Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Studies

Research Article

Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Studies
https://so02.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/hasss
ISSN (Online): 2630-0079

WHEN SCHOOLS CLOSE: CRISIS GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION CONTINUITY IN THAILAND'S BORDER CONFLICT

Lapasrada Jitwarin[1] and Tawatchai Jitwarin[2]*

[1] Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, Thailand
[2] Samut Sakhon Community College,Thailand

ABSTRACT

The 2025 Thai-Cambodian border conflict closed roughly 751 schools and displaced over 131,000 students across four northeastern Thai provinces, exposing how a functioning, non-fragile state can nonetheless govern a crisis with no plan at all. Drawing on crisis governance and policy process theory, this study asks why a foreseeable risk never produced a pre-conflict continuity policy, and what happened to decision-making once the conflict removed that option. Using a qualitative design, the study analyzes 28 semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires with education administrators, supervisors, school leaders, teachers, and parents across the affected provinces, supplemented by four interviews with local administrative organization officers probing the fiscal-governance dimension of the resulting framework. Three findings emerge: the absence of a national education-continuity policy left front-line administrators and teachers as de facto policymakers, improvising under the conditions of street-level bureaucracy; the conflict functioned as a focusing event that could have opened a policy window, but has not yet been converted into legislation; and psychosocial and staffing gaps were compounded because no institution held clear coordinating authority. Building on these findings, the study develops the SHIELD Model (Structural, Hybrid, Interagency, Emotional, Leadership, and Data-driven framework), a six-component crisis-governance architecture that operationalizes the sense-making, coordinating, and learning tasks central to crisis leadership theory at the national, service-area, and school levels. The Model offers a template for converting a focusing event into durable continuity policy before, rather than after, the next crisis.

Keywords: Crisis governance; policy windows; street-level bureaucracy; education continuity; SHIELD Model

***Corresponding author:**
Lapasrada Jitwarin
lapasrada.jit@mahidol.ac.th

***Received:** 6 July 2026*
***Revised:** 12 September 2026*
***Accepted:** 14 September 2026*
***Published:** 23 November 2026*

Citation:
Jitwarin, L., & Jitwarin, T. (2026). When schools close: Crisis governance and education continuity in Thailand's border conflict. Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Studies, 26(3), 798–813. https://doi.org/10.69598/hasss.26.3.288231

1. INTRODUCTION

Children rely on educational institutions primarily when the very protection mechanisms meant to ensure their wellbeing are least capable of fulfilling this responsibility. Despite decades of international calls to create national frameworks for education during crises, legislative action remains largely symbolic. Continuity policies do not exist in most low- and middle-income countries; funding is never budgeted, and training is insufficient. Such deficiencies are amply documented by researchers in the field in terms of learning

losses, psychological damage sustained by students and educators alike, and disproportionate dropout rates among the most vulnerable groups.

In 2025, Thailand provided another illustration. As soon as the armed clashes broke out on the northeastern border of the country in July, the government closed at least 751 schools in Ubon Ratchathani, Si Sa Ket, Buriram, and Surin, displacing over 131,000 students (Human Rights Watch, 2025; Office of the Basic Education Commission [OBEC], 2025). Rather than crisis-management efforts, what followed was sheer improvisation by the teachers, lack of common protocols among the participating agencies, and neglect of psychosocial care for children traumatized by the conflict. It can be said that the conflict itself operated as an unauthorized stress-test for the education sector in Thailand, whose result was crystal clear: the lack of a national policy for education continuity made the whole system collapse.

This study uses findings from field research in all four provinces impacted by the crisis to achieve two objectives: firstly, it documents the governance gaps exposed in the process of handling the situation and secondly, develops the framework for addressing these gaps and preventing their further appearance. The SHIELD Model is outlined here and explained in detail. The model should prove useful for other countries facing similar challenges; namely, countries with ongoing internal conflict and without a coherent national policy for education continuity.

A number of factors in the political-economic context of Thailand account for the way the 2025 crisis unfolded. As of 2025, the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999) regulates a centralized public-school system managed by the Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC); OBEC is in charge of setting policies, managing the curriculum, and supervising approximately 30,000 public schools operating nationwide (Office of the National Education Commission, 1999; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2024). The education system operates under the six-three-three scheme with nine years of compulsory free education. While these formal regulations help explain how the system works, its structure is undermined by a pre-existing structural inequality that the conflict exposed rather than caused: all four affected provinces sit within Isan, the country's poorest and most educationally disadvantaged region (Equitable Education Fund [EEF], 2025a; Pholphirul et al., 2023), which revealed a vulnerability foreshadowed by United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF] Thailand's (2025) own pre-crisis assessment of schools' emergency-preparedness gaps. It was this pre-existing disadvantage, and not the conflict alone, that determined which communities had offline kits, functioning devices, and psychosocial specialists to fall back on when the closures began.

To fully understand the policy gap, one has to consider the overall context of Thailand's governance. The National Education Act passed in 1999 laid down the foundations of quality, equality, and decentralization. However, further reforms only provided cosmetic changes to teaching methodologies, ICT integration, and school administration in the following decade (Hallinger & Kantamara, 2000; Hallinger & Lee, 2011). As of 2022, according to the PISA test, Thailand was placed only 58th in mathematics and sciences and 64th in reading out of 81 countries; this was the worst performance of Thailand's students in the history of participating in PISA, which dates back to 2001; the problem was particularly acute for rural and poor communities (OECD, 2023). On the positive side, the coronavirus pandemic provided some experience for the government: as of 2021, OBEC successfully introduced a five-modality learning framework (OBEC, 2021). Nevertheless, this framework was never adopted formally as a strategy for handling emergencies and was not implemented upon the outbreak of the conflict. The National Strategy B.E. 2561–2580 (2018–2037) includes measures aimed at threat preparedness (Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council, 2018), and the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Act of 2007 created a national disaster management committee under the auspices of the Prime Minister. Neither piece of legislation makes education continuity during the armed conflict a priority. According to the joint assessment by Save the Children Thailand, UNICEF Thailand, and OBEC, this was noted as early as 2016. Still, nothing was done to formalize this finding legally.

Section 2 introduces the theoretical background behind Thailand's experience. Section 3 discusses the methodology used in conducting the fieldwork and analyzing the findings. Section 4 identifies three major gaps in education governance and presents the SHIELD Model, the policy framework derived from the analysis of these gaps. Section 5 discusses these findings in relation to the existing literature and the study's objectives. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW: EDUCATION GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN CONFLICT

Armed conflict adversely impacts education systems through multiple channels. Physical facilities are damaged or used by military forces, educational professionals flee conflict zones, and children attend schools bearing psychological trauma from the experiences that extend beyond the cessation of the conflict

(Novelli et al., 2015). The cases of Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan show consistent trends in this area: widespread school closures, curricula abandonment, and both students and instructors conducting classes without the relevant institutional support in dealing with trauma (Human Rights Watch, 2023; UNICEF, 2024). The scale of the damage is alarming. As of January 2023, the majority of women instructors in Ukraine (61%) reported high emotional exhaustion (Tsybuliak et al., 2023), and, based on the results of a comprehensive study of Ukrainian adolescents, 16% of the participants who experienced long-term armed conflict had PTSD symptoms compared to 1% of their peers who did not (Goto et al., 2024). Females in particular experience severe effects of conflict which affects their access to education. For example, girls are 2.5 times more likely than boys to suffer from schooling exclusion amid the ongoing fighting (UNICEF, 2016).

