

The idea of ‘new regionalism’, highly influenced by social constructivist views, becomes workable mode in this region, which replaced the overriding Eurocentrist concepts, namely international relations based neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism.

ABSTRACT

Does ASEAN-ization exist? Assessing Social Constructivist Process through Europeanization

Natthanan Kunnamas

บทคัดย่อ

ในอดีตทฤษฎีและกรอบความคิดในการศึกษาการบูรณาการของสหภาพยุโรปมักถูกหยิบยกมาถกเถียงว่า สามารถใช้อธิบายปรากฏการณ์ภูมิภาคนิยมใหม่ (new regionalism) หรือภูมิภาคากิวัตน์ (regionalization) ในบริเวณนอกยุโรปได้หรือไม่ โดยเฉพาะทฤษฎีการกิจนิยมใหม่ (neo-functionalism) ที่เน้นภารกิจเฉพาะและการถ่ายโอนอำนาจเหนือรัฐไปยังองค์กรกลาง หรือแนวคิดชั่วคราวข้ามอย่างกรอบความคิดว่าด้วยการบูรณาการเป็นเพียงแต่ความร่วมมือระหว่างรัฐบาลสมาชิก (inter-governmentalism) เพียงเท่านั้น งานชิ้นนี้จึงทดลองใช้กรอบความคิดว่าด้วยยุโรปากิวัตน์ (Europeanization) ซึ่งใช้ในการอธิบายสหภาพยุโรปในยุคหลัง เมื่อภารกิจของสหภาพยุโรปเกี่ยวข้องกับภาคประชาสังคม ภายใต้คุณค่าแบบมนุษยนิยมมากขึ้น ที่ไปพ้นจากมหทฤษฎี (grand theories) เดิม อย่างสองกรอบความคิดข้างต้น มาอธิบายสิ่งที่ปรากฏใกล้ตัว หรือกระบวนการอาเซียนากิวัตน์ว่ามีมากน้อยเพียงใดในแต่ละทิศทาง ในสมาคมประชาชาติเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้หรืออาเซียน ซึ่งมีปัจจัยทางประวัติศาสตร์ ที่มา เหตุผลในการจัดตั้ง และโครงสร้างการบริหารที่แตกต่างจากสหภาพยุโรป แต่คุณค่า ปทัสถานที่สำคัญในอาเซียนหรือภูมิภาคอาเซียน นำมาสู่การหาคำตอบในสามทิศทางที่ว่า กลไกและปทัสถานของอาเซียน ได้ถูกบงการ (top-down) ลงไปภายในระดับรัฐมากน้อยเพียงใด มีรัฐใดที่ผลักดัน (bottom-up) ผลประโยชน์แห่งชาติตนขึ้นไปเป็นนโยบายร่วมกันของอาเซียน และสุดท้ายความเป็นศูนย์กลางของอาเซียน (ASEAN centrality) ได้สร้างแรงบันดาลใจในโครงการอื่นในภูมิภาคหรือนอกภูมิภาค (side-way) อย่างไรบ้าง

Does ASEAN-ization exist? Assessing Social Constructivist Process through Europeanization

*Natthanan Kunnamas*¹

Introduction

Regionalisms, regionalization and regional organizations in Asia are highly vibrant seconded to the European one, ranging from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and East Asia Summit (EAS). Moreover, the idea of ‘new regionalism’, highly influenced by social constructivist views, becomes workable mode in this region, which replaced the overriding Eurocentrist concepts, namely international relations based neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism. Regionalisms in Asia could be ad hoc, bottom up and informal networks and even driven by the concerns of the weaker actors, particularly ASEAN which works its way towards the ‘regional common’ in the ASEAN Community. Besides, there is also the buildings of the regions or ‘regionalization’ process, not a geographic given but ideationally constructed to achieve synergetic development outcomes in East Asia. Examples of “region”

¹ Jean Monnet Chair, and Director of Interdisciplinary Department of European Studies, Chulalongkorn University

construction within ASEAN are Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), and Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS).

