
The Fukuda Doctrine and Japan's New Role in the Asia-Pacific Region

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I. Introduction

Following national unification in 1868, the Japanese experienced growing national power and prosperity for more than seven decades. Further more, under the slogan of Fukoku Kyohei, Japanese foreign policy had been characterized by a series of acquisitions of foreign territories—Taiwan (1895), Korea (1910), Manchukuo (1932) and Southeast Asia (1942). Many Japanese had dreamed—unrealistically that Imperial Japan would be able to reign over the entire Asian region with the aim of promoting peace, stability and prosperity, i.e. the illusionary hope for a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity. Thus, it is not surprising that the surrender of 1945 had a lingering impact on the Japanese as succinctly depicted by Nish :



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The Japanese have suffered from an imperial hangover. Like most hangovers, theirs was unpleasant and uncomfortable, accompanied as it was by a sense of guilt. The guilt in turn acted as a constraint on her freedom of action in the political sphere. Perhaps this is one of the factors which explains why Japan entered so willingly into association with the United States in the 1950's and 1960's and turned her back on Asia.¹

Postwar Japanese foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, beginning with the negotiations over reparations for wartime damages, has been largely successful in economic terms, yet the political role of Japan has been negligible. As one specialist in the field put it, both the substance and the style of Japanese foreign policy have retained an "Alice in Wonderland" quality.²

Since Fukuda Takeo took office in December 1976, however, Japanese foreign policy has been altered from its traditional passive pattern to a more active one, as exemplified by the socalled "**Fukuda Doctrine**".

"Mr. Fukuda's visit to Southeast Asia," as one of the policy planners in the Foreign Ministry explained the change, "was significant in introducing, in a distinct manner, a political dimension in Japan's foreign policy in general and in her policy toward Southeast Asia in particular."³ Some already argue today that Japan's role is to promote firm stability and security of Southeast Asia and to defend it as a vitally responsible region.⁴ What factors made Japan change its passive foreign policy? Is it just a temporal aberration? What effects has it exerted on international politics of the region? The primary purpose of this article is to answer these questions by closely analyzing the process of Japanese foreign policy decision-making

during the Fukuda and Ohira administrations. Before going into the substance of it the explanation of Japanese decisionmaking models and of her historical Asian policy are in order.

II. Models of Japanese Foreign Policy-Making

In the study of Japanese decision-making there are five major approaches or models: (1) the power elite approach, (2) the pluralist approach, (3) the decisional culture approach, (4) the transnational-linkage approach, and (5) the "critical" decision model. Let us adumbrate each approach one by one.

The **power elite approach**, which has been the "*traditional model*" and a frequently quoted one since the advent of the "1955 system", is characterized by the triumvirate alliance between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), senior bureaucrats and leaders of big business.⁵ It is usually contemplated that the three groups comprise a regular and effective alliance and control decisionmaking on major policy issues--i.e. Japan Inc. Reviewing the literature, Prof. Fukui concluded: "the power-elite model of Japanese policy-making stands on three basic propositions: first, the major

groups comprising the elite triumvirate are united, normally if not always, both in purpose and action; second, they participate in most, if not all, important policy decisions; third, individuals and groups other than those included in the elite categories are regularly excluded from decision-making processes involving important policy issues.⁶

Quite contrary is the second approach whose premise is that power in any community may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. This approach will become more salient in that the political changes affecting Japan today undoubtedly make the power elite model less relevant and the pluralist theory more relevant in the analysis of power and influence in Japanese decision-making (e.g. citizen movements).⁷ However, since this approach focuses on fluidity, complexity, and variability rather than regularity, stability, and constancy which are the preconditions of the first approach, it fails to present a viable framework for analysis, as stated by one of the proponents of the pluralist approach : "Pluralist theory, on the other hand, has its own weaknesses. By focusing on the participants in the decision-making process, it runs the danger of underestimating or totally ignoring the extent to which certain participants share the values and represent the interests of groups not directly involved in the decision-making process."⁸

The third major approach emphasizes the "tradition" of Japanese politics such as familism, factionalism, hierarchy, and consensus-making, which thus can be categorized as "*decisional culture*" approach. Most fascinating are the works by Maruyama (Mikoshi politics) and Hosoya (truncated pyramid system).⁹ Reviewing this literature, Prof.

White clarifies the assumption : "Lack of structure in political institution and political culture allows extraordinary room for the exercise of traditional factors".¹⁰ This decisional culture approach can offer an intriguing perspective on Japanese decision-making, yet it also has a weakness as Vogel's book demonstrates. On balance, it can offer necessary conditions, i.e. constraints on surrounding environment, but cannot present sufficient factors, *sine qua non*, to formulate a framework for analysis.

The fourth, the transnational-linkage approach, is fairly new and most underdeveloped in terms of its theorization. As a characteristic of this model, it particularly emphasizes the increasing role of "foreign related factionalism".¹¹ in accounting for the outcomes of foreign decision-making. Due to highly interdependent relationships between nation-states, as the proponents of this approach argue, the international a sources of domestic policy, or vice versa, will be increasingly pronounced. Therefore, this approach is very useful in the field of domestic policy-making too, e.g. the Lockheed scandal,¹² but its applicability awaits further case studies.

The last one, developed by Fukui, gives us an alternative approach to the routine decision-making model. The "*critical*"¹³ decision model single out a small top level officials as the decision unit while emphasizing the role of Prime Minister in the unit. The model thus highlights two features : modality of a positive action, and the central role of the prime minister. Yet, lack of case studies unables us to portray general patterns of this model.¹⁴

With these different approaches in mind, we are going to see how the decision for the Fukuda Doctrine was formulated and chosen

by the players. In so doing, we will explore the following three points. First, who initiates or which actor takes an initiative for policy output? Second, to what extent is the issue in question politicized? Third, how a salient or how critical is the issue under consideration?

III. Evolution of Japan's Asian Policy, 1952-1974

1. The first period: Forging the Superdomino through normalization and reparation, 1952-1964.

How could Japan enjoy the freedom of action to advance into the region immediately after a war which was fought precisely in the same region and which ended in Japan's defeat? The answer seems to lie in the mutual cooptation between Japanese and American decision makers, which incorporated Prime Minister Yoshida's "economics above all"¹⁵

ideology and Washington's "superdomino" ideals.¹⁶ The latter concept reveals not only the keystone role of Japan (as well as West Germany), but also the fact that a creation of triangular, mutually reinforcing relations between the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia has been integral to American objectives in Asia. Suffice it to say that this triangular relations was indispensable for the Japanese to replace "China markets." In pursuing this strategy Japan had to normalize diplomatic relations, to wit, the San Francisco Peace Treaty,¹⁷ and to settle reparation problems.¹⁸ Thus, throughout these years, the two objectives were the main topics around which Asian policy too the Japanese government revolved.¹⁹

Normalization and settlement of reparations undoubtedly enhanced Japanese involvement in the regional affairs, particularly in the economic areas promoted by Japanese big business. By the end of the 1950's, all the reparation problems were negotiated and agreed on between Japan and recipient countries (see the Table I below).²⁰

TABLE I. REPARATIONS PAYMENTS TO SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

countries	signed	terms (years)	reparations (millions of dollars)	loans
Burma				
original	Nov. 5, 1954	10	\$ 200.0	\$ 50.0
supplementary	Mar. 29, 1963	12	140.0	30.0
Philippines	May. 9, 1956	20	550.0	250.0
Indonesia	Jan. 20, 1958	12	223.8	400.0
S. Vietnam	May. 15. 1959	5	39.0	7.5

As a corollary to these economic arrangements, by the end of the 1960's Japan had become the most important economic partner to most of the Asian countries (see the Table II below).²¹

