



"The future is uncertain: accurately predicting events over the period 2020 to 2050 is extremely hard. There are worrying trends: nuclear proliferation continues, large nuclear arsenals remain, and some are being enlarged and modernized; and there is a potential risk from state-sponsored terrorists armed with nuclear weapons."

Prime Minister Tony Blair

ABSTRACT

การป้องปราามอาชุธนิวเคลียร์โดยสหภาพยูโรป : ความพยายามที่ไร้ผล

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บทความนิวเคลียร์ปัจจุบันมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อการประมวลประสบการณ์ทางประวัติศาสตร์ ข้อแม้ทางการเมือง ความเห็นชอบของคนในขณะนั้น ยุทธการร่วมที่สหภาพยูโรปใช้ในการจัดการกับการห้ามไม่ให้เกิดการสร้างระเบิดปรมาณูงานวิจัยนี้เป็นงานวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพที่ตระหนักถึงปัจจัยทั้งในอดีตและปัจจุบันของงานวิจัยซึ่งรูปแบบงานวิจัยเป็นการยืนยันถึงรูปแบบการป้องกันและจัดการเกี่ยวกับระบบการสร้างความรู้ความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับงานปรมาณูของสหภาพยูโรป ผลการวิเคราะห์ถูกกำหนดส่วนมากโดยการนำเสนองานวิจัยที่มีการวิจัยมาก่อนหน้านี้ นำมายังวิเคราะห์อีกรั้งหนึ่งโดยการวิเคราะห์สื่อสิ่งพิมพ์รวมถึงสื่อสิ่งพิมพ์ออนไลน์ โดยเน้นที่มีการนำเสนอเรื่องราวเกี่ยวกับความแตกต่างทางด้านวัฒนธรรมและการเมือง ที่มีผลต่อความคิดทางด้านปรมาณูของประเทศในเครือสหภาพยูโรป โดยยกເອາ 3 ประเทศในสหภาพยูโรปมาพิจารณาในงานวิจัยนี้ คือ สาธารณรัฐฝรั่งเศสและสหราชอาณาจักรได้ถูกเลือกให้เป็นวัตถุประสงค์หลักในการวิจัย เนื่องจากทั้งสองประเทศนี้เป็นประเทศที่รู้กันโดยทั่วไปว่า มีระเบิดนิวเคลียร์อยู่ และอีกประเทศคือ สาธารณรัฐสาธารณรัฐเยอรมนีก็ถูกรวมในงานวิจัยนี้ เนื่องจากว่าชาติของประเทศถูกกำหนดโดยการพัฒนาของสหภาพยูโรป นอกจากนี้ประเทศเยอรมนียังมีความสำคัญกับประวัติศาสตร์โลกในศตวรรษที่ 20 นี้เป็นอย่างมาก และมีแนวโน้มว่าจะมีอิทธิพลกับประวัติศาสตร์โลกต่อไปในอนาคตด้วย ผลการวิจัยยังแสดงให้เห็นว่า ความคิดเกี่ยวกับการจัดการด้านการบริหารระบบปรมาณูของสหภาพยูโรป ถึงแม้ว่าเทคโนโลยีและอำนาจการเงินของสหภาพยูโรปจะมีมาก แต่ก็มีได้ทำให้ในนโยบายนี้ถูกบริหารได้อย่างมีคุณภาพ

การป้องปราามอาชุนิวเคลียร์โดยสหภาพยูโรป : ความพยายามที่ไร้ผล

ความแตกต่างทางด้านลักษณะของการบริหารระบบป्रามाणของแต่ละประเทศ
ในสหภาพยูโรปมีมาก ทั้งในแง่ของความเข้าใจและการบริหารรวมถึงมุ่งมอง
และระบบการป้องกันโดยรวม โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งการใช้อาชุนิวเคลียร์
เป็นสำคัญ

European Nuclear Deterrence – an Unattainable Quest

Sandro Kunz

Introduction

The rise of the European Union (EU) as an economic world power since its foundation in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the EEC (European Economic Community) is currently being complemented by the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This potentially allows the EU to evolve from an economic world power into a truly global player on the geopolitical world stage. The amalgamation of the French and British nuclear arsenals is a logical extension of the current endeavour for a CFSP. Despite such efforts, the European Union has persisted to be an economic phenomenon, while attempts, mostly unilaterally initiated schemes, e.g. EDC, Fouchet Plan, for a truly European defence policy have failed.