New regionalism and social constructivism have, thus, been very useful to understand dynamics in this region. Moreover, as far as ASEAN centrality, identities, and norms are concerned, a Europe based social constructivist perspective, or ‘Europeanization’ could be advantageous in substantiating bottom up and top down processes of ASEAN activities. Besides, the side way process beyond ASEAN territories proposed in this paper will be also examined. Thus, this paper attempts to answer three relevant questions. Firstly, to what extent have the ASEAN mechanisms, ways of practice and norms established or ‘top downed’ in member state levels? In the meantime, an inertia from new and less prosperous member states will be assessed. Secondly, to what extent could individual member state ‘bottom up’ or exert their presence and priority to be those of the ‘Common’? Are there actually Thailand-ization, Malaysia-ization, Indonesia-ization? Thirdly how has ASEAN-ization sided way and shaped regionalism in other geographical areas, such as regional financial stability mechanisms and ideationally constructed regionalizations?

Europeanization and social constructivist process

Europeanization is the latest key theme of studying the European Union (EU) after integration theories and alternative

theories of policy studies². Europeanization is associated with the idea of social constructivism proposed by Alexander Wendt³, saying that states' identities and interests are in important parts constructed by social factors and rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. Wendt nicely puts it;⁴

“Agents (state actors) do not exist independently of the structures around them, but at the same time those structures

² Theoretical developments and the changing paradigms regarding the study of the European Union affairs can be classified into three periods. First, international relations-based integration theories dominated by the competing approaches of Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism/Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The former neatly explained the events during 1950s until 1970s. Subsequent events, particularly General Charles De Gaulle national extremist acts thwarting European integration, led to its demise and gave rise to the latter in the mid 1960s and later in 1990s. Second, alternative theories of policy studies based on political science and public administration theories i.e. new institutionalism, policy networks, multi-level governance, regulatory state and supranational governance. The academic focus began to understand the EU as ‘a dynamic political system’ due to the EU policy impacts on the member states after the establishment of the Single market during 1990s. And thirdly, Europeanization, a recently emerged approach in the studies of the EU.; see Natthanan Kunnamas. (2012). ‘Theories of the European Union studies: From integration theories, alternative policy studies of the EU to Europeanization’, *Journal of Social Science*.

³ Alexander Wendt. (1999). *Social theory of international Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

⁴ Wendt has also pointed out that states are principal units of analysis for international political theory. The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material.

do not exist independently of their reproduction (and possible transformation) by the agents. Hence the importance of paying attention to this co-constitution of agents and structures, which means refusing to overlook the way in which states interpret the meaning of what they do in favour of some underlying structural dynamic.”⁵

Constructivism seems so effective and innovative in explaining international relations circumstances, opposing to the one-size-fits-all theories of rationalism. Thus, it was later adopted in the realm of European integration study by Simon Bulmer. In his writing, Bulmer has illustrated the affiliation between the EU and its member states. In this regard, there are many definitions for the term Europeanization. The first generation of Europeanization would emphasize on institutional development at the European level and its influences on national and sub-national systems. In this case, Europeanization implies 1) development of institutions of governance at the European level; 2) central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance; 3) A process whereby domestic politics becomes increasingly subject to European policy-making⁶; 4) a process of domestic change deriving from the EU⁷; 5) A political project aiming at unifying a politically stronger Europe; 6) EU as an

⁵ Martin Griffiths. (2009). *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (New York: Routledge), 155

⁶ Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne. (2000) “The Member States of the European Union” (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.49-50

⁷ Ian Bache and Stephen George. (2006). *Politics in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p.60

increasingly important reference point for political activities of domestic actors⁸. However, the Europeanization concept argues that the EU's effect on domestic institutions have not been uniform and that their differential impact can be explained in terms of structure of domestic polities, elite and public attitudes towards integration. These factors present quite different opportunities and constraints, and mediate the Union's impact differently.

