viewed 12 June 2006.

⁶² 'Blair terror speech in full', *BBC*, 5 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/3536131.stm>, viewed 22 June 2006.

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terrorists' activities.⁶³ It became obvious that the religious extremism of the Taliban had been sheltering Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda alliance. As a result, the United Kingdom needed to remove the Taliban regime. In Blair's words, "here is an organisation, a network, shielded by the Taliban regime that has committed terrorist atrocities before 11th September. It has now committed a terrible, the most terrible atrocity the world has witnessed. Part of its ideology is to create more such terrorist incidents. What is the alternative?"⁶⁴

Since 11th September, it cannot be denied that international terrorism has been promoted as the greatest threat facing the world. Although the network of the terrorists repeatedly targets Western interests, Blair points out that the entire world has been in danger of terrorist attacks, WMD, and regional conflicts.⁶⁵ Furthermore, the British government insists that the war on terrorism is not a conflict between different value systems or a "clash of civilisations." Terrorism attacks, which have become fluid, global, and relatively unpredictable, are the common enemy of civilisation. This is a threat faced by the West and the "non-western" countries: the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.⁶⁶ Thus, Blair has asked all countries to fight the terrorist threats together. As he stated,

⁶³ 'Full text of Blair's speech', *The Guardian*, 13 November 2001.

<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/speeches/story/0,,592735,00.html>, viewed 19 June 2006.

⁶⁴ 'Blair outlines UK troop decision', *BBC*, 26 October 2001.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/1621252.stm>, viewed 20 June 2006.

⁶⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁶ *ibid*

The only effective response is a truly international and co-operative one, based on a vigorous pursuit of terrorists within the rule of law, on addressing justly and effectively the underlying issues which lead some to use terrorism, on proper protective measures, and on good contingency planning for terrorist attacks.⁶⁷

Certainly, military power is the vital means of defeating the terrorists including the Taliban. Blair realised that American military power can strengthen the United Kingdom's capability to combat global terrorism. However, the United Kingdom cannot depend heavily on only the United States. Blair argued that the defining characteristic of today's world is its interdependence. "Our self-interest was allied to the interests of others and seldom did conflict in one region of the world not contaminate another," he said.⁶⁸ To win the war on terrorism, it is so important to mobilise international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges.⁶⁹

The reaction against the terrorists is complicated. The United Kingdom requires active international co-operation to defeat the threat of

⁶⁷ Cited in T Dunne, 'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy', *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.

⁶⁸ T Blair, *Prime Minister's speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library*, 10 Downing street, 7 April 2002, <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1712.asp>, viewed 19 June 2006.

⁶⁹ JS Nye Jr., 'Why military power is no longer enough', *The Observer*, 31 March 2002, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,676169,00.html>, viewed 9 June 2006.

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transnational terrorism.⁷⁰ For instance, victory over the terrorist cells throughout the world depends on close civilian co-operation across borders, whether that means the co-operation of intelligence service in many countries, co-ordinating police work across borders, or tracking global financial flows.⁷¹ Moreover, reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan are very costly and difficult. Blair needs a broad coalition of countries to help. For this reason, the Blair government needs to be clear in its mind about how the international community can work together in order to deal with global terrorism, especially the United States and Europe.⁷² It is absolutely imperative that the Blair government cannot choose to support one over the other.⁷³ As Blair declared his position,

We have buried the myth that Britain has to choose between being strong in Europe or strong with the United States. Afghanistan has shown vividly how the relationships reinforce each other: and that both the United States and our European partners value our role with the other. So let us play our full part in Europe not retreat to its

⁷⁰ S Chapman, 'Bush's Bad Foreign Policy: Unilateralism and remaking the world don't mix', *Reason*, February 2004, <http://www.reason.com/0402/cr.sc.bushs.shtml>, viewed 3 June 2006.

⁷¹ R Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 105.

⁷² T Youngs, P Bowers & M Oakes, *The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban*, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 2001.