The resolve of the rationale for, despite available resources, for instance financial potential, existent national military assets, and technical know-how, and political willingness, e.g. the Anglo-French declaration at the Saint-Malo summit 1988, Europe's non-performance as a global power, which incorporates not just conventional armaments but the option of a nuclear deterrence can, can very

well provide the key to solve the riddle of the present European impasse in regard of a common defence policy.

The perception and application of defence policy in general and nuclear deterrence in particular of the two European nuclear powers, France and the United Kingdom, diverge too widely to constitute the basis for a universal European nuclear deterrence. This is further complicated by electorates in many EU member states, for instance Sweden or Austria, who are strongly opposed to a nuclear element. The decisive conclusion of CFSP, a common European nuclear defence policy, the convergence and Europeanization of the ultimate hard power, has thus to remain elusive.

The Predicament of Credibility

The member states of the European Union like to perceive themselves as the promoters of political stability, economic integration, cultural diversity, democracy, and good governance, all of which are based on Judeo-Christian ethics and ideals. However, a potential adversary, e.g. Iran or North Korea, is not necessarily constraint by the same value system. As such, what is intended to be of good means, e.g. equality, social democratic values, etc, by the European Union is unlikely to be interpreted in the same fashion by societies adherent to diverse belief systems, e.g. theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, or diverse political philosophies such as the People's Republic of China. Those dissimilar perceptions obviously contract to cultural divergences. This is indubitably valid for all nations and societies and nuclear powers such as the United States,

Russia, India, or Pakistan certainly are no exception; however, the aforementioned nuclear states do not necessarily need to accommodate such levels of cultural diversity and political ethos as those cherished by the European Union.

Further still, precisely because of Europe's treasured distinctions, the absence of a common "pan-European" belief system, on which threat assessments or requirements for aegis are based, further conceivably inhibits a common European perception essential for a credible nuclear deterrent.

For a nuclear deterrent to be credible, an assured level of decisiveness needs to be projected. Such authority is best personalized by a figurehead of compelling standing such as the French or U.S. Presidency. For an effective deterrent, a solidified and resolute tenacity needs to be projected into the perception of not only latent adversaries but that of the global community in toto. Additionally, such a deterrent cannot be vague or suffer of capricious hesitancy, lest it is unintendedly, thus dangerously, interpreted by both allies and foes alike. However, given the hitherto rather uncoordinated foreign policy pursued by the European Union, little potential for a coordinated, thus credible, carriage in foreign relations in general and a common defence policy in particular is apparent. All in all, a successful nuclear deterrent demands a decisive, credible, cohesive, and intrepid leadership, of which the European Union has shown very little since its inception by means of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.

The French view on Nuclear Deterrence

France's nuclear deterrence policy is designed to attain dissuasion and thus assure the sovereignty of the French territory. The concept of the French deterrence is a concept of "no-war", as such that any entity which attempts to threaten France's independence needs to be brought aware that the risk of an attack on France outweighs any possible gain. The French deterrent employs the concept of a "minimal dissuasion", as thus it has never been in France's interest to match either the American or Soviet arsenals, but to be independently able to inflict enough damage on an aggressor as not to be pulled into hostilities. In French strategy, two possible scenarios prevail:

- a) The threat of the attack will be large-scale, and thus the adversary needs to be credibly persuaded that a nuclear counter-attack would be resultant, and thereby the aggressor would be deterred.
- b) The threat of the attack will be small-scale, and the use of nuclear weapons, e.g. limited nuclear warfare would not be justifiable.¹

As thus, the French leadership, and along with it many political parties and a considerable part of the population in France,

¹ Boniface, 'French Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War'. La documentation Française, no. 4, 2nd semester in: The Atlantic Council of the United States, August 1998, <http://www.acus.org/docs/9808-French_Nuclear_Weapons_Policy_After_Cold_War.pdf>, accessed 27 February 2010, p. 18.

do not perceive the nuclear arsenal as an asset of war, but as a means to preclude war, e.g. 'non-guerre'