TABLE II. MAJOR NATIONS' SHARE OF FAR EASTERN TRADE, 1960-64
(percentage of total regional trade)

country	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Japan	10.9	12.5	13.3	14.3	19.3
United States	11.9	13.6	14.4	14.8	16.7
Britain	8.1	8.3	8.5	8.2	7.5
West Germany	4.3	4.3	4.0	3.8	4.6
Australia	2.0	3.1	2.7	3.4	3.9
Holland	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.7
China	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.3
France	2.9	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.0
New Zealand	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4

Yet, Japanese foreign policy remained at a low profile as cogently pointed out by Langton: "The Japanese use of policies of trade promotion, reparations, grants, loans, credits, and investment can only be viewed as a great success. However, even after Japan had recovered from the Pacific war and was well on the way to new rapid growth, it still tended, under Prime Minister Ikeda, to regard most of its policies as contributing to trade promotion in the pursuit of its prosperity goal."²²

2. The Second Period: Pursuit of Regional Diplomacy, 1965-1974

The low profile economic diplomacy of Japan was changed into a "induced" active one beginning at the time of Johnson's announcement of Asian economic development plan in April 1965.²³ External events, particularly China's nuclear explosion in October 1964, furthermore led the Japanese to become more deeply involved in the region and gradually forced reconsideration of their "economic above all" orientation to foreign affairs. What followed was that the Japanese government put more emphasis on peace and political stability through economic develop-

ment of the developing Asian-Pacific countries. Foreign Minister Miki's "Asian-Pacific zone" was a case in point. As a corollary, Japanese foreign policy in the regions has more closely responded in American Asian policy as exemplified by the establishment of the Asian Development Bank. Commenting the Prime Minister Sato's visit to Southeast Asia in 1967, thus, an American official put it: "An especially satisfying aspect of Mr. Sato's trip has been to align Japan more firmly on the side of Washington to Vietnam and against Communist designs generally in the development states of Southeast Asia."²⁴

During the second period, major concerns of Japanese foreign policy were normalization of diplomatic relations with Communist China and conclusion of the peace treaty with the Soviet Union, and creation of peaceful situation in the Korean peninsula and Southeast Asia. A new era of Asian primacy had begun in the years 1969-1970-- an era in which Japan was emerging as the prominent power in the region. As a Japanese official reportedly stated: "We are involved in a serious debate about what role we should play, politically and militarily. Economically we followed a

very aggressive policy in Asia.....Politically we are just beginning to put our toe in the water as far as playing a large leadership role is concerned. Militarily, we are very reluctant to do more than build up our own self-defense capacity.²⁵ In order to pursue this active role in the region, Japan invariably had to consider other superpowers as well as conflict areas in the region.²⁶

The primary concerns were American gradual withdrawal as a result of the Nixon Doctrine, Sino-Soviet conflict, and their rivalry over the Asian-Pacific countries. The task was to conclude favorable terms between Japan and the two communist giants in order to deal with, and to play an important role in, the changing relations in Asia. Tokyo's relations with the Soviet Union were normalized in 1956,²⁷ yet, the friendly relations did not follow because of the northern territories problems. The basis for a stable Soviet-Japanese contact lay in the area of economic cooperation. By the end of the 1960's trade between the two countries had risen steadily to the point that Japan had become the Soviet's largest trading partner outside the socialist bloc. After establishing a new relationship with Beijing in 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka attempted to resume negotiations on a peace treaty and economic cooperation in Siberia. In 1973, Tanaka went to Moscow, but ended his three-day visit with no substantial gains aside from an agreement to open talks on Japanese fishing rights adjacent to the disputed islands.²⁸

Japan's China policy, as we discussed earlier, is not only vitally important to the Japanese, it is also being watched by other major powers deeply interested in Asian international politics. Thus, Japan seeks to retain cordial relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) while positively promoting better relations with Beijing.²⁹ In pursuing

this even-handed policy, the role of big business was of greatest importance.³⁰ The breakthrough came in 1972 when Prime Minister Tanaka visited China, after Nixon's dramatic visit, in order to normalize diplomatic relations, thus ending the technical state of war that had existed between the two countries for 35 years. In a nine-point Sino-Japanese communique both countries pledged that neither nation would seek to establish its hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region, and they promised that various agreements would be negotiated concerning trade, navigation, aviation, fisheries, and a treaty of peace and friendship.³¹

The improved relations with Beijing become all the more significant as Tokyo encountered increasing difficulty in its relations with South Korea,³² Taiwan,³³ and Vietnam. Particularly important was the Japanese policy toward Vietnam as American withdrawal became imminent year after year. The Japanese government adopted a more friendly posture toward North Vietnam, clearly reflecting the altering relations among big powers involved in the region. In January 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka made a major policy address before the opening session of the Diet and said: "The urgent problem facing our nation now is the contribution we make to the firm establishment of the peace in Vietnam... Japan will make utmost efforts for the rehabilitation of the Indochina peninsula."³⁴ Furthermore, commenting on Japan's role in Southeast Asia, Henry Kissinger remarked: "We have no objection whatever to any Japanese assistance program to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or to any other country of Indochina. Indeed we believe that this would be a natural exercise of Japan's sense of responsibility for stability in Asia."³⁵ A reassessment of overall foreign policy, however, came in early

1974 when Tanaka encountered serious anti-Japanese riots in Bangkok and Jakarta. Tokyo was compelled to renew its Asian policy, one that had been pursued for more than two decades, as critically voiced by one governmental official: "It will call on advancing enterprises to self-reflect on their conduct earnestly, taking this opportunity, and to seek the establishment of enterprise morals in foreign nations."³⁶ Furthermore, then deputy Prime Minister Takeo Miki revealed the view: "The time has come for the Government to conduct a serious review of the hitherto-taken foreign policy and the way of economic cooperation."³⁷ Thus, the failure of postwar Nanshin³⁸, together with the first oil crisis (1973-74) which terminated Japan's free access to raw materials and export markets,³⁹ impelled Japan to embark on initiatives in formulating a new Kasumigasaki diplomacy.

IV. The Fukuda Doctrine and Japan's New Role in the Asian-Pacific Region

The above analysis has shown that Japanese foreign policy has entered a new phase, reflecting changes within the national and international environment which have altered the paramount assumptions upon which Tokyo's policy had previously been formulated. The assumptions were three-fold:

1. American military protection and her reliable commitments in Asia.
2. The free access to raw materials and export markets in order to promote Japanese economy.

3. A stable political framework in which a dominant LDP can pursue a consistent foreign policy.

Therefore, as stated by the Foreign Ministry one day after the collapse of Saigon: "Japan has been driven to a situation where it must change its policy drastically from the Asian policy within the U.S. framework to autonomous counter-policies toward Asia."⁴⁰ Under these circumstances, it was the Foreign Ministry that took initiatives to formulate a new Asian diplomacy.⁴¹

In July 1975, the Conference of the Ambassadors to the Asia-Pacific region was held in order to analyze how various Asian nations are coping with "post-Vietnam era", and to explore the basis for Tokyo's new Asian policy. The Conference was supposed to put the finishing touches on a series of conference of this kind, and it was also considered an important conference from the standpoint of consolidating the Foreign Ministry's basic posture.⁴² In the conference, the following points were articulated:⁴³

1. Vietnam is being unified by North Vietnam's initiatives.
2. Better diplomatic relations with North Vietnam are essential.
3. ASEAN countries become skeptical about activation of guerrilla activities.
4. It is not relevant to view that ASEAN will depart from the U.T.
5. It behooves Japan to evaluate economic cooperation through the organizations of ASEAN.