⁷³ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

margins; and let us proclaim our closeness to the United States and use it to bring Europe closer to America.⁷⁴

BRIDGE ROLE

Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote, "Learn all you can from history, for how else can one even make a guess what is going to happen in the future . . . in history lie all the secrets of statecraft". Churchill was right, and his guidance is especially appropriate in understanding the British foreign policy.⁷⁵

Since the end of the World War II, British foreign policy has tried to play a role in "*three circles*," the British Commonwealth of Nations, the transatlantic Anglo-Saxon partnership, and the connections with its continental European neighbors.⁷⁶ The image of the three interlocking circles that represented Britain's position in the world was mentioned by Prime

⁷⁴ T Blair, *Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayo's banquet*, 10 Downing Street, 12 November 2001, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1661.asp>, viewed 19 June 2006.

⁷⁵ Cited in R Raymond, 'The U.S.-UK special relationship in historical context: lessons of the past', in JD McCausland & DT Stuart (ed), *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, the Strategic Studies Institute, 2006, pp. 1-13.

⁷⁶ W Wallace, 'The collapse of British foreign policy', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2005, pp. 53-68.

Minister Winston Churchill during a speech to the Conservative party conference in 1948.⁷⁷

Later, as Britain's empire in Africa came to an end, the Commonwealth connections shifted from apparent asset to apparent burden. As a result, the British government shifted its role from three circles to "two stepping-off points", the United States and Western Europe, with the United Kingdom acting as the "bridge" between them.⁷⁸

Since the end of the Cold War, the British government has emphasised over time its main goals of British foreign policy, which is based on the emergence of the greater role of multinational corporations. The first is an obligation to multilateral co-operation. The second is the longing to be America's closest partners. The third is a leading role in Europe.⁷⁹ These principles have been used as a conceptual framework for understanding the means and the ends for Britain's conduct in the world.

Since Blair became Prime Minister in 1997, the primary vision of the Blair Administration's international role was not especially distinctive from the previous approach of its predecessors.⁸⁰ The Blair Administration has demonstrated clearly its multilateral approach. Strong expressions of

⁷⁷ A Deighton, 'The foreign policy of British Prime Minister Tony Blair: radical or retrograde', Center for British Studies, Humboldt University, 11 July 2005, pp. 1-13.

⁷⁸ W Wallace, 'The collapse of British foreign policy', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2005, pp. 53-68.

⁷⁹ NJ Wheeler & T Dunne, 'Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 4, 1998, pp. 847-870.

⁸⁰ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

multilateralism were evident during the first term of the new Labour's period in power. It emphasised the United Kingdom's global interests in the United Nations Security Council, NATO, the European Union, the G7, and the Commonwealth.⁸¹

Above all, at the heart of Blair's grand strategy was an effort to find the right balance between the relationship with the United States and that with Europe.⁸² As Blair described it to his audience at the Lord Mayor's Banquet on 10th November 1997,

[British foreign policy should aim to be] strong in Europe and strong with the United States. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other. Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the United States at all levels. We are the bridge between the United States and Europe. Let us use it.⁸³

In the 1998 Strategic Defense Review, the British government insisted that the United Kingdom would remain the closest ally of the United States. The United Kingdom also claimed to be at "the centre of Europe" and

⁸¹ K Hughes & E Smith, 'New Labour-new Europe', *International Affairs*, no. 74, issue 1, 1998, pp. 93-104.

⁸² SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

⁸³ Cited in W Wallace, 'The collapse of British foreign policy', *International Affairs*, no. 82, issue 1, 2005, pp. 54-68.

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repeatedly made the presumptuous assertion it was the bridge between Europe and the United States.⁸⁴

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

“Anglo-American relations” have a long history. Since World War II, the historical inheritance of the United States and the United Kingdom is seen as underpinning their close diplomatic and military co-operation.⁸⁵ At this time the United States was becoming the new imperial power, and Churchill realised that Britain’s greatest chance of retaining international influence was to stay close to America. The term “special relationship” was first used by Churchill during his Iron Curtain speech of March 1946.⁸⁶

Similarly, in Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s phase, the belief that the British could retain influence by staying close to the United States was a fundamental element in postwar British economic and political policy. As John Eatwell, the President of Queens’ College, Cambridge, explained,

⁸⁴ D Keohane, ‘The United Kingdom’ in A Danchev & J MacMillan (ed), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*, Routledge, Oxon, 2005, pp. 59–76

⁸⁵ B Wright, ‘Analysis: Anglo-American special relationship’, *BBC*, 6 April 2002.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1913522.stm>, viewed 17 June 2006.