The second generation of Europeanization or "ideational Europeanization" put emphasis on the effects on ideas, discourse and identities apart from the political and administrative structures and policy content. For example, how the motivations and values of political actors are shaped by the institutional context in which they operate; or how the ideas held by political actors shape what they perceive their interests to be. In this category, scholars are more interested in the mechanisms for domestic change or adaptation called "framing", in which European actors can behave as "ideational entrepreneur" trying to alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic factor by disseminating new ideas and concepts⁹. Moreover, Europeanization could be in which this paper

⁸ Ian Bache and Stephen George. (2006). *Politics in the European Union* (Oxford: Oxford University Press),p. 63-65

⁹ Mechanisms for domestic change or adaptation are implemented through 1) "coercion" in which the EU positively prescribes or imposes a model which the member states have to comply i.e. the European monetary integration that requires the member states to meet certain macro-economic criteria; 2) "imitation and normative pressure" in which member states emulate a model recommended by the EU to avoid uncertainty or that has been successfully implemented by other states; 3) "competitive selection or

called “side way” when there was an exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. Eastward enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy are great examples of this dimension.

Europeanization concept is therefore omnidirectional. A “top down” process of domestic change deriving from the EU emphasizes that member states’ behaviours are changed through the engagement with the EU system. How EU has affected the member states and to what extent it has changed their domestic institutions corresponds mostly to the first generation of Europeanization explained above. A “bottom-up” dimension implies the role of member states in the EU institution-building process. Member states are not merely passive receivers of the EU demands for domestic change. Particular member states may proactively shape European policies, institutions, and processes to which they have to adapt later. In other words, the EU is not exogenous to national political system. They have a considerable impact on the operations of the EU institutions. The last direction is called in this paper as “side way” in which EU forms of political organization and governance goes beyond the European territory, shaping the regionalism in

regulatory competition” while the EU neither imposes nor recommends a model, member states compete for the most efficient domestic arrangements in order to avoid comparative disadvantages; 4) “framing” in which European actors can behave as “ideational entrepreneur” trying to alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic factor by disseminating new ideas and concepts. See Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne. (2000) “The Member States of the European Union” (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 57

other areas such as in the case of ASEAN Charter in the areas of human rights and the pillarization of ASEAN Community inspired by those of Europe.

Outcomes, scopes or degrees of change from this social constructivist process, are varied from “inertia” or an absence of change, “retrenchment” or resistance to change, “absorption” or limited change, “accommodation” or adaptation without changing core structures and values, to “transformation” in which member states replace existing policies, processes and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their core structures and values are fundamentally changed¹⁰.

¹⁰ The outcomes, scopes or degrees of change through Europeanization, are varied from these following; 1) “inertia” or an absence of change. Member states resist the adaptations necessary to meet up with the EU requirements which can lead to increasing pressure for adaptation from the regional organization; 2) “retrenchment” or resistance to change may have the paradoxical effect of increasing misfits between the regional and domestic levels. The governments may adopt the negative change; 3) “absorption” or Member states incorporate the organization’s demands but the change is quite limited. The change does not substantially modify existing structures and political behaviors; 4) “accommodation” in which member states accommodate organization pressure by adapting existing structure processes, policies and institutions in their periphery without changing core features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them; 5) “transformation” in which member states replace existing policies, processes and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their core features and/or the underlying collective understanding are fundamentally changed affecting the core of system-wide political, economic and social structures. See Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne. (2000)

In applying Europeanization concept to the case of ASEAN regionalism this paper will assess the process in in three dimensions; namely top down, bottom up and side way. And the following sections will assess the degree of ASEAN-ization through the use of Europeanization in these three dimensions. Although ASEAN member states are not embedded in a system of shared decision-making and collective governance like those EU member states¹¹, Europeanization could still be beneficial when we looking at the three dimensions of the process.