Yet, the Japanese objectives had not reached the consensus among policy-makers in Japan, including the Foreign Ministry.⁴⁴ They seemed to be waiting for clear stabilizing factors. The United States, on its part, had responded to rapidly changing Asian relations

by announcing the New Pacific Doctrine in Hawaii on December 1, 1975 in order to give a psychological boost to those who were apprehensive about the apparent U.S. weakening of commitments in the region. It consisted of the following six points:

1. American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific.
2. Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our strategy.
3. The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.
4. Our continuing stake in stability and security in Southeast Asia.
5. Peace in Asia depends upon a resolution of outstanding political conflicts.
6. Peace in Asia requires a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations of all the peoples in the region.⁴⁵

Soon after the announcement of the Doctrine, Foreign Minister Miyazawa reportedly recognized the important role of Japan as a bridge between ASEAN and Indochina since the Doctrine did not refer to Indochinese countries.⁴⁶

The ideas for the Fukuda Doctrine were also forged by a group of policy-makers, but we do not know as yet who exactly initiated. Available sources suggest that those of the middle echelon in the Foreign Ministry, particularly Nishiyama Takehiko, then counsellor of the Asian Affairs Bureau, formulated Japan's Southeast Asian policies since 1975. Nishiyama, after serving in Laos during 1973-75, returned to Tokyo to work for the Asian Affairs Bureau in September 1975, then started his search for a new policy toward Southeast Asia.⁴⁷ If this observation is correct, this case proves

Hosoya's "middle echelon" thesis that "in Japan the middle levels of the Foreign Office and other agencies concerned with foreign affairs continue to play a greater role in the formulation of foreign policy."⁴⁸

Consensus for the new policies was made at the Conference of East Asian Councillors held in Hong Kong in March 1976. The two points were agreed upon: Japan can no longer be passive in dealing with Southeast Asian affairs; Japan should actively contribute to the stability in Southeast Asia by assisting national resilience of ASEAN countries as well as by harmonizing the relationship between ASEAN and Indochinese countries.⁴⁹

By this time, Foreign Minister Miyazawa expressed his firm posture of Japan's policy toward Indochina. Miyazawa told reporters in May that "Japan can be a bridge between ASEAN and North Vietnam" through economic cooperation.⁵⁰ Since then, Tokyo's policy toward Indochinese countries became very active. In August, for instance, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with Cambodia, which was the last among the three Indochinese countries. Furthermore, Tokyo agreed to export cement plants (2 billion) to Hanoi in October 1976.⁵¹ Thus, one of the problems in Japan's equidistance policy toward both Indochina and ASEAN seemed to be cleared. The pending issue was how to consolidate policy toward ASEAN, which historically breeds serious problems for Japan.

In November, following the first ASEAN Summit Conference of February 1976, the Foreign Ministry held the conference of Ambassadors to Southeast Asia in Bangkok. Reflecting the participants' viewpoint that ASEAN is the core of Japan's Southeast Asian policy, the Conference agreed

on two points : (1) ASEAN countries should show very positive posture to strengthen their relations with Japan; (2) Japan should promote its friendly relationship with Indochinese countries.⁵² As a corollary of this conference, the Foreign Ministry tried to talk with the headquarter of ASEAN in order to promote economic cooperation.⁵³ Therefore, although the Foreign Ministry has not completed its formulation of a systematic policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, the decision was finally made that Japan should respond actively to the changes that have taken place, and are taking place, within the region. The basic framework for Tokyo's new diplomacy was discussed and agreed among Prime Minister Fukuda, Foreign Minister Hatoyama, and ambassadors to Southeast Asia in March 1977, just a few weeks before Fukuda's visit to the United States.⁵⁴

Thus, the final decision for the Doctrine was made by Prime Minister Fukuda who also believed that "the area for which Japan is responsible in the International society is Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN."⁵⁵ At the same time, changes in Southeast Asian international politics were significant for Japan to play an important role in the region. The changes were three-fold : (1) After the Vietnam war, three Indochinese nations became communist countries; (2) ASEAN embarked on the dialogue with these countries not conflict with them; (3) ASEAN was expecting Japan to play a larger role. These changes, according to a Foreign Ministry official, opened a new page in Japan-Southeast Asian relations.⁵⁶

The talks between newly elected Prime Minister Fukuda and President Carter were very significant in that both countries agreed on a basic policy toward the Asia-Pacific region as the joint communique stipulated :

*The Prime Minister Welcome the affirmation by the United States and expressed his intension that Japan would further contribute to the stability and development of that region in various field, including economic development.*⁵⁷

Unlike the former talks, this time Prime Minister Fukuda only tried to "test Washington's reaction" to new Japanese Asian policy, and furthermore, it was the Japanese government that strongly emphasized the "inclusion of ASEAN in the joint communique."⁵⁸ Therefore, it seems to be irrelevant to view the growing role of Japan in the region as a result of "pressure from the United States."⁵⁹

Encouraged by the Japan-US talks, the Foreign Ministry pushed its efforts to formulate systematic policy toward ASEAN

through the first Japan-ASEAN Forum,⁶⁰ and negotiations with ASEAN representatives. Accordingly the following four demands of ASEAN countries were articulated ; (1) cooperation in joint ASEAN industrialization projects ; (2) provision of access to the Japanese market for ASEAN products, both primary and manufactured; (3) introduction of an export stabilization system; (4) granting of favorable treatment with regard to accumulated debts.⁶¹ It naturally behooves Japan to meet these demands as closely as possible should she

gain the understandings from ASEAN countries. Particularly important was the redifinition of "security" for the ASEAN countries since the fall of Saigon.⁶² In other words, With the new realities, the nations of ASEAN began to perceive their own safety in terms of raising the standard of living of its people, thus gaining popular support for the various governments. This redifinition in ASEAN, from a military to an economic one, to wit, national resilience, thus allowed Japan to initiate a more positive role in the region. Undoubtedly the nonmilitary sphere is the area in which Japan can make the best contribution reflecting its particular comparative advantages.

Furthermore, it was the ASEAN countries' rising expectation that allowed the Japanese government to play an active role in the region. As early as October 1976, for instance, President Marcos made a strong speech urging more actions on the ASEAN economic front, including a joint summit with Japan.⁶³ Prime Minister Lee also urged Japan to express a firm commitment to ASEAN by extending more aid, and particularly to help their proposed industrial projects.⁶⁴ In a similar vein, Indonesian Trade Minister Radius Prawiro, a member of the ASEAN mission to Japan in July, clearly expressed: "the ASEAN has been giving priority to its regional economic development since the end of the Indochinese war in 1975. In this context, the ASEAN attaches importance to relations with Japan."⁶⁵ Apparently, since Marcos' call for a summit with Japan big push for further cooperation between Japan and ASEAN had been attempted in early 1977 as exemplified by Fukuda's policy speech before the Diet in January, the meeting between Japanese and Philippine business leaders in February,

ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting, Japan-ASEAN Forum in March, Marcos' visit to Japan, Prime Minister Lee's visit to Japan in May, ASEAN Economic Ministers' meeting in June, and the ASEAN mission to Japan in July.

In July, the substance of the so-called "Fukuda Doctrine"⁶⁶ was formulated and the draft of the Doctrine was made on August 3, 1977, which was composed of the following five points: (1) Japan is committed to peace and to the role of an economic power—it will not become a military power; (2) as "an especially close friend" of ASEAN, Japan will cooperate in efforts to strengthen the solidarity of that organization; (3) Japan will emphasize "heart-to-heart" contacts, building stronger ties as a equal partner not only economically but in social, political and cultural realms as well; (4) Japan will forge particularly close economic relations with them in the context of world economy; and (5) Japan will also attempt to foster relations based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina.⁶⁷

The business community in the process of forging the Doctrine seems to have played little role. Since the community's request to send its mission was rejected by Vietnam, it merely observed with impatience how western countries sent big mission into Vietnam.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Prime Minister Fukuda briefly discussed his trip to Southeast Asian countries with the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) just prior to his departure.⁶⁹ Due to the nature of the Doctrine itself, the concerned bureaucracies were supportive of it although the extent and volumes of Japanese aid had been contested among them. For instance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) sent a mission headed by Minoru Masuda, a councilor of the Ministry, in

February 1977 in order to investigate the state of ASEAN's cooperation and its request to Japan.⁷⁰ Another MITI official furthermore declared that 1977 would be the year of ASEAN assessing the increased level of regional cooperation as well as ASEAN's active cultivation of unified external policies.⁷¹ The opposition parties however could not play any role in the process of decision-making since they had no alternatives instead of a policy of furthering relations between Japan and ASEAN. They merely expressed their objections after declaration of the Doctrine.