⁸⁶ *ibid*

"Britain was to play Greece to American's Rome, to be the wise diplomacy and philosophic advisor to the brash, new fledgling authority."⁸⁷

In the period of the Cold War Margaret Thatcher became a familiar figure internationally, having a very close personal relationship with President Ronald Reagan and gaining the praise of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. This is why Thatcher outlasted the Cold War.⁸⁸

After the end of the Cold War, International order has become an "American World Empire". Charles Krauthammer, political columnist, called it a "unipolar moment", a period in which one superpower, the United States, stood clearly above the rest of the international community.⁸⁹ As the centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United Kingdom quickly learned that it could not act contrary to American wishes. A special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States is known as a "bargain relationship." At its core, the United Kingdom promised its trustworthiness to the United States in return for influence over the United States' direction of foreign policy.⁹⁰ As a result, the British government chose to be a "junior partner" of the United States.⁹¹

⁸⁷ J Eatwell, 'Britain and America: Ameliorating Unilateralism', *Social Research*, vol. 72, no. 4, 2005, pp.791-798.

⁸⁸ *ibid*

⁸⁹ C Krauthammer, 'The Unipolar Moment', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 23-33.

⁹⁰ T Dunne, 'When the shooting starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy', *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.

⁹¹ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, issue 4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

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Undoubtedly, Blair inherited that same commitment. Due to the "*Pax Americana*," the special relationship underpins the fundamental attitude of the British towards the United States. The British government has collaborated with the United States because it hopes that the special relations between the two countries can enable the United Kingdom to influence American policy. While American dominance within the post-Cold War global order is likely to remain, the British government needs to ensure that the United States maintains its liberal approach for the foreseeable future.⁹²

However, since Bush became President of the United States in 2000, it has been difficult for Blair to stay close to the United States in order to influence the United States foreign policy. Bush has demonstrated the clear perception of unilateralism and global American domination.⁹³ The United States, as the pre-eminent power of the world, depended deeply on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get its way.⁹⁴ Bush regarded the United Nations as an "entirely instrumental light." If it were functional in securing wider support for the contemplated achievement, the Bush Administration was willing to work through it. Evidently, the United States decisions demonstrated that it did not

⁹² W Wallace, 'Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas', Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace.htm>, viewed 23 June 2006.

⁹³ IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, *American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.

⁹⁴ R Jervis, 'Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp. 351-377.

give the nod to the United Nations.⁹⁵ For instance, the United States has rejected initiatives on climate change and the trade in small arms. America withdrew from the 'Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ANM Treaty)' in December 2001 and blocked international efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, even though the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States clearly confirmed the dangers of biological terrorism.⁹⁶ Worst of all, the Bush Administration withdrew from a treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002.⁹⁷

After the 11th September attacks, Bush's *neo-conservative* foreign affairs and defense policies have been focused on the Bush doctrine of *pre-emption* with the powerful assertion of American hegemony. As a result, a strongly sense of distrust against the United States' legitimacy has rapidly grown. Even worse, the United States forces violate international Geneva Conventions in events such as the torture and prisoner abuse scandal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,⁹⁸ Bagram, Afghanistan,⁹⁹ and Abu Ghraib, Iraq.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, 'The Source of American Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 6, 2004, pp. 18-32.

⁹⁶ 'US rejects germ warfare plan', *BBC*, 25 July 2001.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1456088.stm>, viewed 16 May 2006.

⁹⁷ 'US renounces world court treaty', *BBC*, 6 May, 2002.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1970312.stm>, viewed 16 May 2006.

⁹⁸ RN Taylor, 'Guantanamo is symbol of injustice, says Goldsmith', *The Guardian*, 11 May 2006.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,,1772226,00.html>, viewed 4 June 2006.