ASEAN-ization through top-down process

This section aims to study to what extent have the ASEAN mechanisms, ways of practice and norms established or ‘top downed’

“The Member States of the European Union” (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 58-59

¹¹ Under the EU governance, all these domestic institutions have assumed new responsibilities and obligations. In some areas, their roles were heavily circumscribed. Despite central governments feel that they were constrained from the EU, they remain the most powerful actors within the EU system and have greater opportunities to pursue their favored positions. National courts have assumed a new function as part of the system of Community law to which they belong. Sub-national authorities have experienced both the effects of regulation and the opportunities deriving from territorial redefinition that has taken place in the Union. National parliaments seem to be the only institution not to have benefited from the Europeanization processes. They remain marginal actors in relation to the EU affairs at both union and the national levels. See Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne. (2000) “The Member States of the European Union” (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

in member state levels. The paper will give less emphasis on how ASEAN has affected the member states institutionally and to what extent it has changed their domestic institutions, since ASEAN has been less institutionalized regionalism¹². As Peter Katzenstein observes “Europe is undergoing fundamental institutional change, with far reaching efforts to redefine state prerogatives...Asia is characterized by marginal adjustments, insistence on state sovereignty and a preference for bilateralism”¹³. The analysis will be more focused on the second generation of Europeanization or the search for ideational ASEAN-ization. Moreover, norm diffusion is a cornerstone of constructivist paradigm¹⁴. According to Amitav Acharya, this is not simply a question of existential fit between local norms and external norms. Rather, it is a dynamic process of “constitutive localization” that enables norm-takers to build congruence between local and external ones.¹⁵ If the external norms are incompatible with existing parochial practices, they are subsequently incorporated after significant modifications undertaken by the actors. However, the static fit of congruence between the

¹² See Amitav Acharya. (2010). *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

¹³ Peter J. Katzenstein (2005) *The World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) quoted in Amitav Acharya. (2010). *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), p. 1.

¹⁴ Central to the norm dynamic is contestation between emerging norms and existing local beliefs and practices and practices. The outcome is shaped by the ideas and initiative of local actors.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4

emerging and the existing ideational tendencies is completely a naïveté. Archaya has neatly concluded that;

“...Local actors do not passively accept new international ideas and simply adjust their belief to fit with them. Instead, they assess outside ideas in terms of their suitability for local reconstruction. Norms that can be made to fit local conditions and traditions spread more easily than those that cannot. Normative change occurs because of the successful fusion of foreign ideas with local ones.”¹⁶

Amitav Acharya has outlined the ASEAN norms as 1) non-interference in the internal affairs of member states; 2) non-use of force in the settlement of disputes; 3) regional autonomy and regional resilience; 4) the practice of “ASEAN Way”, in which the last one is subject to arguments¹⁷. ASEAN assumed consensus is necessitated by the fear that uncontrolled dialogue can lead to intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, that ASEAN states try to avoid. ASEAN Way is an constitutive norms create the possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind¹⁸. Recent development of ASEAN code of conduct becomes more institutionalized with the ASEAN Charter to achieve ASEAN Community which attempt to provide ASEAN with a legal identity,

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 5

¹⁷ Amitav Archarya. (2010). *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

¹⁸ Kim Hyung Jong and Lee Poh Ping. (2011). “The changing role of dialogue in the International Relations of Southeast Asia”, *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 956.

a more institutionalized and binding framework¹⁹. Moreover, the Charter acknowledged the consensus as guiding principle, the principle of non-intervention and called for institutionalized dispute settlement mechanisms.

Degrees of top down change, are varied among ASEAN member states. For ASEAN founding nations or the “inner six”²⁰, degree of changes are more on “absorption” and to some extent “accommodation”. However, the experiences of “transformation” which change core structures and values, or the process never occurred among ASEAN founding members. However, with the launch of the most ambitious project in ASEAN history, the ASEAN Community (AC) with three pillars; namely ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Particularly with the immediate goal of completing the AEC, The AEC and ASEAN Secretariat has drawn domestic politics of individual members to be subjected to ASEAN process. Subsequent policy adoption and preparedness for AEC are immense, since The AEC economic blueprint contains far more commitment than other pillars²¹. Some member states set up

¹⁹ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization. (London: Routledge), p. 152.