Because of the afore-mentioned nature of the decision-making process, i.e. the closed process involved only by a small ad hoc group of decision-makers, politicization of the issue has been avoided, thus averting to a large extent factional and intra-bureaucratic feuds. Accordingly the mass media advocated Fukuda's attendance in the ASEAN summit as one editorial strongly urged : "The last Japanese Prime Minister to visit the region was Mr. Tanaka, and it must be admitted that the treatment he received in Thailand and Indonesia came as a shock and had a sobering effect on the people here. But the

situation has reportedly changed for the better since then as far as the ASEAN feeling toward Japan is concerned. Prime Minister Fukuda certainly must not miss this opportunity to meet the top most leaders of the ASEAN region which is extremely important to Japan as a trading partner. Obviously the ASEAN countries are at a stage where they would want Japan to do more than to offer only lip-service. It will be hoped that the mutual need of Japan the ASEAN to supplement each other economically will be matched by their willingness to oblige."⁷²

With the five-point "doctrine" Prime Minister Fukuda went to Kuala Lumpur to attend the second ASEAN Summit Meeting. However, throughout the talks at the Summit, and with individual countries after the Summit, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister recognized that there still existed a sense of suspicion on the part of ASEAN countries,⁷³ and because of this the second and fourth postures of the "Doctrine" which implies the hinterland role of ASEAN were dropped. Thus, Fukuda announced the "three pillars" of the Doctrine on August 18, 1977 in Manila :

First, Japan, a nation committed to peace, rejects the role of a military power, and on that basis is resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and of the world community.

Second, Japan, as a true friend of the countries of Southeast Asia will do for consolidating the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding with these countries, in wide ranging fields covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas.

Third, Japan will be an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries, and cooperate positively with them in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, together with other nations of like mind outside the region, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina, and will thus contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.

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Fukuda furthermore showed a strong willingness to live up to his promises: "It is time to make this pledge. This pledge cannot fail but be realized. I personally feel I have the necessary leadership to carry this through"⁷⁵

The reaction to the Doctrine was a monumental success for the Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry, and the Press, which expressed that Japan had opened a new page in its Asian policy. However, the view of the

ASEAN countries seemed only cautiously optimistic. Beijing and Washington's reactions were favorable, but understandably the Soviet Union expressed the view that the Doctrine was merely a extension of the Guam and the New Pacific Doctrine of the United States.⁷⁶ At any rate, the Doctrine marked a new vista of Japanese diplomacy as expressed by Fukuda in a major policy speech at the opening of the extraordinary session of the National Diet on September 20, 1978:⁷⁷

The Japanese foreign policy consists in seeking peaceful and friendly relations in all directions with all regions and with all countries of world—in a word, a policy that might be described as omnidirectional diplomacy (underline added) for peace. Precisely through such efforts, will Japan be able to prepare the international environment in which Japan can ensure its place and further to play a positive and important role for the world.

Now, having analyzed the background of the Doctrine, we are going to see Tokyo's pursuance of its foreign objectives. How these policy initiatives are to be translated into actions has apparently been put to test by the policy of Japan towards Southeast Asia. In the following section, we are going to examine the limitation of Japan's foreign policy with special reference to the Third Indochina War.

V. The Third Indochina War and the Fate of the Fukuda Doctrine

Upon announcing the Doctrine four major policy issues have emerged in the context of Japan's approach toward Asia: (1)

the establishment of an integrated strategy toward the United States, the Soviet Union, and China; (2) the development of scenarios for the long-term stability of Korean peninsula; (3) the execution of a Southeast Asian policy directed toward peaceful coexistence between the Indochinese and ASEAN blocs; and (4) the development of a uniquely Japanese policy toward the North-South problem.⁷⁸ Let us take up in this section two difficult issues in the Asian-Pacific region which Japan faces: namely an understanding with Southeast Asia and relations with both China and the Soviet Union. We will closely analyze Tokyo's approach to the Third Indochina conflict so that we can assess how an active attitude of the Japanese government is put to use in pursuing the Fukuda Doctrine.

Under the Fukuda administration, Japan regarded itself as the only country in the Western camp to maintain friendly relations with both ASEAN and Indochina, and by carrying out economic assistance to both sides, hoped to make this entire area into an independent, neutral and peaceful region. This was the basic concept of the Fukuda Doctrine which was supported by all the parties involved in the region except the Soviet Union. Tokyo's attempts seemed to work since the Doctrine was made in tranquil times prior to the turbulent changes in Asia that soon followed. The relations with the Soviet Union, despite its apparent objection to Tokyo's active approach to Southeast Asia and China, have remained cordial due to their agreement on the fisheries pact in May 1977, which was designed to remain in effect until the end of 1977 and to be replaced by a longer-term agreement. With China, the Peace Treaty and its "anti-hegemony" clause remained the central issue until the end of 1977 due to Soviet hardening pressure.⁷⁹ In negotiations

the Treaty, the Fukuda government did not get very far, but made every effort to keep within its policy of maintaining equidistance from China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the year 1977 was to lay a basis for an active diplomacy and 1978 was the year to promote it.

In his policy speech delivered to the National Diet in January 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda made it clear that, in view of the changing multipolar international climate, the time was ripe for Japan to undertake serious treaty negotiations with China in a "mutually satisfactory fashion".⁸⁰ Yet, due to the strong opposition to the Treaty, Fukuda had to take cautious steps toward it in order to accomplish three aims—electoral, personal, and external—which made him more anxious than ever to break the three-year-old diplomatic deadlock.⁸¹ The anti-treaty groups articulated their opposition as followed: (1) the treaty will render Japan subservient to China's diplomatic strategy and will weaken Taiwans' international status; (2) it will jeopardize Japan's national security and will entangle her in the Sino-Soviet conflict; (3) it may provoke retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union against Japan's fishing and other interests or may invite a Moscow-Taipei military alliance; and (4) any legal document may turn out to be meaningless because China cannot be trusted.⁸²

Having realized that most of the opposition came from within his own party,⁸³ Fukuda finally decided to specify the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty, which has been the central problem in the negotiation since April 1975.⁸⁴ Thus, despite the Senkaku Island incident of April 1978,⁸⁵ Fukuda took great care not to overreact to the incident, but contained it through restrained persuasive efforts. Once Fukuda decided to conclude the treaty, the negotiation got its way. Finally,

the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua agreed with Sonoda's proposal which provided the solution to the third-country issue. The following reasons for China's compromise seem to be plausible : (1) Huang was anxious to conclude the treaty prior to Hua Guo-feng's departure (August 15) for Rumania, Yugoslavia and Iran; (2) if the treaty negotiations failed, this might be seen as a victory for the Soviet Union; (3) Huang also needed a demonstrable diplomatic success in the light of China's deteriorating relations with Vietnam and Albania.⁸⁶