⁹⁹ T Golden, 'In U.S. Reports, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths', *The New York Times*, 20 May 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html>, viewed 4 June 2006.

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Many people now believe that if American military act immorally or unethically then they are no better people than the "insurgents" they are trying to find.¹⁰¹

Since Bush's neo-conservative foreign policy swing toward unilateralism, and the decline of American legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, the special relationship between Britain and America was left in an uncomfortable position.¹⁰² During the Bush Administration's first eight months in office, the British government rapidly adapted to the major shift from the engaged internationalist perspective of the Clinton Administration to the unilateral approach of the Bush presidency.¹⁰³

There is no denying that the United States is only one superpower and it can go it alone if it has to.¹⁰⁴ From Blair's point of view, it is time to accept this fact and move on.¹⁰⁵ Blair believes that the world would be a much more risky place if the United States were left to go it alone and the

¹⁰⁰ D Jehl, 'G.I. in Abu Ghraib Abuse is spared time in jail', *The New York Times*, 3 November 2004, p. 16.

¹⁰¹ RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, 'The Source of American Legitimacy', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.

¹⁰² *ibid*

¹⁰³ T Dunne, 'When the shooting starts: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy', *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.

¹⁰⁴ R Jervis, 'Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 120, no.3, 2005, pp. 351-377.

¹⁰⁵ A Moravcsik, 'Striking New Transatlantic Bargain', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 4, 2003, pp. 74-89.

British did not stay close.¹⁰⁶ On occasions, when the United States decides to go it alone, the view of Blair is that his retreat will not make the Bush Administration multilateralist.¹⁰⁷ As a result, the United Kingdom must stay as close to the United States as possible with the aim of influencing United States foreign policy in a more multilateral approach.¹⁰⁸

It is clear from a speech from Prime Minister Blair in 2003 that Blair expected that Anglo-American relations could influence the United States to enlarge its liberal approach. In his words,

The price of influence is that we do not leave the United States to face the tricky issues alone ... We should remain the closest ally of the United States, and as allies, influence them to continue broadening their agenda. We are the allies of the United States not because they are powerful, but because we share their values.¹⁰⁹

Following the 11th September attacks: Blair has positioned the United Kingdom as the closest ally and supporter of the United States' war on terrorism, marking the multiple ties between the two countries. Blair realised

¹⁰⁶ J Eatwell, 'Britain and America: Ameliorating Unilateralism', *Social Research*, vol. 72, no. 4, 2005, pp.791-798.

¹⁰⁷ T Dunne, 'When the shooting starts: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy', *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.

¹⁰⁸ J Eatwell, 'Britain and America: Ameliorating Unilateralism', *Social Research*, vol. 72, no. 4, 2005, pp.791-798.

¹⁰⁹ 'Blair spells out UK and U.S. ties', *CNN*, 7 January 2003.
<http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/07/blair.ambassadors/>, viewed 16 May 2006.

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that “only the most voluble expressions of solidarity with the United States would purchase any influence over the White House.”¹¹⁰ The special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States after the 11th September attacks can be divided into two parts.

Firstly, the United Kingdom stood “shoulder to shoulder” with the United States in seeking to find and punish the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon and accepted the risks involved. Due to the warmth and cordiality of the United Kingdom, Bush paid the United Kingdom a compliment. “America has no truer friend than Great Britain,” Bush said.¹¹¹

Secondly, Blair became a “missionary for the international coalition” against terrorism.¹¹² The role of the British military in Afghanistan may have been minor, but it led a major task in the area of diplomacy. After the 11th September attacks, Blair played an important role in building an international consensus, which would let the United States start an attack on the Taliban.¹¹³ Before the Afghanistan war, Blair embarked on two months of

¹¹⁰ D Keohane, ‘The United Kingdom’ in A Danchev & J MacMillan (ed), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*, Routledge, Oxon, 2005.

¹¹¹ GW Bush, *Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People*, The White House, 20 September 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, viewed 19 June 2006.

¹¹² D Keohane, ‘The United Kingdom’ in A Danchev & J MacMillan (ed), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*, Routledge, Oxon, 2005.