However, this body of literature predominantly derives from fragile or protracted-conflict settings, where state capacity was already compromised before violence broke out. Sudden-onset conflict erupting within otherwise higher-capacity, non-fragile states offers a more analogous comparison to the 2025 Thai case. In the Philippines, the five-month Marawi siege of 2017 forced the cancellation of classes in over 150 schools and disrupted the education of tens of thousands of children in a single, previously stable city, despite the country's functioning national bureaucracy (UNICEF Philippines, 2017). Similarly, Ecuador's abrupt declaration of an "internal armed conflict" against organized crime in January 2024 triggered a nationwide, government-ordered suspension of in-person classes with no pre-existing continuity policy in place, even though Ecuador had, until that point, been considered one of the more institutionally stable states in the region (Loakman, 2024). These cases suggest that the central vulnerability is not a lack of state capacity per se, but the absence of a pre-conflict education continuity policy that can be activated at the moment a functioning bureaucracy is confronted with sudden violence: this is precisely the governance gap this study identifies in Thailand.

The main reason behind the scale of adverse impacts outlined above is poor governance, which predates the conflict itself and is not an effect thereof. Kingdon's (1984) multiple-streams framework offers a useful lens here: policy change requires a problem stream (evidence that something is wrong), a policy stream (ready-made solutions), and a politics stream (the will to act), which converge only when a policy window opens. As shown above, Thailand's problem stream had existed for years, visible in Isan's persistent poverty and the country's disappointing PISA performance; the policy stream was not lacking either, since OBEC's own COVID-19 five-modality learning framework (OBEC, 2021) had already demonstrated the state's technical capacity to design flexible delivery mechanisms. What was missing was the politics stream: without a dramatic, attention-catching event, education-continuity planning never rose high enough on the agenda to be enacted before the crisis it was meant to pre-empt. As Burde et al. (2015) put it, whether a school survives conflict depends more on preparedness than on the degree of armed violence, and preparedness, in Kingdon's terms, is a policy-stream product that a closed political window prevents from ever being adopted.

Disasters and armed conflicts of this kind are what Birkland (1997) calls focusing events: sudden, harmful occurrences that briefly concentrate public and elite attention on a problem which community with a limited policy had long tried, unsuccessfully, to place on the agenda. A focusing event does not guarantee policy change; it only opens a window that can close again, if no coalition organizes to act while attention lasts. This distinction reframes the central puzzle of the present study: namely, not why Thailand's education system "failed" in some general sense, but why a foreseeable, well-documented risk was never converted into pre-conflict policy, and whether the 2025 conflict itself now constitutes the focusing event capable of forcing that conversion. The problems Thai schools experienced were therefore neither accidental nor unpredictable; they were the observable signature of a closed policy window.

Once a policy window opens (or, as in Thailand's case, remains firmly shut), someone still has to run the schools. Boin et al. (2005) identify five tasks that crisis leadership must perform regardless of whether formal policy exists: sense-making (working out what is actually happening), decision-making and coordinating (organizing a response across agencies), meaning-making (communicating a credible account to the public), terminating (declaring the acute phase over), and learning (converting experience into institutional change). In the absence of a national policy, these tasks in Thailand fell not to designated crisis managers, but to individual school and district administrators, who had to sense-make, coordinate, and communicate with no mandate, no training, and no budget line for the purpose. This is precisely the condition Lipsky (1980) describes as street-level bureaucracy: front-line workers, granted no formal discretion, nonetheless become the policy by default because someone has to decide, in real time, who gets served and how. The SHIELD Model developed in Section 4.4 is best understood as an attempt to relocate Boin et al.'s (2005) crisis leadership tasks away from improvising street-level bureaucrats and back into a designed governance architecture, before the next focusing event arrives.

The Structural Readiness component developed in Section 4.4 rests on a claim about intergovernmental finance as much as about crisis leadership, and that claim has its own theoretical lineage independent of the policy-process literature reviewed above. Fiscal federalism theory holds that assigning taxing, spending, and decision authority to the level of government closest to the affected population improves both efficiency and responsiveness, provided the central government retains a standard-setting and stabilizing role (Oates, 1972, 2005; Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). This logic extends into crisis outcomes specifically: cross-country evidence associates greater fiscal decentralization with fewer disaster-related fatalities, an effect that strengthens when fiscal decentralization is paired with political decentralization rather than pursued alone (Iqbal & Ahmed, 2009; Skidmore & Toya, 2013), and public-budgeting scholarship treats a jurisdiction's capacity to reallocate funds without a full appropriations cycle as itself a component of emergency-management readiness (Donahue & Joyce, 2001). Thailand's own Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization to Local Government Organization Act B.E. 2542 (1999) already assigns local administrative organizations independent budgetary authority under ordinary circumstances (Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Commission, 1999; Shah et al., 2012). The gap identified in Section 4.4.1 is, therefore, not the absence of decentralized fiscal machinery in Thai law generally, but its absence from education-continuity planning specifically; from this point of view, the S component is less a governance innovation than an application of established intergovernmental-finance principles to a sector where they have not yet been extended.

It is surprising that the topic of education-governance challenges amid conflict remains understudied in such conflict-prone regions as Southeast Asia, considering its rich history of border conflicts, insurgencies, and disaster-related school closures. For instance, school destruction and teacher displacement in Mindanao (Philippines) occur systematically due to conflict and require external funding and reconstruction efforts, although there is much experience accumulated locally that could be institutionalized (UNICEF, 2021). Moreover, in Thailand's three southern provinces, numerous years of insurgency have contributed significantly to practitioners' experience of working in insecure conditions, but there was still no attempt to develop this knowledge into national policy (Save the Children Thailand et al., 2016). As opposed to these examples, the case of the 2025 Thai-Cambodian conflict is interesting, because it involves a previously peaceful territory and occurs so abruptly that there is no opportunity for preparation beforehand.