France's stance must definitely also be appreciated in historic terms. French territory was invaded no less than three times within a period of only 75 years, e.g. Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the Western Front during World War I (1914-1918), and the German occupation of France (1940-1944). It is evident that the French leadership after the end of hostilities perceived the nation's frontiers as vulnerable, especially in consideration that the new Soviet threat was located barely 200 kilometres east of the Rhine River in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany. The French leadership, especially during General de Gaulle's presidency, was also painfully aware that the results of both World Wars were majorly due to the involvement foreign powers, e.g. the United Kingdom to a lesser and the United States of America to a larger extend. Additionally, the once prided French colonial empire, e.g. Algeria and Indochina, was crumbling away as a direct result of the hostilities which ended in 1945. "La Grande Nation" was free, but not so grand anymore. The sanctuary of the French territory, moreover the notion of French autonomy, could not be further compromised. The presence of American air bases and troops on French soil certainly did not help to alleviate the notion of injured confidence and continued dependence on foreign powers for the nation's security. Additionally, two occurrences convinced the leadership of the 5th Republic for France to embark on a path of independence and unilateral deterrence. Firstly, the confounded ramifications of the First Indochina War between France and the Viet Minh communist

revolutionaries in 1954, when France saw herself abandoned by both the United States of America as well as the United Kingdom in her battle at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam.² Secondly, the refusal of the Eisenhower administration to support the Franco-British attempt to regain control over the Suez Canal in 1956, e.g. the resultant

² Albeit extensive logistical help, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to assist Paris unilaterally, especially with ground troops, as renewed direct confrontation with China, which supported the North-Vietnamese rebels, as to avoid a repetition the events of the Korean War just a few months earlier. Furthermore, the American and French interests in Vietnam diverged largely: the U.S. administration was intend to preclude a “domino” effect, where one country after another was feared to “tumble over” into communist control; as such an establishment of a Western oriented regime in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the French forces was envisaged. The French, on the other hand, saw the conflict in Indochina as a “colonial” conflict, and were perceived unlikely to depart after a long and costly war. The British were opposed against military action prior to peace talks which were to be held at the Geneva Conference in May and July 1954, as the UK government under Prime Minister Anthony Eden felt that the long-term security in Southeast Asia would be better served by diplomatic means than by short-term military actions. As the Eisenhower administration felt that only a collective action by France, USA, and the UK can effectively deter increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, Washington decided not to intervene in the crucial battle at Dien Bien Phu, which resulted not only in the French defeat in the First Indochina War, but marked the final stage of the fall of the French colonial empire in places such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Pentagon Papers, U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954. Gravel Edition, Volume 1, Chapter 2, Beacon Press, A1971,

<<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent6.htm>>, accessed 14 March 2010.

political bungle for the two European U.S. allies, certainly further convinced the French leadership under de Gaulle to attain autonomy in her defence.³ As thus, the French strive for an *independent* nuclear deterrent must be assessed from the perspective of the historic French trauma and puts the French nuclear policy into a unique perspective.

What is especially noteworthy is the political unity in respect to the French nuclear deterrent. All three major political parties, the far-right Gaullist RPR; the centre-right UDF; and the socialist PS support the notion of the French dissuasion. The Socialist Party originally hedged opposition to nuclear testing in the Pacific, which the party leadership believed to threaten the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but not to the concept of dissuasion. The nuclear

³ The Eisenhower administration found itself in a dilemma. A joint American-French-British intervention on Israel's side certainly would have consolidated the Western alliance against any future aggressors; however, the Suez Canal was of no economic significance to Washington but much more so for the Europeans, e.g. the shipping routes for oil tankers from the Middle East to Europe. The Eisenhower administration decided that the risk of American military intervention, e.g. the support of imperialist, or colonist, interests of both France and Britain would drive many an Arab leader into Nasser's arm. Furthermore, the potential of conflict with the Soviet Union, which supported Nasser's Egypt, had the Eisenhower administration to believe that the acceptance of Egyptian nationalization of the Suez zone to be the preferable option. McDermott, 'Risk-Taking in International Politics – Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy', The University of Michigan Press, 2004, <<http://books.google.com/books/umichpress?id=MOBdwHpRvC0C&pg=PA135&dq=The+1956+Suez+Crisis&ei=gkGfS--4F4OMkASjxPjiCQ&cd=1#v=onepage&q=The%201956%20Suez%20Crisis&f=false>>, accessed 16 March 2010

deterrence was consequentially not relinquished during the presidency of the socialist François Mitterrand (1981-1995), Furthermore, the objections of the PS were completely diminished with the termination of French nuclear testing in 1996,