¹¹³ ‘Afghanistan: The shape of things to come?’, *BBC*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in-depth/uk-politics/2001/open-politics/foreign-policy/afghanistan.stm>, viewed 11 May 2006.

diplomacy gathering international support for military action. Peter Riddell, a *London Times* columnist, estimates that, in the eight weeks after the 11th September attacks, Blair held 54 meetings with world leaders and traveled more than 40,000 miles, on 31 flights to persuade governments such as Russia and Pakistan to join the United States-led group.¹¹⁴ The United Kingdom also provided a diplomacy bridge between the United States on the one side and countries that America deemed to be sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran and Syria.¹¹⁵ By doing so, the British and American media designated Blair as “United States ambassador to the world.”¹¹⁶

Blair’s solidarity with the American tragedy and his leading role in and commitment to defeating Al Qaeda made an impression on Bush, the American congress, and the public. In 2003 he became the first Briton since Winston Churchill to be awarded a Congressional Gold Medal by the United States Congress for being “a staunch and steadfast ally of the United States of America” for his “outstanding and enduring contributions to maintaining the security of all freedom-loving nations.”¹¹⁷ In 2003, Blair was also awarded

¹¹⁴ Cited in W Wallace, ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2005, pp. 53–68.

¹¹⁵ D Keohane, ‘The United Kingdom’ in A Danchev & J MacMillan (ed), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*, Routledge, Oxon, 2005.

¹¹⁶ C Suellentrop, ‘Tony Blair: Bush’s ambassador to America’, *Slate*, 13 September 2002, <http://www.slate.com/id/2070857/>, viewed 14 June 2006.

¹¹⁷ L Hollingshead, ‘Whatever happened to Blair’s congressional gold medal?’, *The Guardian*, 20 May 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1779384,00.html>, viewed 19 June 2006.

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an Ellis Island Medal of Honor for his support of the United States after 9/11. He is the first non-American to be so honoured.¹¹⁸

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Atlanticism is a philosophy of co-operation among European and North American nations regarding political, economic, and defense issues.¹¹⁹ According to a theory of liberal hegemony from Arnold Toynbee, a British economic historian, it has provided a rationale for American engagement in the construction and maintenance of global order after 1945. Toynbee looked back to the Western international organisation established under the United States leadership. Dominant powers had established structures of custom, law and institutionalised diplomacy, which were accepted as authoritative by America's allies and partners.¹²⁰

Since the post-Cold War era, the relationship between America and Europe has begun to transform from a true friendship with a strong-shared vision and common values, into a "coalition of the willing" with many non-willing states.¹²¹ Therefore, the United Kingdom has tried to bridge the gap

¹¹⁸ 'US to award Blair for leadership', *BBC*, 16 April 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2954567.stm>, viewed 19 June 2006.

¹¹⁹ IH Daalder, 'The End of Atlanticism', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 147-166.

¹²⁰ W Wallace, 'Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas', Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace.htm>, viewed 23 June 2006.

¹²¹ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, issue 4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

between the United States and Europe. As William Wallace, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics, cited, "British foreign policy has tried to punch above its weight for the past half-century, while balancing between different sets of international allegiances".¹²² To reach this goal, successive British governments have followed the familiar strategy of seeking to persuade the United States to view the United Kingdom as its most trustworthy and effective ally and then leveraging this special status in its relations with other European countries.¹²³

Douglas T. Stuart, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, stated that it has been difficult for the United Kingdom to sustain its role as a bridge between the United Kingdom and Europe, but the British have sixty years of experience to draw upon. As he said,

On the American side, the United Kingdom appreciate that it is not enough to "play Greece to America's Rome." Washington will only accord London a special status if the British are prepared to make a substantive contribution to the solution of common problems. On the Europe side, British attempts to play the "prefect" to an American "headmaster" are always resented and often rejected by the other NATO allies. To cope with the image of being an American "Trojan

¹²² W Wallace, 'The collapse of British foreign policy', *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 1, 2005, pp. 53-68.

¹²³ DT Stuart, 'NATO and the Wider World', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 58, no.1, 2004, pp. 33-46.