A common finding from recent studies on education during emergencies relates to teachers along with school facilities. According to Winthrop and Kirk (2008), teachers' level of motivation and confidence in their skills matter more to learning outcomes in conflict settings than the availability of school infrastructure. Further research expands this finding to the psychological sphere: the lack of crisis-oriented skills and institutional support increases the risk of educators' exhaustion and even professional burnout (Tsybuliak et al., 2023). There is an overwhelming consensus in the literature on the necessity to incorporate crisis pedagogy training into both preservice and inservice programs (Burde et al., 2015; Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies [INEE], 2024). Nevertheless, few countries managed to sustain this measure. Bridging the gap between evidence and practice is one of the goals of the SHIELD Model.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research design

This study adopts a qualitative single-case design (Yin, 2018; Creswell & Poth, 2018) set within an interpretive policy inquiry approach (Yanow, 2000). Closed-response instruments were ruled out early: understanding how administrators, teachers, and parents made sense of a policy vacuum in real time required room for them to describe, explain, and reflect on their own terms, which only semi-structured interviews and open-ended questionnaires could provide. To situate these accounts within the wider governance picture, the study also draws on peer-reviewed literature, international organizations' reports, and Thai government policy documents spanning 2010 to 2025, which together supply the comparative and conceptual backdrop for interpreting the interview data.

3.2 Participants

Sampling combined purposive selection with snowball referral, yielding 28 informants, the point at which thematic saturation was reached (see below), and which was drawn from the four northeastern border provinces affected by the 2025 conflict: Ubon Ratchathani, Si Sa Ket, Buriram, and Surin. The final sample comprised four educational area administrators, four educational supervisors, four school administrators, eight teachers, and eight parents whose children attended affected schools. Recruitment deliberately pursued variation along two axes: governance level (national, service area, and school) and stakeholder category (administration, instruction, and community).

Key informants were required to meet the following inclusion criteria: (a) direct, first-hand involvement in managing, delivering, or receiving education during the school closures precipitated by the 2025 conflict; (b) residence or duty station in one of the four affected provinces at the time of the crisis; and (c) a minimum of four weeks of continuous engagement with the affected school system during the closure period, so that informants could talk about governance processes rather than isolated incidents. Administrators, supervisors, and school leaders were additionally required to hold a formal decision-making or coordination role during the crisis; teachers were required to have taught in an affected school during the closures; and parents were required to have at least one child enrolled in an affected school at the time. Individuals who learned of the crisis only second-hand, or whose direct involvement began only after the closures had ended, were excluded.

The selection process began with the identification of an initial pool of contacts through the researcher's professional network within OBEC's regional education service areas, supplemented by publicly available lists of school and education-area administrators in the four affected provinces. From this pool, four initial informants per province, one from each stakeholder category, were purposively selected to maximize variation in governance level and role. Each initial informant was then asked to nominate up to two further potential informants who met the inclusion criteria above; nominees were screened against these criteria before being approached, and referral chains were capped at two waves per starting informant to limit homogeneity bias. Recruitment continued iteratively across the four provinces until thematic saturation was observed, at which point enrolment was closed. Of the 34 individuals approached in this manner, 28 (82%) consented to participate; the remaining six declined or were unavailable within the September–December 2025 data collection window.

3.3 Supplementary informants: fiscal-governance triangulation

Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 develop a fiscal-decentralization argument that the core sample could talk about only from the receiving end of the budget process. To triangulate this dimension, a supplementary round of four semi-structured interviews was conducted with local administrative organization (LAO) officers, one from each affected province, a stakeholder category outside the 28-informant sample described above. LAO officers hold statutory responsibility for local budget execution and were purposively selected for direct experience with education-related requests during the closure period. Recruitment, consent, and interview procedures followed the protocol described in Sections 3.4–3.7; the resulting transcripts were analyzed using the same thematic-analysis procedure described in Section 3.6. This supplementary group is reported separately from, and does not enlarge, the core 28-informant sample on which the study's saturation and demographic claims rest; its quotations are identified throughout as LAO Officers 1–4.

3.4 Interview guideline

Item generation followed two tracks: deductively from the INEE Minimum Standards domains (INEE, 2024), and inductively from a preliminary scan of the education-governance literature. Three experts in conflict-context education policy then rated content validity using the Item-level Content Validity Index (Lynn, 1986; Polit & Beck, 2006); with a three-member panel the required threshold is a perfect I-CVI of 1.00 per item (Polit & Beck, 2006), and items falling short were revised or dropped. A pilot round with two educators outside the sample checked item clarity, language, and completion time, and the guide was adjusted accordingly.

Eighteen open-ended questions made up the final guide, organized around four themes: governance issues during the conflict period, instructional and logistical response strategies, psychological factors, and policy implications. The same four themes structured a parallel questionnaire, offered to informants who preferred written reflection or could not be reached for an interview.

3.5 Data collection

Data collection ran from September to December 2025, in person and over video calls, with sessions averaging 60 to 90 minutes. Every interview was audio-recorded with consent and transcribed verbatim in Thai; questionnaires went out on a rolling basis and were returned within a week, in either digital or paper form. The researchers translated all transcripts into English, an independent research assistant back-translated them, and Brislin's (1970) procedure was used to confirm equivalence between versions.

3.6 Data analysis

Transcripts and questionnaire responses were analyzed using Braun and Clarke's (2006, 2021) six-step reflexive thematic analysis, moving from familiarization through coding, theme generation, theme review, definition, and finally write-up, with coding managed in NVivo 14. Rigor followed Lincoln and Guba's (1985) four criteria: credibility, built on four months of field immersion, triangulated sources, peer debriefing, and member checking with six purposively selected informants; transferability, supported by rich contextual

description; dependability, maintained through a reflective audit trail; and confirmability, achieved by grounding interpretation in the participants' own testimonies.

3.7 Ethical considerations

The Institutional Review Board of the Committee for Research Ethics (Social Science), Mahidol University, approved this study (Certificate of Approval No. 2025/086.2509; approved September 25, 2025), and all procedures followed the Declaration of Helsinki. Every participant gave written informed consent before the data collection began. Because the subject matter touched on conflict-related distress, a protocol was designed to minimize re-traumatization risk, and referral pathways to psychological support remained available to all informants for the duration of the study.

4. FINDINGS: GOVERNANCE GAPS AND THE SHIELD MODEL

Three recurring governance gaps emerged from the interview and questionnaire data. Each is presented below together with participants' own accounts.