Accomplishing the treaty with China, Fukuda declared the success of his "omnidirectional diplomacy" which was actually different from the "equidistant diplomacy" taken by former prime ministers. Thus, although the Japanese government took three years and nine months to justify the Soviet allegiance, it was plain that "Japan has changed her policy of keeping politically equidistant from China and the Soviet Union and has moved closer to China".⁸⁷ As a corollary of the treaty, the position of Japan in the Asian-Pacific region has been strengthened by : Beijing's explicit endorsement of the primacy of Japan's western ties, specifically the US-Japanese security relationship; greater Chinese flexibility on economic issues such as foreign credits and investments; the likelihood of a constructive Chinese role in minimizing tensions on the Korean peninsula; and acknowledgement of the importance of the Japanese Self Defense Forces for regional security.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, there appeared two distinguished trends-American rapprochement with China (e.g. Brzezinski's visit to Beijing in May) and deterioration of relations between China and Vietnam. Particularly important were the Vietnam's decision to join COMECON on June 29, 1978, and China's reaction to terminate her assistance to Vietnam. Im-

mediately the Foreign Ministry invited Vietnam's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Phan Hien and discussed Vietnam's policy and impacts of the decision on Asian international politics. In the talks with Foreign Minister Sonoda, Hien explained that Vietnam never changed its independent policy, and the participation was to gain economic assistance to reconstruct the national economy. Commenting on Japan's aid to Vietnam, Sonoda said that "since ASEAN countries have been expressing their suspicion that the aid would be transformed into military preparation or aggravate the Sino-Soviet conflict, our government must be careful about the aid. Thus, the precondition for our assistance is Vietnam's promise to keep its independent policy".⁸⁹ Believing what Hien said in the talks, Sonoda decided to continue economic aid to Vietnam. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry took initiatives to prevent Vietnam from leaning toward the Soviet Union by calling for American economic assistance to Vietnam.⁹⁰ because for the first time Vietnam made it public that Vietnam was ready to negotiate normalization with the United States without any prior conditions.

If the idea was to keep Vietnam out of the Soviet sphere, Japan should have been more cautious in concluding the Peace Treaty with China, for it would invite serious repercussions and adverse impacts on international relations of the region. At least other countries would interpret differently regardless of Tokyo's intention. As Chinese newspaper triumphantly stated : "The development of friendly relations between China and Japan and the signing of the treaty seem to have put a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet Union. The signing of the treaty proclaims the ignominious bankruptcy of the Soviet social imperialist plot to interfere and sabotage".⁹¹ The attitude of the Foreign Ministry was rather optimistic partly

because the treaty includes the third country clause and in part because the Soviet Union needs Japan's economic cooperation in Siberia.⁹² Thus, there still existed a strong need to pursue the Fukuda Doctrine in Southeast Asia as Sonoda explained in Minneapolis in September 1978 : "Southeast Asia is an important area of that Asian region where Japan recognized a responsibility to play an actively supportive role in peace-building and regional development. Last June, I met in Thailand with the foreign ministers of the five ASEAN countries for a wide ranging exchange of views on the current Asian situation, on world economic trends. I dare say that never before have relations between Japan and the ASEAN countries been closer, warmer and more cooperative."⁹³

By the end of October, the central issue in Japan's Asian policy was how to improve relations between ASEAN and Indochina countries, with Japan being the mediator between the two. In Southeast Asia Vietnam's diplomatic offensive had already begun in September, and clearly reflected intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry in the region. Although ASEAN countries carefully watched the progress of the Dong's tour and were pleased with Vietnam's softening attitudes, they could not sense the underlying purpose of the tour which was to test the political ground before the invasion of Kampuchea.⁹⁴ The Japanese government also intensified its approach to the region by offering economic assistance to Kampuchea as well as being a go-between in the process of normalization between the United States and Vietnam.⁹⁵

Then came the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between the Soviet Union and Vietnam on November 3, 1978. Article 6 of the treaty stipulated that "In case neither

party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the Treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate and effective measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries"⁹⁶ Japanese reactions were mixed with suspicion and caution, yet the government stated that there would be no change in its policy toward Vietnam, including economic assistance, for the treaty would be a temporal decision on the part of Vietnam to deal with Chinese threat.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry soon held the Conference of Ambassadors to Southeast Asia, and confirmed Japan's policy toward Southeast Asia.⁹⁸ These political attempts were continued even when Masayoshi Ohira took the Fukuda's place on December 7, for Ohira asked Foreign Minister Sonoda to continue his efforts. Therefore, while Prime Minister Ohira was involved in a political arrangement within the party the diplomatic efforts were vigorously undertaken by the Foreign Ministry.

Vietnam's Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh was invited to Japan at the Japanese government's request one day before the President Carter's announcement to normalize diplomatic relations with China as well as to shelve her normalization talks with Vietnam.⁹⁹ At the meeting between Sonoda and Trinh, Sonoda clearly remarked that "Japan does not consider that Vietnam has placed itself completely on the side of the Soviet Union as a result of the Treaty". But he also pointed out that "Since ASEAN countries feel insecure about current Vietnam policy, Vietnam must remove this feeling of insecurity among neighbouring countries by deeds not by words. Japan's economic aid may be cut depending upon future Vietnamese deeds."¹⁰⁰

With respect to Sino-American normalization, the Foreign Ministry showed a welcoming attitude, and clarified the view that it would contribute to stability in the region.¹⁰¹

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea on December 25 took ASEAN countries as well as Japan by surprise. ASEAN leaders felt "cheated by Vietnamese pledge of peace."¹⁰² Japanese leaders were embarrassed and irritated, and came to reconsider their aid commitment to Vietnam.¹⁰³ Following the fall of Phnom Penh, the Japanese government decided to firm up the policy of strengthening economic cooperation with ASEAN, while postponing economic aid to Vietnam, in order to cope with the sudden change in Indochina situation.¹⁰⁴ From January 12 to 13, 1979, Foreign Ministers of ASEAN met and demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchean territory."¹⁰⁵ Apparently the ASEAN countries began to question Hanoi's intentions, yet they tried to stress their strict neutrality in the conflict as well as in the Sino-Soviet rivalry which was threatening to engulf the whole region. Understandably, China hardened its policy toward Vietnam, thus starting Deng's diplomatic offensive. Accordingly, Chinese ambassador to Japan, Fu Zhao branded Vietnam as a "small hegemony" country which is supported by a "big hegemony" nation, and asked Japan to support the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea in accordance with the Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese treaty (anti-hegemony clause).¹⁰⁶ Although Foreign Minister Sonoda rejected concerted actions against Vietnam this response was not convincing.

The China-Vietnam war in February 1979 has finally terminated ASEAN's neutral stance, or at least fragmented its concerted

efforts in dealing with the external powers. Immediately ASEAN countries issued a joint statement calling for "an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the areas of conflict in Indochina",¹⁰⁷ and after the start of the war their posture became increasingly compatible with that of China. Japan's response to the war was similar in that it did not reject the cause for the war.¹⁰⁸ However, by this time ASEAN leaders began to question Japan's aid to Vietnam. The feeling was that Japan's desire to pursue the principles of the Fukuda Doctrine—giving economic assistance to both ASEAN and Indochina to enhance stability in Southeast Asia—was becoming increasingly fanciful.¹⁰⁹ Despite this suspicion, the Foreign Ministry has confirmed its judgement that Vietnam is leaning toward the Soviet Union temporarily, and that it will return to its independent policy line again in the future. The reasons for this are three-fold: (1) Vietnamese government leaders clarified again and again that Vietnam's basic diplomacy is an independent diplomatic line; (2) there are indications that as a result of the China-Vietnam war, Vietnam has felt that the Soviet Union's ability to supply aid is limited, and that Vietnam is reexamining its policy toward the Soviet Union; (3) Vietnam absolutely has no intention of permitting the Soviet Union to establish military bases within the borders.¹¹⁰

The problem of the so-called "boat people", which was one of the primary causes for the war, has been intensified as the war bogged down. Facing the boat people problem and the war, Japan and ASEAN countries brought these issues to the United Nations in order to settle them at an international forum and also to guarantee the legal position of the Pol Pot regime. Although Japan was slow to respond

to the issues and showed surprising regidity due to its national regulations¹¹¹ she later began to make more positive solutions. Responding to increased international pressure, thus, the Japanese government announced that it would greatly increase its financial contribution to the resettlement of refugees by absorbing one half of the 1979 Indochina budget of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.¹¹²

From June 26 to 30, ASEAN foreign ministers met for their annual meeting in Bali, Indonesia, issuing the subsequent communique which castigated Vietnam for its role in Kampuchea, and also focused upon "the explosive situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border as well as on the refugee problem."¹¹³ Immediately after the Bali conference, Japan, the U.S. and representatives of E.C. talked with ASEAN leaders, and they expressed the view of supporting the ASEAN position.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, Sonoda for the first time stressed the role of China in establishing stable and peaceful regional order, as well as concerted efforts among the US-EC-China-Japan vis-a-vis the Soviet-Vietnam alliance.¹¹⁵ Thus, Japan's position on the Kampuchean situation now is to align itself as closely as possible with that of ASEAN, propped up by the western countries, in addition to China.