²⁰ Inner six was first used to stand for France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, six founding nations of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which marked the start of the European integration. In this paper the inner six implies Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the six founding nations of ASEAN.

²¹ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization. (London: Routledge), p. 150.

domestic institutions and prepare for legal adjustments to facilitate the AEC. For example, the federation of Thai industries (FTI) has urged the government for legal changes ahead of AEC to ensure Thailand's competitiveness. Private enterprises have proposed for modernizations include Foreign Business Act BE 2542, the Trade Competition Act BE 2542 and other laws related to liberalization of telecommunications, financial and tourism markets.²² ASEAN becomes an increasingly important reference point for political activities of domestic actors within member states.

For new and less prosperous member states, the signs of "inertia" and "retrenchment" could easily be seen among the new member states. Post-Cold War ASEAN enlargement has not attempted to transform these four new CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) politically. They are a mixture of socialist and young democratic members. These new Southeast Asian members differ from the case of enlargement to Eastern Europe, in which the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have been gone through democratization and economic liberalization processes²³. Cambodia and Myanmar have shown resistant to incorporate the ASEAN way of ASEAN consensus in their practice. Myanmar's uneasiness in human right issue was clearly seen in its objection the ASEAN Charter on the issue of human rights regarding mechanism

²² <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Business-groups-push-for-legal-changes-ahead-of-AE-30177334.html>

²³ Jittipat Poonkham and Natthanun Kunnamas. (2012). Behind the Curtain of Socialism: Political Economy of Central and Eastern Europe (Bangkok: Centre for European Studies).

for enforcement²⁴. ASEAN counterparts feared that the next scheduled Myanmarese chairmanship will break the ASEAN Way. ASEAN could not create positive change in Myanmar and changed to ‘mutual disengagement’ from each other between ASEAN and Myanmar²⁵, until the Nargis cyclone struck Myanmar.

Cambodia showed the sign of inertia when it failed to produce joint communiqué for the recent AMM Meeting in Phnom Penh during late July 2012, which wrecked 45 years of ASEAN way history of consensus. The summit broke up in acrimony after failing to reach agreement over worsening maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea. Without a consensus, no joint communiqué was released for the first time in the organization’s 45-year history.²⁶ Hor Nam Hong, Cambodian foreign ministers said that “I requested that we issue the joint communiqué without mention of the South

²⁴ Kim Hyung Jong and Lee Poh Ping. (2011). “The changing role of dialogue in the International Relations of Southeast Asia”, *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 958.

²⁵ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). *ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization*. (London: Routledge), p. 134-9.

²⁶ The Philippines and China had a maritime stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal in April, with China denying reports it was preparing for war at the height of tension in May. Both sides accused each other of trespassing on territorial waters. The Philippines and Vietnam wanted ASEAN to resist Beijing’s insistence that the disputes be handled on a bilateral level only. The two countries needed a joint statement including references to their territorial discords with the PRC. However, the attempt was hindered by Cambodia. Hor Nam Hong, Cambodian foreign ministers; see <http://wsws.org/en/articles/2012/07/asea-j14.html>.

China Sea dispute...but some member countries repeatedly insisted to put the issue of Scarborough Shoal. The meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute.”²⁷ This two examples of Myanmar and Cambodia’s inertia and retrenchment led to increasing asymmetry within ASEAN that makes difficulty in achieving consensus. Likewise the new members see ASEAN as a strategic means rather than rules and norms.

Territorial conflicts are disturbing factors for ASEAN-ization both occurred between ASEAN members and those involved extra-regional powers, such as China and Japan. Considering territorial disputes and growing nationalism among ASEAN members, it is likely that more disputes will be settled aside of ASEAN dialogue. The disputes have been involved by both ASEAN members alone and extra-regional powers like China and Japan. Christopher Roberts lists out nine non-exhaustive territorial disputes involving ASEAN countries²⁸. Two current disputes involving military clashes are Preah Vihear Temple between Cambodia and Thailand, and Spratlys Islands between China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Philippines. Thus, the outcomes of this disputes will determine the credit of ASEAN Way as symbolized in non-use of force in conflict resolution.