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horse" London has had to demonstrate its continuing commitment to some elements of the EU campaign of "ever closer union."¹²⁴

When Blair came to office, it was obvious that he is an "Atlanticist." One of his grand strategies of foreign policy focused on how to enhance a relationship with Europe, while the United Kingdom still played a leading and self-confident role. At the same time the United Kingdom government was concerned about how to balance the relationship with the European Union (EU) while binding the special relations with the United States.¹²⁵

In his first keynote speech on foreign policy, Blair made two clear points: that he wanted the United Kingdom to (1) bridge the gap between the United States and the continent of Europe and (2) play a leading and self-confident role in Europe. As he insisted, "we must end the isolation of the last twenty years and be a leading partner in Europe."¹²⁶

Once again, Blair set out this ambition in a speech in the autumn of 1999. He alluded to Dean Acheson's famous remark some 40 years earlier, that Britain had lost an empire and failed to find a role. As Blair argued, "we have a new role...not as a superpower but as a pivotal power, as a power

¹²⁴ ibid

¹²⁵ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

¹²⁶ T Blair, *Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayo's banquet*, 10 Downing Street, 10 November 1997, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1070.asp>, viewed 19 June 2006.

that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future.”¹²⁷

Acting as a bridge across the Atlantic, Blair made good progress until Bush came to office in 2000. Since Bush became President of the United States, his foreign policy has been focused on a unilateral approach.¹²⁸ The rise of American unilateralism led to the ensuing European countries, especially France and Germany, feeding back against it. They question to the United States power, which has the ability to harm other states.¹²⁹ The losses of mutual trust and faith in the value of the partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic have been increasing. An argument in the contemporary European debate over world politics is to find ways of restraining American hegemony. Critics point out that European countries need to balance American dominance by building up European institutions as a competing center of power. For instance, the French policy has opposed a unipolar world. President Jacques Chirac of France took on the leadership of a coalition, which was designed to counterbalance American unilateralism and to put a multilateral approach as the top priority.¹³⁰ As Chirac stated,

¹²⁷ Cited in P Stephens, 'The special relationship and foreign policy: panel chairman's report', in JD McCausland & DT Stuart (ed), *U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century*, the Strategic Studies Institute, 2006, pp. 135-143.

¹²⁸ R Jervis, 'Understand the Bush Doctrine', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp. 365-388.

¹²⁹ SP Kramer, 'Blair's Britain after Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, issue 4, 2003, pp. 90-104.

¹³⁰ *ibid*

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When you look at the evolution of the world, you see that quite naturally a multipolar world is being created, whether one likes it or not. It's inevitable... That means our relations between the European Union and the United States will have to be relations of complementarity and partnership between equals. Otherwise it will be a different world, which is not what France observes and wants.¹³¹

Similarly, Dominique de Villepin, former foreign minister of France, augured that to counterbalance the hyperpower: the expansion of numerous regional poles will help to achieve international stability rather than enhancing the partnership with the United States.¹³²

Tim Dunne, the Head of the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, concluded "the theory of realism would suggest that the rational response for states in a unipolar order is to balance against the hegemon in order to check the projection of its power. An underlying assumption here is that a unipolar world is a more disorderly one. The ties that bind alliances together will also be looser in a unipolar world."¹³³

The growing imbalance of power between the United States and European countries is becoming a crisis in transatlantic relations. Americans

¹³¹ C Kovacs, 'US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 8, 2003, pp. 435-455.

¹³² T Dunne, 'When the shooting starts: Atlanticism in British Security Strategy' *International Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.

¹³³ *ibid*

and Europeans are growing apart. Robert Kagan, an American neo-conservative scholar and political commentator, pointed out “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”¹³⁴ Kagan argued, “It’s time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world”.¹³⁵

Ivo H. Daalder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, expected that the one crucial consequence of the differentiation of power is the effective end of Atlanticism. “American-European foreign policies no longer centre around the transatlantic alliance to the same overriding extent as in the past,” he said.¹³⁶

It has been suggested that it is pointless to offer advice to the American empire due to the belief that the United Kingdom government has no influence on the United States. Peter Riddell, a leading political commentator for *Times*, argued that the alliance between the British and the United States over Afghanistan has been a marriage of convenience and circumstance, not of ideological unity. He pointed out that Bush and Blair have different approaches. “The former is nationalist in origin and application, while the later is internationalist,” Riddell stated.¹³⁷ In addition, Larry Diamond, a Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Stanford University, stated that the United States has had a policy to “freeze out the

¹³⁴ R Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003, p. 3-4.