While the Sino-Vietnamese conflict ended after a short limited war, the Vietnamese forces have remained in Kampuchea and show no signs of withdrawing. Therefore, the ASEAN countries and the West passed resolutions calling for the immediate departure of Vietnamese forces in the UN General Assembly and at other international forums. Japan also joined this chorus of denunciation of Vietnam and indefinitely freezed a planned 14 billion assistance to Vietnam decided in late 1978.¹¹⁶ On Novem-

ber 14, the UN General Assembly approved an ASEAN resolution calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Kampuchea by a larger margin (19 for, 21 against, with 29 abstentions). Commenting on this success, Chinese **People's Daily** reported that "the relations between Japan and ASEAN countries has now changed from an economic alliance to political one".¹¹⁷ By early 1980, the polarization of the region seemed to be a known fact as Philippine President Marcos stated: "A united ASEAN could serve as a neutral bulwark against a newly appearing realignment of forces in Asia and the Western Pacific that involved the US, China, and Japan on the one hand, and the USSR, Vietnam and India on the other."¹¹⁸ As a result of this, Hanoi portrayed the ASEAN-Japan suggestion as part of a Chinese propaganda package, and contended that "Vietnamese troops would stay until the treat from China is over".¹¹⁹

Thus, the Kampuchean problem was stalemated with an added urgency of Vietnam's penetration into the Thai border. In June 1980, the conference of ASEAN foreign ministers was held, denouncing strongly the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Foreign Minister Okita also strongly blamed Vietnam while offering no clearcut Japanese policy on the issue.¹²⁰ In August, furthermore, newly appointed Foreign Minister Ito's trip to ASEAN countries accomplished no significant results but enhanced the polarization in the region.¹²¹ The Japanese government this time clearly presented its basic policies in order to ease the tension: (1) Japan will support the Democratic Kampuchea along the ASEAN policy line; (2) Japan will not resume its economic assistance to Vietnam at this moment; (3) Japan strongly oppose the Vietnam's intervention into the third country.¹²²

Therefore, by the end of 1980, Japan's Asian policy which was centered on aid to Vietnam has lost its direction.

VI. Conclusion

In summary, let us review the process of the formulation of the Fukuda Doctrine with special reference to Japan's policy-making models we have discussed in the Section II. In the first place, Japan's thrust into Southeast Asia since 1975 was not necessarily a response to American pressure nor "short term self-interest calculations".¹²³

As we have observed, it rather resulted from the convergence of a number of historical circumstances (e.g. the Nixon shock, the oil crisis, Tanaka's visit to Southeast Asia, the fall of Saigon, and growing ASEAN expectation for Japan). Particularly important was the exclusive role played by the Foreign Ministry, and especially the role of the middle echelon in the Ministry should not be overlooked. The role of big business has been minor as exemplified by the fact that Vietnam turned down a Keidanren's request to send its mission there. Thus, political executives and senior diplomats played a central role in formulating the new posture of Japanese foreign policy, while business circles, the mass media, and political opposition parties were largely relegated to a position of spectators.

Second, politicization of the issues involved in the process has been largely prevented, thus averting factional and intra-bureaucratic infighting. This is due to the Foreign Ministry's skillful handling of its equidistant attitudes towards the Soviet Union and China (e.g. the decision to shelve the "hegemony" controversy). Otherwise the consensus within the Cabinet might have

been delayed, and eventual politicization might have hampered the establishment of the Doctrine.

Third, the critical decision model seems to explain the process better than anything else especially in the light of the absence of factional infighting. We could not clearly see the tripartite alliance nor transnational actors. Since the end of Vietnam War the steps were deliberately taken by the Foreign Ministry with coordination of senior diplomats and other bureaucracies. Most important was the termination of traditional "passivity" hypothesized by the decisional culture approach.

Fourth, although the Fukuda Doctrine did not mark the end of Japan's dependence on the United States (e.g. its defence) or her "low profile" posture in international affairs, the description by Professor Hellmann that the new policy was "little more than a restatement of themes central to past Japanese policy"¹²⁴ is inaccurate in that it overemphasizes the limitation imposed on Japanese domestic political politics and policy maneuverability, and ignores the vital role played by the Foreign Ministry. As the Doctrine shows, the Foreign Ministry found the most favorable occasion to pursue its active policy in Southeast Asia where the three major powers' interests overlap. As an example of the new policy, therefore, it is not surprising that Japan seems confident in approaching Vietnam's reconstruction, which she could never take any policy toward Hanoi in the past.

Fifth, the above analysis suggests that Fukuda has opened a new stage in Japan-Southeast Asian relations. The changes, if not newness, can be portrayed by the following *three criteria*.

The first criterion is that the declaration of the Doctrine itself intended to

establish the systematic framework for Japan's conducts in the region, thus replacing the anarchical process of decision-making upon which previous Southeast Asian polices were based. It is therefore not difficult to see post-Doctrine South-east Asian policies largely nurtured by the declared framework.

Second, Since the declaration of the Doctrine the Japanese government has actively been developing its contacts with ASEAN e.g. Japan's support for the regional projects, adoption of the Generalized Scheme of Preference to ASEAN countries, establishment of the fund for cultural exchange, meeting of Japan-ASEAN Foreign Ministers and Economic Ministers. Thus, it seems to be undeniable that since the declaration of the Doctrine ASEAN has become integral to Japan's Southeast Asian policies for the first time in its history.

Third, Japan thought that it could play an extremely significant role (i.e. serving usefully as intermediary role) by helping to convey the peaceful intentions of ASEAN countries to the Indochinese side since the establishment of peaceful relations between the two blocs not only would play

an extremely significant role in the maintenance of stability in the region, but also would affect the degree of independence that the three Indochinese nations were able to manifest in their relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. This rather grandiose attempt can be seen by the Japanese government's request to the United States in October 1978 to normalize relations with Vietnam as well as its meeting with Vietnamese Vice Premier Trinh in December 1978. In other words, for the first time, Japan attempted to exercise its economic power as a leverage vis-a-vis Vietnam in order to minimize regional conflicts.

Sixth, quite contrary to Pepper, the failure and limitation of a Japan's new role in the region stems from its attempted pursuance of long-term ideas or values, i.e, an assistance to Vietnam contributes to regional stability. Thus, until Vietnamese intervention into Kampuchea Japan seemed confident in promoting the three pillars of the Doctrine. What this "failure" of Japanese foreign policy indicates is that Southeast Asian demands and interests have become a growing factor in determining Japan's Southeast Asian policy.