4.1 Gap 1: Inadequate national-level policy on education continuity during conflict

No statute, budget line, or command protocol existed anywhere in the Thai system for keeping schools running through armed conflict when the 2025 crisis began. In the vocabulary introduced in Section 2, this is what a closed policy window looks like from the inside: individual school and district administrators, not designated crisis managers, were left performing crisis leadership's sense-making and decision-making tasks (Boin et al., 2005) with no institutional mandate to do so. One administrator described it this way:

> *In the time of crisis, the responsibilities of an administrator went beyond teaching management to also include safety management, evacuation, inter-agency cooperation, and communicating emergencies in parallel… there was a lack of systematic specialized training in wartime education management; everything had to be done by guesswork.* (School Administrator 8, personal communication, October 3, 2025)

This absence propagated through every layer of the system. OBEC did eventually issue localized continuity instructions (OBEC, 2025), but only once the crisis was already underway, which was a policy produced in reaction to a focusing event rather than in anticipation of one (Birkland, 1997), and too late to substitute for guidance that needed to exist beforehand. Benchmarked against the INEE (2024) standards, the resulting gaps span all four recognized governance domains, summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Policy gap analysis: Thailand's wartime education governance against INEE (2024) standards

Domain	Current status in Thailand	Policy gap identified	Recommended policy response
Access & learning environment	Ad hoc shelter learning; no student tracking	No emergency enrolment protocols; no displaced-student registry	Mobile student registry; emergency learning kits; temporary learning spaces
Teaching & learning	Improvised hybrid and paper-based delivery	No national emergency curriculum; no flexible assessment system	Condensed emergency curriculum; competency-based assessment
Teachers & personnel	Existing teachers assumed multiple emergency roles without training	No emergency teacher pool; no crisis-pedagogy professional development	Emergency pedagogy professional development program; crisis allowances
Education policy	Decentralized, reactive responses by local administrators	No national education continuity in emergencies policy; no crisis coordination center	National education continuity in emergencies policy; national crisis education coordination center

4.2 Gap 2: Insufficient psychosocial support infrastructure

A second gap concerned the near-total absence of psychosocial infrastructure. Children arriving in makeshift classrooms carried fear, anxiety, PTSD symptoms, concentration difficulties, and behavioral regression, while the institutions receiving them had neither the clinical knowledge nor the organizational capacity to respond:

> *The sounds of the explosions or evacuations or news of violent incidents caused feelings of fear and anxiety in children, some of whom became withdrawn or had problems concentrating. Teachers therefore spent considerable time and effort on helping children cope psychologically rather than teaching the content.* (Educational Supervisor 3, personal communication, October 4, 2025)

Teachers were not bystanders to the trauma they were expected to manage: many had lived through the same violence as their students, yet were still required to double as counselors, safety officers, and evacuation coordinators with no training in any of these roles:

> *Teachers had to make quick transitions from teaching inside the classroom to facilitating lessons in shelters… However, teachers had never been trained to deliver psychosocial support or flexible lessons. It resulted in additional pressure, exhaustion, and confusion.* (Teacher 6, personal communication, October 13, 2025)

Mandatory mental health checkups as well as referral procedures were not instituted; moreover, teachers were never taught trauma-informed teaching strategies. This gap is consistent with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA], 2014) six-principle framework for trauma-informed practice, which holds that an organization cannot claim to support trauma-affected people unless safety, trustworthiness, and skill-building are designed into everyday routines rather than added afterwards as a referral service; in the absence of that design work, learning stalls no matter what physical infrastructure is available.

4.3 Gap 3: Infrastructure constraints and lack of skilled staff

The third gap was material rather than procedural: schools lacked the equipment and trained staff to sustain any alternative to in-person instruction. Distance-learning infrastructure was largely absent, evacuation sites were never built for teaching, and in several border towns even basic infrastructure communications failed outright:

> *Technology and communication limitations: there were problems with either telephone service or internet access in some communities during the unrest period.* (Educational Supervisor 3, personal communication, October 4, 2025)

> *Lack of equipment for students or insufficient internet connection to facilitate online learning.* (Teacher 1, personal communication, October 2, 2025)

Comparable shortages have been documented in Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine (Human Rights Watch, 2023; UNICEF, 2021), but the Thai case stands out for how avoidable it was: no learning kits, no makeshift-facility plans, and no roster for mobilizing educators existed anywhere in the system before the conflict began. The EEF's post-hoc learning centers (EEF, 2025b) showed that Thai civil society could improvise competently under pressure, which only sharpens the question of why none of this had been pre-positioned when the underlying risk, as Section 1 explained, was already well documented.

4.4 The SHIELD Model: A Governance Policy Framework

All three governance weaknesses seen in the case of Thailand exist in the Global South. An education system with no previous governance preparedness plan tends to show certain consistent characteristics: lack of national policy, lack of psychosocial structure, and an unprepared workforce for any critical situation. The SHIELD Model (Structural, Hybrid, Interagency, Emotional, Leadership, and Data-driven framework) translates Boin et al.'s (2005) crisis leadership tasks into a designed governance architecture rather than leaving them to improvising street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980); each element of the model deals with one specific gap and can be easily adapted into many different institutional settings.

The governance hierarchy on which the model works includes three levels: national policy level, education service area level, and school level. There are six components of the model, each having a similar goal: equity and continuation of the education process (see Figure 1). Table 2 shows all the elements of the SHIELD model. Each of these components is associated with a particular governance level and mapped onto one or more of Boin et al.'s (2005) crisis leadership tasks, so that the model as a whole covers sense-making, decision-making and coordinating, meaning-making, and learning (Boin et al., 2005; Kingdon, 1984).




Figure 1: The SHIELD Model: Structural, Hybrid, Interagency, Emotional, Leadership, and Data-driven framework for education continuity in conflict. Components operate across three governance levels (national policy [S], education service area [H, I], and school [E, L]), with the Data-driven Equity Feedback loop [D] closing the cycle back to the national level.

Table 2: The SHIELD Model: components, governance levels, theoretical bases, and policy implications

Code	Component	Governance level	Theoretical basis	Primary policy implication
S	Structural readiness	National policy	Policy-window theory; sense-making and decision-making tasks (Kingdon, 1984; Boin et al., 2005); fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972, 2005)	Enact a national education continuity in emergencies policy with legal mandate, command structure, and budget line
H	Hybrid & flexible learning	Education service area	Coordinating task; street-level bureaucracy and adaptive discretion (Boin et al., 2005; Lipsky, 1980)	Mandate multi-modal learning infrastructure including offline kits and temporary learning spaces
I	Interagency coordination center	Education service area	Coordinating task; whole-of-government crisis response (Boin et al., 2005); decentralized disaster response (Iqbal & Ahmed, 2009; Skidmore & Toya, 2013)	Establish a national crisis education coordination center with cross-sector mandate
E	Emotional & psychosocial care system	School level	Meaning-making task; trauma-informed practice (SAMHSA, 2014; Boin et al., 2005)	Mandate psychosocial screening, referral pathways, and trauma-informed pedagogy as core school functions
L	Leadership & teacher upskilling	School level	Sense-making and meaning-making tasks; street-level bureaucracy training (Boin et al., 2005; Lipsky, 1980)	Fund a pre-conflict emergency pedagogy professional development program as a mandatory credential
D	Data-driven equity feedback	Cross-cutting (feedback loop)	Learning task; policy feedback and institutional learning (Boin et al., 2005; Kingdon, 1984)	Mandate disaggregated (displacement, gender, nationality) outcome data collection that feeds back into the national readiness policy cycle