ASEAN-ization through bottom-up process

This section aims to study to what extent could individual member state ‘bottom up’ or exert their presence and priority to

²⁷ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18825148>

²⁸ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization. (London: Routledge), p. 148.

be those of the ‘Common’? According to Europeanization concept, national governments of member states has two roles which are 1) ascending including policy formulation and decision making’ and 2) descending or implementation. In the EU experiences, the core groups have often asserted their influences and shaping regional agendas. For instance, Francoization and Germanization have been the fundamental legals and institutions of the EU as well as the architecture of Eurozone. Britainization has advocated to the establishment of Single market in Europe. Scandinavianization has been the leading members for regional and global environmental regimes and norms.

When considering ASEAN, are there any core members that could exert their influences region wide? Are there Indonesianization, Malaysianization, Singaporeanization and Thailandization like those in Europe? Considering the ASEAN inner six, Indonesianization and Malaysianization worked together as a motor of ASEAN engines since the end of World War II. The non-alignment norms from those two countries have well presented in ASEAN. Indonesia’s concept of *mushawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus) has been placed at the heart of ASEAN Way. *Mufakat* is consensus that can be reached through a process of *mushawarah*. In this practice, majority does not rule and long and intensive discussions are necessary²⁹. Moreover, the assumed consensus is to guarantee that any decision would not interfere domestic affairs of member states.

²⁹ Kim Hyung Jong and Lee Poh Ping. (2011). “The changing role of dialogue in the International Relations of Southeast Asia”, Asian Survey. 51(5), p. 958.

Thailandization or Thai code of conduct does not have clear pattern in ASEAN like Indonesia and Malaysia despite the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanad Kohman was the major driving force to set up ASEAN and the Bangkok Declaration as an establishing treaty in 1967³⁰. But one thing that Thailand succeeded in its “framing” roles was to place the concept of threat and enemy for ASEAN throughout history of Cold War. ASEAN needs to come to the common position, deriving from Thai standpoint as the only front line state, that the Soviet Union and Vietnam were immediate threats rather than China. Subsequently, ASEAN hard line positions towards Vietnam were adopted throughout the Cold War era. In some occasion, Thailand, nevertheless, disrupted its own code of conduct when the former Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhavan initiated the policy “Change the battlefields into the markets” to approach the communist neighbours in the 1990s.

Singaporeanization have more advocated in free trade agendas with the major powers like Japan, US, China, and the EU. Singaporeanization on economic perspective could be derived from the country’s status as the most liberalized economy in the world and the highly professional economic bureaucracy. After the 1997 Asian financial crises, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong pushed for trade liberalization under ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)³¹. And many times it received less supports from the nationalist counterparts,

³⁰ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization. (London: Routledge), p. 42, 47.

³¹ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization. (London: Routledge), p. 95.

particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore later went unilaterally signing the FTA agreements with its trading partners nearly 20 agreements by 2010. Singapore's unilateral action undermined ASEAN-based multilateral negotiations with trading partners except for the like-minded Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra³². The most far-reaching Singaporeanization was the proposal for AEC in 2002 to create a Single market with free flow of goods, service, investment and capital³³. As noted earlier, Singapore serves as the first economic and surveillance office in East Asia.

The bottom up dimension of ASEAN-ization required ASEAN elites providing region-wide public goods to force ASEAN synergy. These people must articulate the goal of regional community to propel regional projects. ASEAN inner six elites have long served in power except for Thailand ranging from Indonesian Suharto, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammed, Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, and Brunei's Sultan Hassanah Bolkiah. Former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and former Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong used to advocate on free trade agendas during their terms of office, but whether the region-wide public goods have been accommodated is still in questions.

³² Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). *ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization*. (London: Routledge), p. 97.

³³ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). *ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization*. (London: Routledge), p. 149.