NOTES

- 1 Ian Nish, "Regaining Confidence : Japan After the Loss of Empire," *Journal of Contemporary History*, XV, 1 (January 1980), p. 194.
- 2 Donald C. Hellmann, *Japan and East Asia* (New York : Praeger, 1972), p. 44.
- 3 Koji Watanabe, "Japan and Southeast Asia," *Asian Pacific Community*, no. 10 (Fall 1980), p. 89.
- 4 See, for instance, Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai, *ASEAN to Nihon* (Tokyo : Nihon Keizai Chosa Kyogikai, 1980).
- 5 Thus, Prof. Tsurutani explained the model : "The three member of the triumvirate have been mutually integral and reinforcing, and the past economic success of the country was the fruit of their unity and collaboration." See, Tsurutani Taketsugu, *Political Change in Japan* (New York : David McKay Company, Inc., 1977), p. 94.
- 6 Fukui Haruhiko, "Studies in Policymaking: A Review of Literature" in T.J. Pempel, ed., *Policy-making in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 35.
- 7 See, *ibid.*, pp. 35-48, for a summary of this approach.
- 8 Gerald L. Curtis, "Big Business and Political Influence", in Ezra F. Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1975), p. 68.
- 9 See, Maruyama Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* (Tokyo : Mirai Sha, 1964) and Hosoya Chihiro, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan", *World Politics*, XXVI, 3 (April 1974), pp. 353-369. Also, studies by Vogel, *op. cit.*, Michael K. Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1977), and Watanabe Akio, "Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style", *International Affairs*, LIV, 1 (January 1978), pp. 75-88 belong to this approach.
- 10 James W. White, "Tradition and Politics in Studies of Contemporary Japan", *World Politics*, XXVI, 3 (April 1974), p. 412.
- 11 Kan Ori, "Political Factors in Postwar Japan's Foreign Policy Decisions", in Morton A. Kaplan and Mushakoji Kinhide, eds., *Japan, America, and the Future World Order* (New York : The Free Press, 1976), p. 152.
- 12 Howard Schonberger, "The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," *Pacific Historical Review*, XLVI, 3 (August 1977), pp. 327-359. See also, J.S. Hoadley and Hasegawa Sukehiro, "Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-1970 : An Application of the Linkage Model of International Politics", *International Studies Quarterly*, XV (June 1971), pp. 131-157, for an increasingly important role of transnational actors.

13 See, Haruhiro Fukui, "Okinawa Henkan Kosho : Nihon Seifu ni Okeru Kettei Katei," *Kokusai Seiji* (1974), pp. 97-124.

14 Another case study can be seen in H. Fukui, "Tanaka Goes to Peking," in T.J. Pempel, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 60-102.

15 Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs : The Story of Japan in Crisis* (London : Heinemann, 1961).

16 John W. Dower, "The Supwedomino in Postwar Asia : Japan in and out of the Pentagon Papers", in the Senator Gravel edition, *The Pentagon Papers*, Vol. V (Boston : Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 101-142. See also, K.V. Kesavan, *Japan's Relations with Southeast Asia, 1952-60 with particular reference to the Philippines and Indonesia* (Bombay : Somaiya Publications, 1972), pp. 204-207.

17 See particularly, Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy : The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963) and Fredirick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and Settlement with Japan* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963). Since it was a "partial" treaty Japan had to normalize diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (hereinafter China) depending on external conditions.

18 See, Lawrence Olson, *Japan in Postwar Asia* (New York : Praeger, 1970), pp. 15-32, and Yanaga Chitoshi, *Big Business in Japanese Politics* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 8.

19 The first White Paper of Japan's Diplomacy defined "economic diplomacy" as "peaceful expansion of Japan's economic power", See, *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (Tokyo : Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1957), p. 9. This material will be cited as *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* hereinafter.

20 Yanaga, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

21 Donald C. Hellmann, *Japan in the Postwar East Asian International System* (McLean, Va. : Research Analysis Corporation, 1969), p. 24.

22 Frank C. Langton, *Japan's Foreign Policy* (Vancouver : University of British Columbia, 1973), p. 104.

23 Department of State *Bulletin*, April 26, 1965, pp. 606-610. Therefore, Japan initiated the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in April 1966 and joined ASPAC in October 1966, These events led Prime Minister Sato to visit Southeast Asian countries twice in 1967.

24 *New York Times* (hereinafter *NYT*), October 29, 1967, p. 20.

25 *Ibid.*, August 15, 1970, p. 8.

26 For a discussion of the new era in the region, see, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad : Japan and Okinawa", 91st Congress, Second Session, Part 5, 1970, particularly p. 1162.

27 See, Donald C. Hellmann, *Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley : University of California Press 1969), and Rodger Swearinger, *The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan : Escalating Challenge and Response* (Stanford : Hoover Institution Press, 1978) pp. 71-89.

28 *NYT*, October 23, 1973.

29 See, Matsumoto Shigeharu, "Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influence on Japan's Policy", in A.M. Halpern, ed., *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 123-159. This policy has been applied more or less to two Koreas and two Vietnams.

30 For instance, when Beijing announced four trade conditions, Japanese firms accepted them with little difficulty. See, Chalmers Johnson, "How China and Japan See Each Other", *Foreign Affairs*, L, 4 (July 1972), pp. 711-721.

31 See particularly, Chae-Jin Lee, *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976) and Wolf Mendl, *Issues in Japan's China Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). It also pointed out that Japan "fully understands and respects China's claim to Taiwan".

32 For an intriguing analysis on South Korea, see Yung H. Park, "Japan's Korean Policy, and: Her Perceptions and Expectations Regarding America's Role in Korea", in Yung-hwan Jo, ed. *U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1978), pp. 347-371.

33 For Taiwan, see A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977), a chapter on Japan.

34 *NYT*, January 28, 1973. Japan normalized diplomatic relations with N. Vietnam on September 1973. See *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 22, 1973, p. 1.

35 Department of State *Bulletin*, March 19, 1973, p. 319.

36 *Asahi Shimbun*, January 16, 1974. The Foreign Ministry had little control over Japanese firms, tourists and economic bureaucracies in order to prevent rapid expansion of Japanese economy into Southeast Asia. See, Nagano Nobutoshi, *Gaimusho no Kenkyu* (A Study of the Foreign Ministry) (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1975), pp. 198-199.

37 *Asahi Shimbun* (Evening), January 16, 1974.

38 Yano Toru, "Postwar Structure of Nanshin", *Japan Echo*, I, 1 (1974), pp. 36-45. See also, Franklin B. Weinstein, "Multinational Corporations and the Third World: The case of Japan and Southeast Asia", *International Organization*, XXX, 3 (Summer 1976), pp. 373-404, and Raul S. Manglapus, *Japan in Southeast Asia: Collision Course* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976), for the effects of Japan's postwar Nanshin.

39 For an intriguing analysis on this, see Kenneth I. Juster, "Foreign Policy Making during the Oil Crisis", *Japan Interpreter*, II, 3 (Winter 1977), pp. 293-312.

40 *Asahi Shimbun*, May 1, 1975, p. 2. Furthermore, the statement also reflected changing domestic politics as shown by a declining trend of LDP popularity. For instance, the result of the election of Decem-1976 was a devastating one, thus compelling Prime Minister Miki to resign. The LDP

received only 41% of the vote (compared to 46.9% in 1972), leaving it 7 seats short of a numerical majority. See, *NYT*, December 1, 1976, p. 1.

41 For a study of the Ministry, see particularly, Haruhiro Eukui, "Policy-Making in the Japanese Foreign Ministry," in Robert A. Scalapno, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 3-35.

42 As focal points of the conference, the Foreign Ministry listed the following three points: (1) the moves on the Korean Peninsula, (2) the separation of Southeast Asia from the US, (3) the future direction of diplomacy and internal politics of the Indochina countries. See, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 13, 1975, p. 2.

43 Nagano, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

44 See, *Waga Gaiko no kinkyo* (1975), and *Asahi Shimbun* (evening), September 12, 1975, p. 2.

45 Department of State *Bulletin*, December 29, 1975, pp. 913-916.

46 Hirano Minoru, *Gaiko Kisha Nikki: Miyazawa Gaiko no Ninen* (News Writer's Diary: Two Years of Miyazawa Diplomacy) (Tokyo: Cosei Tushin Sha, 1979), Vol. I, pp. 282-283.

47 Takehiko Nishiyama, "Fukuda Sori no Tonan Azia Rekiho," *Gaiko Jihō*, (October 1977), pp. 3-10.

48 Chihiro Hosoya, "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan," *World Politics*, XXVI, 3 (April 1974), p. 367.