4.4.1 S: Structural readiness: preventive governance at the national policy level

The Structural Readiness component bridges the first gap in that it lays down the legislative and institutional groundwork without which none of the remaining model components can be developed. The component operationalizes the sense-making and decision-making tasks of crisis leadership theory (Boin et al., 2005), and directly answers Kingdon's (1984) politics-stream problem: without it, no policy window can ever be converted into legislation before a crisis, only during or after one. In order to address the first gap, the country requires a policy on national education continuity during emergencies. The policy should clearly outline the command structure, legal requirements, and budget allocation for this issue. Critically, this budget allocation cannot be held centrally alone: a purely central emergency fund reintroduces the same bottleneck the 2025 crisis exposed, so the policy should pre-authorize education service area directors to disburse a ring-fenced emergency budget line directly to schools without case-by-case central approval. Otherwise, any reaction toward armed conflict will rely on improvised solutions at the local level. Interviews with local administrative organization officers, conducted specifically to test this component against the perspective of the officials who would execute it, corroborate the bottleneck this provision is designed to remove:

> *Under normal circumstances, budget requests can follow standard administrative procedures. However, during an emergency, we cannot wait for every request to receive central approval before helping children. If local administrative organizations were provided with a pre-allocated emergency education budget and clear rules for its use, we could immediately support affected schools… The central government should establish the policy framework and accountability mechanisms, but decision-making authority and budget management should be decentralized so that local areas can respond rapidly to the situation.* (LAO Officer 1, personal communication, October 14, 2025)

A second officer situated this claim within a system-preparedness argument rather than a case-by-case one, framing decentralization as something that has to be pre-authorized before the next crisis rather than negotiated during it: "The system should have a pre-established emergency education fund that can be activated immediately when specified conditions occur… This approach would ensure that decentralization is not merely a transfer of responsibilities, but a form of system preparedness that allows decisions and resources to reach children and schools at the time they are needed most" (LAO Officer 4, personal communication, October 14, 2025). From a practical perspective, the implementation of the S component involves the following actions.

4.4.2 H and I: Hybrid learning and interagency coordination: adaptive governance at the service-area level

The two components, H and I, are service area-focused, working in tandem to solve Gap 3. The first component of the proposal is the Hybrid and Flexible Learning strategy that operationalizes the coordinating task of crisis leadership (Boin et al., 2005) at the point where street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) currently improvise alone. In terms of policy formulation, this requires a legislative provision for multi-modal learning systems, which include off-line learning modules that can be used even without internet access, as well as an emergency curriculum concentrating on key literacy, numeracy, and life skills. The second proposed component is the Interagency Coordination Center, which operationalizes the coordinating task of crisis leadership theory (Boin et al., 2005). This implies the creation of a national center of crisis education that will have a multisectoral mandate and will provide real-time tracking, allocation of resources among agencies, as well as liaison with security, health, and civil society organizations.

Local administrative organization officers, who would sit alongside education service areas within this coordination structure, independently converged on the same design principle from the resource-mobilization side:

> *During a crisis, schools cannot solve problems alone. Education management must be connected with safety, public health, child protection, and assistance for affected families… With appropriate fiscal decentralization, local administrative organizations could immediately plan and mobilize resources together with education service areas, schools, public health agencies, and civil society organizations, rather than waiting for instructions and budget allocations to pass through multiple administrative levels.* (LAO Officer 3, personal communication, October 14, 2025)

Read together with the H and I components above, this account supports the view that interagency coordination and fiscal decentralization are not separable reforms; a coordination center with real-time tracking authority, but no local disbursement power would simply relocate the same bottleneck at one administrative level lower down.

4.4.3 E and L: Emotional care, leadership upskilling, and equity: transformative governance at the school level

At the school level, components E and L are designed to solve Gap 2. The Emotional and Psychosocial Care System operationalizes the meaning-making task of crisis leadership (Boin et al., 2005), applying SAMHSA's (2014) trauma-informed principles, so that psychosocial care is designed into everyday school routines rather than left to individual teachers' improvised judgment. The corresponding policy solution would ensure that the screening, referral, and trauma informed pedagogical practices are among the core activities of schools and not optional strategies to be considered once continuity of education is achieved. Component L will utilize crisis leadership theory (Boin et al., 2005), calling for the establishment of a pre-conflict emergency pedagogy program that includes such elements as communication, psychosocial first aid, instructional design, and evacuation procedures. These measures are to be taken as mandatory pre-service or in-service credentials and not as additional training to be conducted once the crisis occurs.

The normative foundations of the whole model consist in recognizing the right of every child to access continuous and quality education during armed conflicts, no matter his or her displacement, socio-economic background, and even citizenship. In practice, the coordination center needs to disaggregate its monitoring results by displacement, gender, and nationality. In addition, the emergency enrollment procedures should take into account cross-border children. Emergency messages should be available to communities in the relevant languages.

4.4.4 D: Data-driven equity feedback – closing the cycle

The sixth component, Data-driven Equity Feedback (D), is what sets the SHIELD Model apart from other emergency response models: rather than a one-off checklist, the model operates as a cyclic process. Feedback is gained from data collected using the equity and education continuity outcomes assessment, such as student enrollment, academic progress, and psychological well-being, disaggregated by displacement, gender, and nationality, which then feeds into the Structural Readiness component (S), thereby enabling further policy amendments. This is precisely the learning task that Boin et al. (2005) identify as crisis leadership's fifth and most neglected function: converting lived experience into institutional change rather than allowing the policy window to close unused once the acute crisis ends (Birkland, 1997). Without real-time data from the Interagency Coordination Center (I), the cycle cannot function; lack of coordination makes information non-actionable.

5. DISCUSSION

This study set out to achieve two objectives: to document the governance gaps exposed by the 2025 Thai-Cambodian border conflict, and to translate these gaps into a policy framework capable of preventing their recurrence. The three governance gaps identified in Section 4, and the SHIELD Model developed from them, are aimed directly at both objectives. This section interprets these findings against the existing literature on education in emergencies and governance theory, situates the SHIELD Model relative to established frameworks, and considers the limitations of the study design.

5.1 Comparative positioning

Firstly, and most importantly, the SHIELD Model clearly specifies the actor who should ensure the delivery of quality education during emergencies, as well as the respective institutional level and the associated legal authority to do so (information not present in the INEE Minimum Standards, 2024). While building on earlier conceptual approaches (Burde et al., 2015; Winthrop & Kirk, 2008), the SHIELD Model provides an analysis of a multi-level governance approach instead of a tool to evaluate specific programs, and the evidence for all elements of the proposed framework comes from a source that is generally under-represented in the literature on this issue. In policy-process terms, the Model is a deliberate attempt to keep a policy window open past the moment the focusing event fades from headlines (Kingdon, 1984; Birkland, 1997), something the practitioner-facing INEE Standards, by design, do not attempt to theorize.