ASEAN-ization at its side way

This section explains how ASEAN norms and practices that have been exported to other regions or beyond ASEAN territories. ASEAN has by far contributed to the multiplicity of conceptions of what an Asian region is. ASEAN persistently involved in drawing and redrawing of its region along the lines of Asia-Pacific and East Asia³⁴, in which the former dedicates to a more trade and capitalist interdependence, while the latter emphasizes more on materialistic idea of geographically connected region³⁵. Another important point that should be noted is that external major powers was rather let ASEAN be in central for the wider regionalisms than the other single denominator powers among them. This is the case when China and the United States refused Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposed by Japan in 1997 with the fear of Japanese dominations in the region, and the modest Miyazawa Initiative emerging from ASEAN Plus Three (APT) framework was launched instead.

East Asian region has been clearly framed in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises in which ASEAN members were central to that. The APT was set up in 1997 among finance ministers of ASEAN states, China, Japan and South Korea to be economic and financial norms under ASEAN centrality. The meetings' three core goals are 1) strengthening regional bond markets; 2) promoting

³⁴ Deepak Nair. (2009) "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A frustrated regionalism?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 31(1), p. 115.

³⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein (2005) *The World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

monetary policy cooperation; 3) creating an emergency financing facility³⁶. This economic and financial regionalism became the viability and normative preference in Asia excluding the United States³⁷. The APT's economic regionalism, likewise, is a regional alternative to the dominance of Western Bretton Woods institutions and neo-liberal economic agenda. Later the 2010 Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) Agreement has been developed to serve the third goal in which the APT members will contribute a total of 120 billion USD to a multilateral swap facility³⁸.

Apart from ASEAN centrality in the APT, ASEAN norms and codes of conducts were later exported to the CMIM. ASEAN members become equal partners with the plus three, despite the former contribute much less financially. And this appears in the allocation of votes in which ASEAN states is overweighted compared to their financial allocation³⁹. There will be a possibility of a double majority in which both a majority of countries and majority of votes would be required in decisions, which will give ASEAN more power⁴⁰.

³⁶ Christopher B. Roberts. (2012). *ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalization*. (London: Routledge), p. 148.

³⁷ Deepak Nair. (2009) "Regionalism in the Asia Pacific/East Asia: A frustrated regionalism?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 31(1), p. 111.

³⁸ John D. Ciorciari. (2011) "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International politics and institution-building in Asia", *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 926.

³⁹ John D. Ciorciari. (2011) "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International politics and institution-building in Asia", *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 941.

⁴⁰ John D. Ciorciari. (2011) "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International politics and institution-building in Asia", *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 940.

The CMIM enables individual ASEAN governments to consult with one another and speak as a collective voice⁴¹. A strong normative consensus within ASEAN prevents the weak Southeast Asian states to be underweighted by their plus three counterparts. Thus, the CMIM favors the ASEAN Way which involves numerous dialogues but no central secretariat and binding organizational treaty. And this special financial architecture differs from the previous Arab Monetary Fund (ArMF) created by the Arab League states in 1976, and the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) in 1978, since the CMIM is less institutionalized with a small regional surveillance office in Singapore called ASEAN Plus Three Research Office (AMRO). Its duties are and modest in serving only liquidity support and a supplementary organizations to international financial arrangements⁴². Moreover, the financial arrangement is relatively decentralized with a self-managed reserve pooling arrangements.

Another example of ASEAN-ization and its side-way is ASEAN's long experiences in constructing "region" sub-regionally. Sub-regional geometric economy has also been perceived as a complementary accelerator for wider regionalism. The 'region' construction project took place within sub-regions characterized by both materialist and ideational geographical proximity and

⁴¹ John D. Ciorciari. (2011). "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International politics and institution-building in Asia", *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 931.

⁴² John D. Ciorciari. (2011). "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International politics and institution-building in Asia", *Asian Survey*. 51(5), p. 936.

economic complementary. The uses of geometric economy, i.e. growth triangles and growth polygons to define ‘a region’ go beyond nation-states and physical boundaries to link contiguous border areas of different countries or using water network linking different zones⁴³. The cases of linking water networks particularly the Me Kong are clear in the formation of the Quadripartite Economic Cooperation, Mekong River Commission, and Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS).