¹³⁵ Cited in PH Gordon, ‘Bridging the Atlantic Divide’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.1, 2003, pp. 70-83.

¹³⁶ IH Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 147-166.

¹³⁷ P Riddell, ‘Tony Blair Needs a Hug’, *Foreign Policy*, issue 139, 2003, pp. 90.

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Brits.”¹³⁸ The United Kingdom has also been damaged by supporting the United States in the war on terrorism resulting in the United Kingdom’s diminished influence in Europe. Therefore, it is imperative that the United Kingdom turns away from the United States and pays more attention to enhancing its relationship with Europe.¹³⁹

This tension has put the United Kingdom in a difficult situation. Bush’s neo-conservative perception has become one of the most important challenges facing Blair’s foreign affairs. Questions are raised about the heart of Blair’s strategy, which is an effort to find a new position in order to balance the relationship with the United States and that with Europe.¹⁴⁰

In an age of an American world empire, Blair disagrees with the critics’ perception of “the end of Atlanticism”. In a speech by Blair in 2006, the second in a series of three he is giving on international policy, he confirmed his support of Atlanticism, stated that there needs to be a strong alliance to tackle the world problems, especially the terrorism threats. From Blair’s point of view, the conflicts can be solved by a strong by maintaining alliance and supporting an active foreign policy of engagement not isolation. Blair realises that it is difficult to become a true friend with the United States. Moreover, he insisted that the United Kingdom would not always agree with America. However, Blair blamed the strain of anti-American feeling in parts of

¹³⁸ Cited in J Sloboda & G Rifking, *What would we want to say on global security policy to the incoming US Administration*, Oxford Research Group, Oxford, 2004.

¹³⁹ J Sloboda & G Rifking, *What would we want to say on global security policy to the incoming US administration*, Oxford Research Group, Oxford, 2004.

¹⁴⁰ IH Daalder, ‘The End of Atlanticism’, *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 147–166.

European politics and called it “madness.” Instead of being against the American hegemon, the United Kingdom has urged Europe to co-operate with the United States in order to promote the long-term interests of the world. As Blair concluded,

The danger with America today is not that they are too much involved. The danger is they decide to pull up the drawbridge and disengage. We need them involved. We want them engaged. The reality is that none of the problems that press in on us can be resolved or even contemplated without them. Our task is to ensure that with them, we do not limit the agenda to security. If our security lies in our values and our values are about justice and fairness as well as freedom from fear, then the agenda must be more than security and the alliance include more than America.¹⁴¹

After the 11th September attacks, Blair’s foreign policy has thus been guided by the hope that Britain can combine its position as America’s closest friend with one of foreign policy leadership in the EU.¹⁴² Blair instigated bilateral meetings with some European leaders and with President Bush. Blair and other heads of states and governments of the European Council attended an urgent meeting in Brussels, at which an action plan of anti-terrorism was approved. The European Foreign Secretary and other

¹⁴¹ T Blair, *Global alliance for global values speech*, 10 Downing Street, 27 March 2006, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9245.asp>, viewed 19 June 2006.

¹⁴² SP Kramer, ‘Blair’s Britain after Iraq’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 90–104.

government ministers attended special sessions of the EU Council of Ministers, at which initiatives to combat terrorism at a European level were taken.¹⁴³

While the United States, the strongest military power in the world, hesitated over whether or not to co-operate with the NATO, Blair has begun to renew the American relationship with Europe by playing a leading role in NATO. The United Kingdom, therefore, tried to encourage Europe to commit them to multilateralism to solve global problems, and particularly over the issue of global terrorism. The British government hoped that Europe's general commitment to multilateral efforts would close the policy gap between the European states and America, and influence the United States to enlarge its multilateral approach.¹⁴⁴

In the anti-terrorist campaign, the United Kingdom needs collective security, which promotes shared and sustainable responsibilities for the management terrorism threats. The United Kingdom has respect for international law and fundamental human rights at its heart. Blair insisted that only by working together would countries be able to overcome the threats they face.¹⁴⁵ The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of efforts within NATO to transform it from being a military alliance designed to defend its

¹⁴³ T Youngs, *Afghanistan: the culmination of Bonn process*, *International Affairs and Defence Section*, House of Commons Library, the United Kingdom Parliament, 26 October 2005.