As far as Thailand is concerned, this choice is particularly justified because this country cannot be classified either as a fragile state or a post-conflict setting. Being an upper-middle-income economy with the GDP (PPP) in 2023 estimated at approximately $1.3 trillion and an education budget of approximately $12.9 billion (representing 2.5% of the GDP; World Bank, 2024), Thailand has a functional centralized education bureaucracy (i.e., the Office of the Basic Education Commission, OBEC) which routinely conducts national and international student assessments (such as TIMSS and PISA) and even operated a five-modality distance learning program after the COVID-19 outbreak (OBEC, 2021). By any measure of education sector capabilities, Thailand has a highly robust system. However, the 2025 crisis revealed a significant policy gap. Indeed, while the current disaster risk reduction and emergency management framework, i.e., the Disaster Prevention and

Mitigation Act B.E. 2550 (2007), covers all matters related to the former, but not to the latter, the law on education, specifically the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999) issued by the Office of the National Education Commission (1999), has not been amended for the past couple of decades and does not contain relevant information related to educational continuity. Thus, the lack of governance in this particular area stems not from structural weakness, but a specific type of vulnerability that can easily emerge in otherwise competent organizations. Thailand had the necessary institutional capabilities, but no relevant legal authority or command structures existed to facilitate collective action following the outbreak of the conflict. Consequently, when applying the model to other countries, this feature must be taken into account, and it is clear that it will only work for those countries that have similar governance systems, but no conflict-preparedness measures in place.

Another important point about the Thai case concerns regional inequality, which makes the situation there even more complex. Isan is one-third of the land area and population of Thailand and has historically been the poorest part of the country. Students from the four largest cities of Isan province are among the poorest in the country and consistently score the lowest across standardized tests in all subjects (EEF, 2025a). Indeed, Thailand ranked the lowest in mathematics, science, and reading on the 2022 PISA scores (394, 409, and 379, respectively) and showed significantly lower results compared to the average of the developed OECD countries; moreover, the difference in learning outcomes between the children from the richest and poorest quartiles of the country's income distribution exceeds 60–70 score points per test (OECD, 2023; Equitable Education Research Institute, 2024). Furthermore, Isan schools experience an acute shortage of teachers, with 85% of schools in rural areas reporting such shortages compared to 28% of schools located in urban settings (Pholphirul et al., 2023). Thus, in the case of an outbreak in conflict, the situation becomes doubly disruptive: first, school-aged children become subject to abrupt cessation of schooling amid the poor conditions they had before; second, they cannot even access online schooling because they had no computers and little psychosocial and technical assistance before the conflict began. It follows that the equity-oriented aspect of the SHIELD Model, including enrolment procedures for displaced and cross-border children, use of communication in the languages of the affected groups, and disaggregated monitoring based on the status of students, derives from this regional characteristic. A unified response strategy will be inadequate because equity consideration becomes imperative in contexts where disparity already exists.

The issues described above are not unique to the situation in Thailand. In fact, a similar pattern, namely, the absence of national policy, poorly coordinated responses, low training of educators, and ineffective psychosocial programs, can be identified in Colombia (Novelli et al., 2015), South Sudan (INEE, 2024), and the Philippines (UNICEF, 2021). Importantly, the three-level governance structure suggested by the SHIELD Model fits into this framework perfectly.

5.2 Limitations

First, it is critical to acknowledge that the study relies on a single incident of conflict as its basis, and this limits what claims can be warranted from the findings. The 2025 conflict between Thailand and Cambodia represents a fast-moving bilateral conflict between two neighboring countries with a track record of disputed territory. As such, the conflict is distinct from the protracted insurgency and civil war settings, as well as climate change-induced displacement situations that predominate in the existing educational needs literature. Governance issues that consistently emerge in the Thai case are specific to this incident and its peculiarities: the rapid escalation, geographically concentrated character along a demarcated boundary, and the lack of conflict history since 2011 in this region. While the applicability of the model components for slowly burning insurgencies where schools must function continuously under insecurity, as well as in displaced populations without the bilateral state element, remains to be seen, this goes beyond the scope of the present study. From the standpoint of limitations, this issue cannot be dismissed lightly, because the SHIELD Model is better understood as a theoretically informed framework based on what Yin (2018) calls a revelatory single case (one that illustrates a phenomenon rather than licenses statistical generalization) than a validated model with its components piloted across various types of conflicts.

There is a further limitation stemming from the sampling strategy used and the timing of data collection. The 28 key informants interviewed participated in the process in September–December 2025 when the conflict was in full swing and its consequences were unfolding rapidly. In effect, the timing ensured that the participants' accounts could not benefit from subsequent reflection; conversely, it means that the informants recounted a crisis whose long-term consequences had yet to be processed and thus they could not fully assess their own adaptive capacity. Further, follow-up data collection was impossible because by January 2026, the crisis had already reached a stable stage. As such, there is no data about whether the initial ad hoc solutions led to sustainable local practices or how the situation affected children's learning in the following months. In addition, the selected sample was purposively heterogeneous in terms of governance hierarchy and the type

of stakeholder; yet, as previously mentioned, it cannot claim representativeness due to the exclusion of the voices of students, health/civil agencies, and the migrant families from Cambodia returning across the border.

It is worth noting that the position of the researcher as a Thai education policy specialist with direct professional experience of working with schools in northeastern Thailand may constitute a potential limitation. This situation enabled access to information and contacts, yet at the same time, it presented risks related to researcher bias. The reflexive audit trail, peer debriefing, and member checking methods used in this project, as described in Section 3, were meant to reduce risks of biased interpretation, but the possibility of a selective analysis still exist. Specifically, the decision to conceptualize the 2025 crisis mainly as a policy failure in a national governance system as opposed to an achievement of front-line actors improvising in a vacuum of institutional capacity reflected specific research positions and interpretations. The risk can be mitigated in future comparative studies of this topic with researchers having different backgrounds from that of the present one.

The SHIELD Model has not been piloted and tested so far as a governance intervention tool. Each component draws on primary field-based evidence and relevant theoretical constructs; however, none has been tested in live or simulation-based crisis conditions. In effect, this study makes a claim that is limited to the results obtainable in Phase 1 of the overall policy-making project, namely, that the proposed model captures critical governance gaps and organizes them into a coherent framework with sufficiently specified institutional responsibilities at each level. The validity of the model's components in practice will be demonstrated in Phase 2, via prospective implementation research that examines how model mechanisms lead to the desired outcomes, including enrolment retention and learning continuity, as well as psychosocial recovery. An exemplary validation study of the model would involve pre-positioning offline learning kits in a stratified sample of high-risk border schools in a single country, developing contingency plans in collaboration with schools and communities, and then measuring retention and continuity against a matched group in the event of a disruption.