Alain Juppé (RPR), the then incumbent French minister of foreign affairs, suggested a pan-European application of the French nuclear deterrent in January 1995: “After developing a joint doctrine between France and the United Kingdom, should our generation fear the prospect, not of a shared deterrent, but at least discussing the issue of dissuasion with our main partners? Might not adopting a single currency and a new Franco-German contract alter France’s perception of its vital interests?”⁴

However the debate over an extended, Europeanized, nuclear doctrine was effectively terminated by the lifting of the moratorium on nuclear tests in 1995 followed by several test “shots” on the Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. Although French leaders attempted to justify the resumed nuclear tests as not only beneficial for France but constructive for the European security, not only did the testing come under harsh international criticism but also the concept of an extended nuclear deterrent in particular and nuclear weapons in general. Paris had severely miscalculated the levels of sensitivity towards nuclear weapons in Europe. What the French leadership perceived as major concession and progress, e.g. the potential for an extended, thus European, deterrent, was

⁴ Juppé, ‘Quel horizon pour la politique étrangère de la France?’ in Pascal Boniface, French Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War, p. 9

effectively of no interest to most of France's partner countries, especially in Germany. Furthermore, many in Europe expressed their dislike of being "nuclearized" against their will and were additionally suspicious that a French offer of a European nuclear deterrent would involve considerable financial implications for France's partners in Europe.

The French leadership sees the nuclear deterrent as a necessity to assure the country's security and independence and as a mean to avoid confrontation, whether conventional or nuclear, in Europe; whereas most in Europe see it at most as an unnecessary provocation towards Moscow. Moreover, the sentiments in other EU member countries, such as Austria and Sweden, are strongly anti-nuclear, regardless whether nuclear technology is applied for civilian or military purposes, and any proposal of nuclear deterrence is bound to encounter harsh criticism.

The domestic public acceptance of the French nuclear weapons policy can potentially be related to its symbolic value as a totem of national modernization and international prestige in a broader sense. Ideologically motivated high levels of support of the national defence policy in recurrent opinion polls are further epitomized by the continued public tolerance towards high defence budgets and remarkably low levels of draft evasion. Secondly, the theory of nuclear pacifism, which relates to the concept of an eternal state of "non-war" which is assured by a nuclear deterrent, rendered the French public so assured by their nation's nuclear umbrella as to deem the possibility of aggression towards French

territory as negligible. Furthermore, the deliberate ambiguities of the French nuclear doctrine led many of the public to imagine that if an international armed crisis in Europe were to occur, France, exactly because of her own nuclear potential, to have the capacity to abandon all her alleys and withdraw into her own national “réduit” (fortified defence)⁵. As such, French “nuclear pacifism” is comparable to the idea of the Swiss armed neutrality. The support of the French public for nuclear deterrence was further propagated by the fantasy of French citizens to be spared the horrors of war, at least within the borders of their motherland. Moreover, such a concept of self-reliance led the French public understand itself to be distant from the U.S. political leadership and the correlated debates on security policy, thus public French opinion was not affected by the American concept of a “limited” nuclear confrontation, which was significantly responsible for major anxieties in other Western European countries. A further divergence of French and German views is also apparent: France has been lucky in the 20th century, as she was spared the material destruction and political occupation as suffered twice by Germany. However, the lasting trauma was not to have lost sovereignty, but to have France’s status of “*la grande nation*” tarnished twice in the 20th century.

In the past, France saw her nuclear deterrent as a purely national issue, which cannot be shared, as stated in the 1972

⁵ Mason, ‘Mitterrand the Socialist and French Nuclear Policy’, in Le Prestre ‘French security policy in a disarming World – Domestic challenges and international constraints’, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.