49 Nishiyama, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

50 Hirano, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 119. Miyazawa also added: "If China objects Japan's support for N. Vietnam we can explain to China that Japan should strengthen its relations with Hanoi in order to prevent Hanoi's dependence on the Soviet Union". *Ibid.*

51 *Ibid.*, p. 304.

52 *Asahi Shimbun*, November 27, 1976, p. 2.

53 *Ibid.*, December 28, 1976, p. 2. By this time, Japan and ASEAN countries agreed to establish the Japan-ASEAN Forum as a basis for their cooperation. See, Nishiyama, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

55 Takeo Fukuda, "Waga Shusho Jidai," *Chuo Koron*, (October 1980), p. 292.

56 Yosuke Nakae, "Nihon no Tai Tonan Azia Gaiko," *Keidanren Geppo*, "Keidanren Geppo", (October 1977), p. 27.

57 Department of State *Bulletin*, April 18, 1977 p. 376. *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 23, 1977, p. 2.

58 Yano Toru, "Fukuda Horeki oyobi Fukuda Dokutorin no Hairei" (Background of Fukuda's Trip and the Fukuda Doctrine), *Azia Jihō*, (November 1977), p. 7.

59 See, for instance, *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereinafter *FEER*), April 22, 1977, p. 28.

60 *Mainichi Shimbun*, March 24, 1977, p. 7.

61 *Ibid.*, July 17, 1977, p. 6.

62 *Ibid.*, April 28, 1976, p. 4.

63 *FEER*, April 22, 1977, p. 28.

64 *Ibid.*, February 18, 1977, p. 34.

65 *Japan Times*, July 16, 1977 and see *FEER*, June 24, 1977, p. 17 for the ASEAN Secretary General's view of Japan-ASEAN relations.

66 *Asahi Shimbun*, July 26, 1977, p. 1. As far as this writer is aware of, this is the first time for the Japanese government to use the term. The first appearance in English materials is *FEER*, August 12, 1977, p. 10.

67 Yano, "Fukuda Horeki oyobi Fukuda Dokutorin no Haikei", *op. cit.*, p. 8.

68 *FEER*, August 12, 1977, p. 10.

69 The Federation of Economic Organizations, *Keizai Dantai Rengokai Sanjūnen Shi* (Tokyo: F.E.O., 1978).

70 *Tsusen Janaru*, (April 1977), pp. 4-14.

71 *Boeki Seisaku*, (March 1977), p. 15.

72 *Japan Times*, April 9, 1977.

73 See, for instance, *Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 18, 1977. p. 1.

74 *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (1978), pp. 326-330. *Japan Times*, August 19, 1977.

75 *Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 1977, p. 3.

76 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, September 9, 1977, p. 4.

77 *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (1979), p. 301.

78 See, Yano Toru, "Toward a Reorientation of Asian Policy: The Fukuda Doctrine and Japanese-US Cooperation", In Herbert Passin and Iriye Akira, eds., *Encounter at Shimoda: Search for a New Pacific Partnership* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 127-145.

79 See, for instance, *NYT*, June 19, 1975, p. 9.

80 *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (1978), p. 308.

81 Chae-Jin Lee, "The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty", *Pacific Affairs*, LII, 3 (Fall 1979), p. 429.

82 *Ibid.*, p. 427.

83 Fukuda Takeo, "Waga Shusho Jidai" *op. cit.* p. 293.

84 *Asahi Shimbun*, May 25, 1978, p. 2.

85 It still remains unclear why the incident occurred. See, Daniel Tretiak, "The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude", *Asian Survey*, XVIII, 12 (December 1978), pp. 1235-1249, which concluded that the LDP "hawks" provoked China's belligerent response. See also, Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 430-431, for an opposing interpretation.

86 *Ibid.*, p. 436.

87 RIPS, *Asian Security 1979* (Tokyo : Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1979), p. 3.

88 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Japan's Contribution to military stability in Northeast Asia", 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979, p. 20.

89 *Asahi Shimbun*, July 6, 1978, p. 1. See also, *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 3, 1978, p. 1, for ASEAN's request to Japan on Indochina Problems.

90 *Ibid.*, July 6, 1971, p. 2.

91 *Peking Review*, August 18, 1978, p. 14.

92 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, August 12, 1978, p. 2.

93 *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 24, 1978, p. 2. See also, *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (1979), pp. 349-351.

94 Michael Leifer, "Conflict and Regional Order in South-East Asia", *Adelphi Paper*, No. 162, Winter 1980, p. 26.

95 *Asahi Shimbun*, October 30, 1978, p. 1. See also, *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 15, 1978, p. 4, for the diplomatic offensive and its impacts on the region.

96 RIPS, *Asian Security 1979*, p. 198. *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyo* (1979), pp. 446-447.

97 *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 5, 1978, p. 2.

98 *Ibid.*, November 26, 1978, p. 2. *Asahi Shimbun*, December 3, 1978, p. 2.

99 *Mainichi Shimbun*, (evening) December 15, 1978, p. 2.

100 *Asahi Shimbun* (evening), December 18, 1978, p. 1. Sonoda rejected Vietnam's request for additional aid. *Ibid.*, December 20, 1978, p. 1. Nevertheless, Japan agreed to grant yen loans amounting Y14 billion, and lend 150,000 tons of Japanese rice as well to Vietnam in fiscal 1979.

101 *Ibid.*, December 19, 1978, p. 2. Yet, the Ministry did not deny the possibility of critical situation depending on the Soviet reaction. See, *Mainichi Shimbun*, December 17, 1978, p. 2.

102 *FEER*, January 19, 1979, p. 12.

103 *Asahi Shimbun*, January 7, 1979, p. 2.

104 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, January 10, 1979, p. 1. The government decided to grant "political" assistance to Thailand. See, *Mainichi Shimbun*, January 19, 1979, p. 1.

105 *Asiaweek*, January 26, 1979, pp. 16-17.

106 *Asahi Shimbun* January 17, 1979, p. 2.

107 BBC, *Summary of World Broadcast* (hereinafter *SWB*), February 1979, FE/6050/A3/1.

108 *Asahi Shimbun*, March 2, 1979, p. 2. Sonoda has already sensed that China would soon attack Vietnam in his talks with Deng Xiaoping on February 8. See, *ibid.*, February 9, 1979, p. 2.

109 *Asia Yearbook 1980*, p. 199.

110 *Tokyo Shimbun*, March 21, 1979, *Japan Report*, April 16, 1979, p. 6.

111 See, *Mainichi Shimbun*, December 1, 1, 3, 1978.

112 *Asahi Shimbun*, July 3, 1979, p. 1. *FEER*, July 13 1979, pp. 24-26.

113 *SWB*, July 4, 1979, FE/6158/A3/1-3. China strongly supported the statement. See, *Asahi Shimbun*, July 4, 1979, p. 7.

114 *Ibid.*, (evening) July 2, 1979, p. 1 and July 3, 1979, p. 7.

115 *Ibid.*, July 4, 1979, p. 2. See also, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "The United States, China and Japan", 96th Congress, 1st Session, September 1979.

116 *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 27, 1979, p. 2.

117 *Asahi Shimbun*, November 27, 1979, p. 2. For the vote, see *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, November 15, 1979, p. 3. (evening)

118 *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Asia/Pacific, February 19, 1980.

119 *Bulletin Today* (Manila), May 23, 1980, p. 2.

120 *Asahi Shimbun*, June 26, 27, 28, 29, 1980.

121 See, *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 26, 1980, p. 2, for Vietnam's criticism.

122 *Ibid.*, August 28, 1980, p. 2.

123 See, Thomas Pepper, "Japan's Asian Policy," *Pacific Community*, (April 1978), pp. 411-423.

124 Donald C. Hellman, "Japan and Southeast Asia: Continuity Amidst Change," *Asian Survey*, XIX, 12 (December 1979), p. 1196. Neither it was merely to improve a poor image of Japan. See, on this point, William W. Haddad, "Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 11, 1 (June 1980), pp. 10-29.