6. CONCLUSION

In contrast, the school closings and displacement of more than 131,000 learners in northeastern Thailand were not simply collateral damages inflicted by an unpredictable conflict. They were predictable consequences of the governance failure recognized in prior assessment exercises, but ignored in successive governments' policy agendas.

Firstly, as outlined, the SHIELD Model consists of more than just theory. Five of its six letters represent an area of governance deficiency described by 28 practitioners through their personal experience, while the sixth (D) captures the feedback mechanism that keeps the framework responsive over time. Although not all policy frameworks can ensure the safety of children in war, this particular model serves as a governance blueprint aimed to allow preparedness rather than a reactive response: pre-existing legislation for the period prior to the outbreak of the conflict (S); learning alternatives and coordination in place from the outset (H, I); psychosocial care along with trained teachers at all times (E, L); and continuous, equity-disaggregated outcome monitoring that feeds back into policy (D). As such, it allows for ongoing development through equity-focused accountability, which makes the framework far from a mere idealistic idea, but rather a concrete action plan for what Thailand experienced in 2025.

For any policymakers in countries potentially facing armed conflicts, the crucial message is quite clear. The 2025 conflict has already done the hard political work of opening a policy window (Kingdon, 1984); the task now is to use it before it closes, rather than waiting, as Thailand did before 2025, for the next focusing event to reopen it (Birkland, 1997). A policy framework for education continuity should precede the next conflict, not be developed as its reaction. In other words, the SHIELD Model offers a necessary governance structure for converting a closing window into a lasting institution.

As to Thailand, the SHIELD Model offers an example of legislative action. Firstly, enacting a specific Education Continuity in Emergencies Act would grant the needed legal basis for the command and funding structures revealed by the 2025 event to be notably lacking. Next, amending the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999) to include a chapter about the continuity of educational provision in emergencies, drawing from civil protection law, would help ground the proposed framework in Thailand's constitutional duty. As for the institutions, establishing OBEC as the main agency responsible for the functioning of a permanent National Crisis Education Coordination Center as part of the Cabinet Resolution would ensure the stability of the I aspect in the framework. Yet centralization cuts both ways: the same centralized command structure discussed in Section 1, which left education service areas and schools waiting for instructions during the 2025 crisis, can just as easily paralyse the Structural Readiness component (S) unless it is paired with fiscal decentralization. A national policy that leaves emergency budget approval solely with central authorities will be as slow to act as no policy at all;

the S component should therefore also carry a pre-authorized, ring-fenced emergency education budget line that local authorities can disburse directly, without waiting for case-by-case central approval; this is not merely the research team's inference, but the position articulated independently by local administrative organization officers interviewed for this study (Section 4.4.1). All these steps are far from minor improvements of the current policy, but rather the key requirements for implementing any parts of the model at all.

Three areas have been highlighted as research topics worth exploring. Firstly, a case-study comparison of analogous governance problems emerging in emergencies of various types and duration (ranging from rapid-onset border conflicts to prolonged insurgencies and climate-related migration events) would help assess the model's capacity to generalize across conflicts. Secondly, an implementation study would help track the extent of the incorporation of the model into Thailand's policy adjustments post 2025. Lastly, quantitative research of individual governance aspects (such as pre-positioned learning kits, teacher crisis training programs, and real-time data on learners) would contribute to measuring their effectiveness. Thus, the identified topics could help further academic understanding beyond listing adverse effects in emergencies.

DECLARATION

1. Conflict of interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

2. Generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process

The authors are responsible for any errors in the paper. In revising this manuscript, Grammarly (Premium Edition) was used only to check grammar and spelling. This software was used strictly for editing the text and was not involved in any analysis or interpretation of the data or in the construction of the SHIELD model. ChatGPT (OpenAI, GPT-6) was used to generate the Graphical Abstract from content, structure and labels supplied by the authors. The authors reviewed and edited the generated image to ensure that it accurately represents the findings and the SHIELD model. No AI tool was used to generate, analyze or interpret the research data. The authors take full responsibility for the content of the paper, including the Graphical Abstract.

3. Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study consist of interview transcripts and questionnaire responses collected from 28 key informants, together with four supplementary interviews with local administrative organization officers described in Section 3.3. These data are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request, subject to participant consent and ethical approval conditions. The data are fully anonymized; no author information appears in the dataset. This article is one output of a broader research program examining the 2025 Thai-Cambodian border conflict's education governance impacts from multiple disciplinary angles; related outputs from the same fieldwork examine multicultural and multilingual dimensions of the crisis and practice-oriented management guidelines for a separate audience, and are cited here where directly relevant. The fiscal-governance analysis in Sections 3.3, 4.4.1, and 4.4.2, grounded in interviews with local administrative organization officers, is unique to this article and does not appear in the related outputs. No findings, analysis, or interpretive claims are duplicated between outputs.

4. Ethics statement

The research was conducted in accordance with all relevant national regulations and institutional policies and the tenets of the Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical clearance was obtained from the authors' institutional review board and approved by the Committee for Research Ethics (Social Science), Mahidol University (Certificate of Approval No. 2025/086.2509, approved September 25, 2025).

5. Funding

This research was funded by Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, with contract number 01/2569.

6. Contributor Role Taxonomy (CRediT)

Lapasrada Jitwarin: Conceptualization, Data curation, Resources, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Project administration, Validation, Writing – review & editing.

Tawatchai Jitwarin: Methodology, Supervision, Software, Visualization. Formal analysis, Writing – original draft.

ORCID

Lapasrada Jitwarin: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-2265-3213
Tawatchai Jitwarin: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-6376-5369

REFERENCES

Birkland, T. A. (1997). *After disaster: Agenda setting, public policy, and focusing events*. Georgetown University Press.

Boin, A., 't Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). *The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure*. Cambridge University Press.

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3*(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2021). *Thematic analysis: A practical guide.* Sage.

Brislin, R. W. (1970). Back-translation for cross-cultural research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 1*(3), 185–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/135910457000100301

Burde, D., Guven, O., Kelcey, J., Lahmann, H., & Al-Abbadi, K. (2015). *What works to promote children's educational access, quality of learning, and wellbeing in crisis-affected contexts.* Department for International Development.

Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (4th ed.). Sage.