White Paper on defence. Although France did not subscribe to the American notion of a European-scale nuclear deterrent as proffered by NATO, France did not wish to propose a less potential substitute. As such France sees her nuclear deterrent neither in contradiction nor in competition to NATO's nuclear umbrella over Europe, but rather as a compliment. Hence, the French see their nuclear deterrent specifically designed to protect France's sovereignty and her vital interests within the Western alliance. Paris understands the nuclear deterrent as an asset to the Western alliance in general and to European security in particular, where France can assure for her own security, albeit France's stance towards NATO and her determination to maintain an independent policy of not just nuclear deterrence, but defence in general.

Due to their aforementioned interpretation of the nuclear deterrent, French leaders however progressively encountered a dilemma during the 1990s. The French dissemination of European Unity, especially in regard to the Franco-German relationship, which increasingly appeared to be in contradiction to the French definition of nuclear dissuasion as a policy of purely national interest. Although the French white paper on defence from 1972 reiterated the purpose of the French deterrent as of vital national interests, Paris appeared convinced that Europeans benefit from the French strategy as the limits of French interests are vaguely defined, e.g. a potential adversary of Europe is also a likely adversary of France, and is hence deterred effectively. The French Army Chief of Staff, General Mery went in 1976 so far as to speak of a "broadened territory" which

caused considerable uproar, and the subject was quickly dropped. Conversely, the then incumbent president Mitterrand stated in 1984 that France cannot accept responsibility for the security for the whole of Europe. The defence white paper of 1994 further clearly stated: “A European nuclear doctrine and European nuclear deterrent will only be achievable when there will be vital European interests, considered as such by the Europeans and understood as such by others. Until then, France does not intend to dilute its national defence resources in such a field under any pretext.”⁶

The notion of “minimal dissuasion”, e.g. the possession of nuclear weapons in numbers small enough to discourage any potential attacker, but to exclude nuclear warfare, was originally determined by budgetary restraints, but has since mutated into a political and diplomatic necessity. However, the French leadership understands that too many nuclear weapons would devoid their rationale as *“trop des nucléaires tue le nucléaire”* - too many nuclear weapons kill them altogether.

Furthermore, the independency of the French nuclear arsenal of NATO allowed France not only to dissuade the Soviet threat during the years of the Cold War but also enabled a foreign policy as to peruse a relationship with Moscow which was distinctly singular in comparison to other West European nations. Without debilitations of the Western solidarity, France felt neither restricted nor inhibited in her relations to either superpower. Furthermore, France’s policy of minimal deterrence did not compel the perusal

⁶ Boniface, ‘French Nuclear Weapons Policy After the Cold War’, p. 9.

of extensive conventional and nuclear arsenals such as those of the two superpowers but allowed France the status of a nuclear power.

The British Rationale for a Nuclear Deterrent

The rationale for the British perseverance of a nuclear deterrent has been consistent, albeit the disappearance of the Cold War threats. In stark contrast to the French perception of nuclear deterrence, no national prestige or benefits to the nation's status are associated with the nuclear deterrent in Britain. Conversely, the UK's nuclear policy is regarded as Britain's contribution to NATO's strategy.

The British fundamental principle for its small nuclear deterrent is the concept of "multiple decision centres" from which the North Atlantic Alliance would gain strength. This concept has been consistently adhered to since the 1960s by governments of both parties, Conservatives and Labour, and endured the drastic changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. The British view is that, while Her Majesty's government has complete confidence in the U.S. security guarantees, potential adversaries might do less so. A second centre of nuclear decision making within NATO, especially one geographically closer to a probable conflict, would further convince an adversary of the alliance's determination of deterrence. The official British view is that an antagonist might be prepared to speculate on the American deterrent, especially in regard to issues which might be perceived of lesser relevance to Washington, but would refrain to do so if confronted with the dual determination of

both an American and a British deterrent. The British Secretary of Defence under Margaret Thatcher stated in 1981: “.... that I would feel more than a touch of discomfort if France, with her clear policy of non-commitment to Alliance strategy, were the only West European nuclear power.” This perception, whilst not a reprimand for the then French absence of dedication to NATO, reflects the British notion that a credible Western nuclear deterrent is not sustainable by a single national entity, lest the perception of the deterrent of the dissuaded party were to falter; thus the British perspective of a credible nuclear deterrent is based on the principle of perspective of the deterred party rather than that of the architect of the deterrent.⁷ As such, a credible nuclear deterrent as perceived by the United Kingdom needs to be multilateral in nature rather than national such as the French policy of deterrence.