Sub-regionalism in Southeast Asia ranges from Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Quadripartite Economic Cooperation, Mekong River Commission, to Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). ASEAN has a high density of sub-regionalism. Christopher Dent and Peter Richter added that the construction of economic geography in the region could be called “developmental regionalism” in which the stronger or core state tried to engage peripheral state into the core economic zone of the region⁴⁴. This sub-regional localized initiatives between state, business and civil society⁴⁵. ASEAN leaders, particularly former Thai Prime

⁴³ Oliver Hensengerth. (2009). “Transboundary river cooperation and the regional public good: The case of Mekong river”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 31(2), pp.327-330.

⁴⁴ Christopher Dent and Peter Richter. (2011). “Sub-regional cooperation and developmental regionalism: The case of BIMP-EAGA”, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33(1), p. 34.

⁴⁵ Christopher Dent and Peter Richter. (2011). “Sub-regional cooperation and developmental regionalism: The case of BIMP-EAGA”, *Contemporary*

Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was fond of this ideational construction linking water networks which has expanded to wider East Asian regionalization especially an initiative of Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation or the Bay of Bengal Initiative Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and also the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) between Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. However, for the depth of cooperation, the regionalization intents and activities were rather declaratory. Given that the way ‘region’ has constructed ideationally and how it has connected materialistically, it needs many criteria to determine its success ranging from regional elites providing region-wide public goods and level of elite socialization, level of pluralistic society and organizations’ visibility, and multi-level structure.

Conclusion

As far as ASEAN centrality, identities, and norms are concerned, a Europe based social constructivist perspective, or ‘Europeanization’ could be advantageous in substantiating both bottom up and top down processes of ASEAN activities. ‘ASEAN-ization’, which implies its ideational and normative roles, euphemistically called ‘norm subsidiarity’, are highly seen in the establishment of ‘ASEAN Way’ and ‘non-alignment’ norms, regional financial

stability mechanisms, financial regionalism and economic-driven regionalizations, which have been followed by many others. Besides, ASEAN-ization has been sided way towards other regions.

The study revealed that the degree of ASEAN-ization top-down is limited to the ASEAN Way prior to the advent of ASEAN Community particularly with an immediate goal of achieving the AEC blueprint. Moreover, ASEAN Charter will be the next move trying to institutionalized ASEAN Way and code of conduct, such as consensus as guiding principle, the principle of non-intervention and call for institutionalized dispute settlement mechanisms. Member states, especially the more developed inner six are adjusting their domestic structure to accommodate these two changes. But the outcomes of ASEAN-ization in these six founding nations would not result to the level of “transformation” in which member states replace existing policies, processes and institutions to the extent that their core features and/or the underlying collective understanding are fundamentally changed, affecting the core of system-wide political, economic and social structures. For the less developed and prosperous new members like Cambodia and Myanmar showed more signs of inertia and retrenchment to ASEAN-ization process. The two cases of Myanmar’s human rights and Cambodia’s chairmanship revealed that ASEAN norms has not well established in small states and particularly where political sensitivity and territorial disputes occurred.

Regarding ASEAN-ization bottom up or member states exert their presence and priority to be those of the ‘Common’, this dimension will be central to the core members like Indonesia.

Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. While the first two countries' norms are more consistent considering the ASEAN Way of consultation and consensus, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in domestic affairs of others, the latter two agendas are more a la carte practices and policies when considering Thailand's perception of threat and Singapore's liberal agenda. For ASEAN-ization side way or practices that have been exported beyond ASEAN territories, it is explicit that ASEAN norm subsidiarity has been quite successful in terms of economic and financial regionalism as well as economic regionalization since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. External major powers rather let ASEAN lead for the wider regionalisms than the other single denominator powers among them. The APT and CMIM frameworks are great example of this side way where ASEAN code of conduct and voice has managed to be central in their decision-making. Moreover, ASEAN has a high density of sub-regional economic geometries, which are ideationally constructed region.