¹⁴⁴ JM McCormick, 'The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations', *Politics & Policy*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006, pp. 426-450.

¹⁴⁵ T Blair, *Global alliance for global values speech*, 10 Downing Street, 27 March 2006. <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page9245.asp>, viewed 19 June 2006.

members, to one focused both on high-intensity warfighting and, increasingly, demanding post-conflict stabilisation operations. Blair persuaded NATO to tackle the root causes of terrorism 'aboard. Blair's policies focus on diplomacy, peacekeeping and nation-building efforts, economic aid, and democracy-promoting assistance.¹⁴⁶

As Blair cited, So I believe this a fight for freedom. And I want to make it a fight for justice too. Justice not only to punish the guilty, but justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom around the world... The starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of Northern Africa, to the slums of Gaza, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan: they too are our cause.¹⁴⁷

The United Kingdom has had much success in the case of the Afghanistan war. A long-term commitment to regional stability became the EU's main priority.¹⁴⁸ Eighteen countries, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Great Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey are contributing to the ISAF, the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan

¹⁴⁶ JM McCormick, 'The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations', *Politics & Policy*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006, pp. 426-450.

¹⁴⁷ Cited in IH Daalder, 'The End of Atlanticism', *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2, 2003, pp. 147-166.

¹⁴⁸ S Duke, 'CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 153-169.

sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001. France, Italy, Germany and Britain are the main contributors.¹⁴⁹

The ISAF works closely with the United Nations and the Afghan interim government. It carries three principal tasks: (1) aiding the interim government in developing national security structures; (2) assisting the country's reconstruction; and (3) assisting in developing and training future Afghan security forces.¹⁵⁰ ISAF's role has primarily been one of successful roles of Europe after 11th September 2001.¹⁵¹

Evidently, the United Kingdom tried to reconstruct the transatlantic partnership between the United States and European countries. While Blair has great faith in the value of the special relationship with the United States, he also made efforts to ensure that he does not detach himself from his partners in the European Union.

CONCLUSION

While the United States has been placed as the pre-eminent power of the world, the world is becoming increasingly interdependent. Consequently, the United Kingdom needs to find a new balance between a

¹⁴⁹ R Huang, 'Fact Sheet: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan', Center for Defense Information, 14 February 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/isaf.cfm>, viewed 21 June 2006.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*


¹⁵¹ P Rogers, *Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran Once Again*, Oxford Research Group, Oxford, 2006.

close relationship with the United States and a determination to finally become an unquestioned part of Europe. It is imperative that the United Kingdom is able to be the "bridge" between America and Europe.¹⁵²

No country is great enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone. To win the war on terrorism, the United Kingdom needs to mobilise international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges. The United Kingdom needs to ensure that the United States and European countries do not go their separate ways. The Blair government needs to convince both sides of the Atlantic that despite their differences, in the world of interdependence and global terrorism, neither Europe nor America can tackle on these issues independently. They need to work together to promote common interests around the world.¹⁵³ This will be a win-win situation all round.

¹⁵² J Dumbrell, 'Working with Allies: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror', *Politics & Policy*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2006, pp. 452-472.

¹⁵³ PH Gordon, 'Bridging the Atlantic Divide', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.1, 2003, pp. 70-83.



“...อาเซียนอาจจะไม่จำเป็นต้องเลียนแบบ
เพียงแต่นำมาเป็นตัวแบบที่นำมาศึกษา
นำส่วนที่ดีมาใช้ และคงจะไม่เหมือนยุโรป
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