Despite the official declaration that the British deterrent served no nationalistic ideals and is to be seen as closely linked to the UK’s allies, e.g. NATO, much debate on the British deterrent was linked to its true state of “independence”. The possibility of employment of British nuclear forces needs to be recognized in the context of an European crisis, e.g. an aggression of the Soviet Union during the Cold War or Russia in the predictable future, but the British leadership, irrelevant of the political spectrum, attempted to argue that the British nuclear deterrent was not designed to substitute the nuclear potential of the United States. The British deterrent is

⁷ Jervis R. ‘Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, an International Security Reader’, Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 59-83

consequently perceived as an additional impetus to a combined US/UK strategy for the nuclear forces; as such the British nuclear deterrent is an extension, the European branch, of NATO, which is able to operate independently under British control, but not detached from the Western alliance.

The most reputable contention is that the British deterrent is rendered irrelevant by the presence of the American deterrent. Such a perception was a cause for predicaments for the Labour Party in the 1980s, as opposition to U.S. bases in the UK would have endorsed a justification for the British nuclear forces, lest Labour would have been perceived in denial of any protection against a threat from the Warsaw Pact. However, that was exactly what the Labour Party conveyed in the 1987 election campaign. Labour opposed the nuclear umbrella, whether offensive in form of the American nuclear forces based in the UK or the defensive version in the form of the British nuclear deterrent. The overwhelming victory of the conservatives and the Labour's subsequent extensive confinement into opposition unquestionably brought about a transformation in the Labour Party manifesto.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the rationalization for a British deterrent became more intricate, as any immediate threats appeared to have disappeared. Nonetheless, Britain retained the Cold War validation of "second centre of decision-making" for her nuclear deterrent. The British Secretary of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind (Conservative), warned of: "...any tendency towards thinking that there could be a major conflict in Europe in which the question of nuclear use arose which did not involve the vital interests of the

allies, including the U.S". However, the successive British leaderships envisaged circumstances where Washington's commitment might be doubtful, and thus the United States could prove either unwilling or unable to intervene. Although the nature of such a potential situation is indistinct, the occurrences of 1956 can be taken as precedence. As such, the British nuclear deterrent needs, in addition to its affiliation to NATO and the U.S. American nuclear strategy, to be understood as an "insurance policy".

Prime Minister Tony Blair stated:

"The future is uncertain: accurately predicting events over the period 2020 to 2050 is extremely hard. There are worrying trends: nuclear proliferation continues, large nuclear arsenals remain, and some are being enlarged and modernized; and there is a potential risk from state-sponsored terrorists armed with nuclear weapons."

The notion of a foundation of security on French and British capacities is assumed to lack the element of credibility in comparison to the American security guarantee. For Britain, the French security policy, which is based on nationalist notions and on the concept of a national sanctuary, as well as the discrepancy in the balance of forces in comparison to those of the United States, and the considerations of potent threats such as of a re-emerging Russia, impedes cooperation with France on the issue of nuclear deterrence.⁸

⁸ Freedman, 'British Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament, France and the United Kingdom', Stimson – Pragmatic Steps for Global Security, Nuclear Security Series, 2009, <<http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/british-nuclear-policy/PDFs/>

The British not only view the nuclear deterrent in context with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but furthermore as insurance in conditions where Britain would deem herself detached from her alliance partners and the support of other nuclear allies, e.g. the United States and France, might not be forthcoming in uncertain future developments.

Furthermore, the official position of five principles as to define the British methodology of the nuclear deterrent further eliminates the possibility of a combined Franco-Anglo nuclear deterrent:

1. Deterrence: The nuclear arsenal is designed to deter an attack and as such is not considered as a military asset, but to nuclear prevent intimidation by adversaries. The British nuclear arsenal is only to be applied when threats against Britain's vital interest cannot be countered by other means.
2. Limited Deterrence: The UK government is to maintain only the minimum amount of nuclear weapons needed to maintain the objective of deterrence.
3. Deliberate ambiguity: The UK does not to divulge the circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons is considered, nor does the Royal Government disclose the severity of a potential employment of the nuclear arsenal. Consequently, the first use of nuclear weapons by Britain is not ruled out.