Donahue, A. K., & Joyce, P. G. (2001). A framework for analyzing emergency management with an application to federal budgeting. *Public Administration Review, 61*(6), 728–740. https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00143

Equitable Education Fund (EEF). (2025a, May 5). *Reconsidering education inequality: 10 provinces with most students in extreme poverty in 2024 and solutions*. https://en.eef.or.th/2025/05/05/reconsidering-education-inequality-10-provinces-with-most-students/

Equitable Education Fund (EEF). (2025b, July 25). *EEF collaborates with partners in four Thai-Cambodian border provinces to establish learning promotion centres for children affected by the armed conflict*. https://www.eef.or.th/news-250725/ [in Thai]

Equitable Education Research Institute. (2024, March 26). *The PISA 2022 findings assess the state of Thai education in a time when COVID-19 continues to have adverse effects on the field.* https://research.eef.or.th/the-pisa-2022-findings-assess/

Goto, R., Pinchuk, I., Kolodezhny, O., Pimenova, N., Kano, Y., & Skokauskas, N. (2024). Mental health of adolescents exposed to the war in Ukraine. *JAMA Pediatrics, 178*(5), 480–488. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2024.0295

Hallinger, P., & Kantamara, P. (2000). Educational change in Thailand: Opening a window onto leadership as a cultural process. *School Leadership & Management, 20*(2), 189–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/13632430050011425

Hallinger, P., & Lee, M. (2011). A decade of education reform in Thailand: Broken promise or impossible dream? *Cambridge Journal of Education, 41*(2), 139–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2011.572868

Human Rights Watch. (2023, November 9). *"Tanks on the playground": Attacks on schools and military use of schools in Ukraine*. https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/11/09/tanks-playground/attacks-schools-and-military-use-schools-ukraine

Human Rights Watch. (2025, July 25). *Thailand/Cambodia: Protect civilians amid border clashes*. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/25/thailand/cambodia-protect-civilians-amid-border-clashes

Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). (2024). *Minimum standards for education: Preparedness, response, recovery* (3rd ed.). INEE. https://inee.org/minimum-standards

Iqbal, K., & Ahmed, M. (2009). *Disaster and decentralization*. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1424782

Kingdon, J. W. (1984). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies.* Little, Brown and Company.

Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Sage.

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services.* Russell Sage Foundation.

Loakman, K. (2024, March 7). *Ecuador: Escalating internal armed conflict and the necessity of upholding international humanitarian law standards*. Human Rights Research Center. https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/ecuador-escalating-internal-armed-conflict-and-the-necessity-of-upholding-international-humanitaria

Lynn, M. R. (1986). Determination and quantification of content validity. *Nursing Research, 35*(6), 382–386. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006199-198611000-00017

Martinez-Vazquez, J., Lago-Peñas, S., & Sacchi, A. (2017). The impact of fiscal decentralization: A survey. *Journal of Economic Surveys, 31*(4), 1095–1129. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12182

Novelli, M., Lopes Cardozo, M., & Smith, A. (2015). *A theoretical framework for analysing the contribution of education to sustainable peacebuilding: 4Rs in conflict-affected contexts.* Research Consortium Education and Peacebuilding. https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/44045793/2591292.pdf

Oates, W. E. (1972). *Fiscal federalism*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Oates, W. E. (2005). Toward a second-generation theory of fiscal federalism. *International Tax and Public Finance, 12*(4), 349–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-005-1619-9

Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC). (2021). *Guidelines for educational management during the COVID-19 situation: Five learning modalities*. Ministry of Education.

Office of the Basic Education Commission (OBEC). (2025). *Guidelines for instructional management during the Thai-Cambodian border conflict situation*. Ministry of Education.

Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Commission. (1999). *Determining plans and process of decentralization to local government organization Act B.E. 2542 (1999)*. Office of the Prime Minister.

Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council. (2018). *National strategy B.E. 2561–2580 (2018–2037)*. Office of the Prime Minister.

Office of the National Education Commission. (1999). *National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999)*. Office of the Prime Minister.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2023). *PISA 2022 results (Volume I): The state of learning and equity in education*. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2024). *OECD skills strategy Thailand: Assessment and recommendations*. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/153a1fe6-en

Pholphirul, P., Rukumnuaykit, P., & Teimtad, S. (2023). Teacher shortages and educational outcomes in developing countries: Empirical evidence from PISA-Thailand. *Cogent Education, 10*(2), Article 2243126. https://doi.org/10.1080/2331186X.2023.2243126

Polit, D. F., & Beck, C. T. (2006). The content validity index: Are you sure you know what's being reported? Critique and recommendations. *Research in Nursing & Health, 29*(5), 489–497. https://doi.org/10.1002/nur.20147

Save the Children Thailand, UNICEF Thailand, & Office of the Basic Education Commission. (2016). *Basic education sector snapshot for comprehensive school safety and education in emergencies in Thailand*. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/67965_6796509esscsseiereportthaeng2016.pdf

Shah, A., Boothe, R., Triratanasirikul, N., Mohib, S. A., & Varanyuwatana, S. (2012). *Central-local government relations in Thailand: Improving service delivery*. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org//server/api/core/bitstreams/be65745b-19aa-5874-b141-6ae294775035/content

Skidmore, M., & Toya, H. (2013). Natural disaster impacts and fiscal decentralization. *Land Economics, 89*(1), 101–117. https://doi.org/10.3368/le.89.1.101

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). (2014). *SAMHSA's concept of trauma and guidance for a trauma-informed approach* (HHS Publication No. SMA 14-4884). https://www.fredla.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/SMA14-4884.pdf

Tsybuliak, N., Suchikova, Y., Shevchenko, L., Popova, A., Kovachev, S., & Hurenko, O. (2023). Burnout dynamic among Ukrainian academic staff during the war. *Scientific Reports, 13*, Article 17975. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-45229-6

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2016). *Uprooted: The growing crisis for refugee and migrant children*. https://www.unicef.org/reports/uprooted-growing-crisis-refugee-and-migrant-children

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2021). *Children and armed conflict: Annual report of the Secretary-General*. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/sites/default/files/2022/07/Summary-of-the-Annual-Report-of-the-Secretary-General-on-Children-and-Armed-Conflict-2021-3.pdf

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). (2024, December 28). *'Not a new normal' – 2024 'one of worst years in UNICEF's history' for children in conflict*. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/not-new-normal-2024-one-worst-years-unicefs-history-children-conflict

United Nations Children's Fund Philippines (UNICEF Philippines). (2017, May 30). *Marawi conflict: UNICEF calls for efforts to keep children safe, protected and able to resume school on time.* https://www.unicef.org/philippines/press-releases/marawi-conflict-unicef-calls-efforts-keep-children-safe-protected-and-able-resume

United Nations Children's Fund Thailand (UNICEF Thailand). (2025, December 4). *New findings reveal that Thailand must act swiftly to prepare schools for future emergencies*. https://www.unicef.org/thailand/press-releases/new-findings-reveal-thailand-must-act-swiftly-prepare-schools-future-emergencies

Winthrop, R., & Kirk, J. (2008). Learning for a bright future: Schooling, armed conflict, and children's well-being. *Comparative Education Review, 52*(4), 639–661. https://doi.org/10.1086/591301

World Bank. (2024). *World development indicators: Thailand* [Data set]. https://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand

Yanow, D. (2000). *Conducting interpretive policy analysis (Qualitative research methods series 47)*. Sage.

Yin, R. K. (2018). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods* (6th ed.). Sage.