Nuclear_Security_FINAL_Complete_PDF[1].pdf>, accessed 15 March 2010, pp. 23-56.

4. Collective security through NATO: The UK nuclear deterrent is seen as a contribution to NATO for the North-Atlantic area
5. Independent decision centre: The British government maintains the perception that an independent decision centre within the North-Atlantic coalition contributes to the overall credibility, and thus effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent of NATO.⁹

The third point, which does not preclude the first use of nuclear weapons, appears to be of especial relevance. As such, the British nuclear weapons can potentially be used as a pre-emptive asset rather than a purely preventive instrument.

The British concept of nuclear deterrence thus significantly diverges from the French model as such as a) the British nuclear weapons are an implicit part of the North-Atlantic alliance, e.g. NATO, and b) the British nuclear weapons could potentially be applied for a first strike under the postulation of deliberate ambiguity. This differs vastly from the French conception of nuclear deterrence, where the use of nuclear weapons is contemplated as justifiable by the notion of the preservation a national sanctuary which is to be shielded by an utterly sovereign, thus isolated, nuclear strategy.

⁹ U.K. Secretary of State of Defence, 'The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent', Cmnd (Command paper) 6994, 2006, http://www.mod.uk/nr/rdonlyres/ac00dd79-76d6-4fe3-91a1-6a56b-03c092f0/defencewhitepaper2006_cm6994.pdf, accessed 22 March 2010, pp. 17-19.

The German Reluctance

The trauma of the consequences of the brutal and disastrous military follies of the Nazi Regime still was very much felt in a divided Germany with reconstruction of destroyed cities, towns and industrial infrastructure hardly accomplished in the 1950s. These horrors of a war recently lost collided bluntly with the new harsh realities and the daunting tensions of the Cold War such as the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) and the Berlin Crisis of 1961, which cumulated in the erection of the Berlin Wall.

The debate on defence policy in general and the necessity of a nuclear deterrent in such a tense geo-political environment initiated a fierce public debate which was to endure for four decades in West Germany. For obvious reasons, such discussions were not known to take place publicly in East Germany, which was to remain under the Soviet sphere of influence.

A nuclearization of Germany was vehemently opposed by scientific and religious groups within the West Germany. Those groups found themselves in an unlikely alliance with the centre-left German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which caused the conservative-liberal Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU/CSU alliance) to retract its stance on a nuclear armament of the West German troops. The CDU/SCU electoral victories of 1957 however renewed the discussions of a German nuclear arsenal. Such concepts were passionately contested by the emerging German peace movement, which was led by the nuclear-physics community, churches, and diverse dedicated antinuclear organizations.

In addition to the apprehension of a nuclear holocaust in Germany as a result of an armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, the opposition to German armed forces equipped with weapons of mass destruction was, although marginally, based on the fear that the such an equipped German military could hedge aspirations which do not conform to the democratic rules laid out in the West-German constitution. The advocates of a nuclear armed German military by contrast were alarmed by the prospect of a German political landscape destabilized by factions of extreme social forces, which had the potential to recreate the conditions which had spelled the end of the Weimar Republic and had given raise to the National Socialist regime some 35 years earlier. Such anxieties on both side of the then political divide in Germany are proof of the inherent trepidations present in Germany at the time in regard to a potential nuclear armament of the newly established German military. Additionally, the deliberations of a German nuclear option where more and more replaced by general reflections on the overall strategy on NATO planning and the deployment of the alliance's assets in Europe.

The reasons for the fierce public opposition to the U.S./NATO deployment of additional and upgraded sub-strategic nuclear delivery systems in the 1980s are best explained by the "not with us" attitude of the German populace. *Deutschland's* population is in a state of rejection to accept foreign policy from the perspective of defence. The German relationship with the past is very much unlike the French rapport with history. François Mitterrand's statement that "France does not confuse pacifism as a postulate

with peace as a result" is starkly inspired of the events of 1938 when both France and Britain capitulated in face of Nazi Germany's demands because of their weakness. As such, in popular French view, security, stability and thus peace necessitate strength, both in the diplomatic as well as the military sphere. The German view of history in contrast, is shaped by the start of World War II in 1939 and the resultant catastrophe, the utter destruction and humiliation of the German nation in 1945. Many Germans equal pacifism as the absence of military strength, because military prowess is seen responsible for Germany's anguish in both 1918 and 1945. Whereas in France, the term "nuclear" has a largely positive connotation, in particular as it allows la grande nation to preserve her national independence in both the energy as well as the military sector; conversely, the both the strategic and the civilian use of nuclear power in Germany remains poisoned by the totally negative impact of Germany's military history in the 20th century. Demonstrations, as the witnessed by during the anti-nuclear rallies in Germany, have two potential roots: either a total rejections of the established public system or a manifestation of democracy, where the population can freely and openly express their opposition. These two forces were combined in the German peace protests and marches, mainly because the large majority parties, e.g. SPD, CDU/CSU, as well as FDP, were unable to offer a perspective for the concerns of the German population. As such, a clear cleavage between the German political scene and the German population was evident in regard to the deployment of NATO nuclear delivery systems. Consequently, any notion of either a European or a purely

German strategy of nuclear deterrence would be condemned to failure.¹⁰

Indigenous European Nuclear Deterrence Impeded

A successful strategy of nuclear deterrence needs to be perceived as credible, explicit, and resolute. Given the multitude of divergent perceptions moulded by the dissimilar cultural, economical, political, and sociological dimensions of the 27 member states of the European Union, it appears unlikely that a common set of values and perception can be agreed upon, lest be projected into a nuclear deterrent of a potential adversary .

The study of the historical circumstances of the French Republic, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany reveals the origins of ideological diversities existent in the EU's three most significant member states. While both the French and the British notion of nuclear deterrence are based on the concept of national defence by a minimal nuclear deterrent, the justifications are dissimilar: France's deterrent policy is shaped by the aspiration of national self-reliance supported by indigenous technology of both the warheads and their delivery systems, whereas the British deterrent is embedded as a "secondary decision

¹⁰ Grosser, 'This Crisis is the Most Serious One of All, The Peace Movement and German Foreign Policy', volume 9, Two Germanys, 1961-1989, German History in Documents and Images, <<http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Chapter12Doc10.pdf>>, accessed 15 March 2010.

making centre” in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supported by U.S. technology, e.g. warhead design and the Trident delivery system. Although both the French as well as the British nuclear ambiguity denote that the intended targets remain to be covert; only the latter does not exclude a first strike option. As the French deterrent is defined as a guarantee of a state of “non-war”, the British deterrent is regarded as an “insurance policy” in a conflict that does not preclude limited warfare.

However, most importantly, the French and the British conception of nuclear deterrence are shaped by three dimensions: a) their former status of colonial powers b) the awareness of the decisiveness of their military resolve that helped to bring about the defeat of Nazism, which ultimately lead to c) the general public and political acceptance for the perceived necessity for a national nuclear deterrent. These three dimensions are not merely absent in Germany, yet reversed as a) Germany’s attempts as a colonial power overseas were paltry and consequently replaced by the

- theory of “Lebensraum”, e.g. “living space” which lead to the eastward expansion on the European continent, which ultimately resulted in b) not only the annihilation of Germany at the end of World War II, but also the distress of segregation into two adverse states for four decades, which lead to c) a public and largely political opposition to the concept of militarism in general and nuclear weaponry in general. As thus, the suggestion of a common European defence strategy, lest a universal European nuclear deterrent, is doomed for rejection.

การป้องปราบอาชุนิวเคลียร์โดยสหภาพยุโรป : ความพยายามที่ไร้ผล

The European integration has not progressed sufficiently as to allow for an independent, but unified European nuclear umbrella, which renders the European nations with the choice of two options. Firstly, adaptations of an exclusively national nuclear deterrent, e.g. "*la force de frappe*", which is prone to exacerbate nuclear proliferation and thus eventually endanger the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to which all EU member states have acceded. Conversely, the second alternative is to abide to the agreements set forth by NATO, and thus to remain reliant on the alliance's sustained commitment to the strategic defence of Europe.