

CONSOLIDATING FOR CONSOLIDATION: TECHNOCRATS, PARTY BUILDING AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA

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ABSTRACT

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In Ghana, political parties have proven to be guardians of its democracy. Unfortunately, they are doing very little toward the permanent institutionalization of democracy as party building is for 'the next election'. Drawing on a mixed method research design that uses secondary qualitative and quantitative data from archived newspaper and digital news reports, detailed review of political party decisions, events, reports and other relevant textbook and journal articles for analysis, this work investigates the relationship between political party building and democratic consolidation, and how technocrats can be useful in this enterprise. The study finds that political parties in Ghana are engaging technocrats wrongly and their inclusion in party strengthening is mostly thought of during busy electoral seasons. Both the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party which has formed government since the inception of democracy in Ghana in 1992 use their seasoned technocrats only during vote canvassing periods. These technocrats most of time leave the party offices to take up positions in government as reward for helping to get the party elected to office. This leaves the administration of political parties to non-technocrats in election free periods. Owing to evidence that political parties in Ghana always need restructuring after every electoral loss, an argument is made for technocrats to be incorporated into national party structures permanently in order to ensure strengthened party building strategies and the proper contribution of political parties toward democratic consolidation. If political parties are consolidated themselves, they can more meaningfully contribute to democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Democratic consolidation; technocrats; party building; political parties; bureaucracy-like structures

1. INTRODUCTION

Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan African country to win autonomy from colonial imperialism on the 6th of March 1957. Just like many other African countries after decolonisation, Ghanaians after gaining autonomy from British imperialism have engaged in an experimental search for an appropriate political system that will support its development aspirations. One-party system, military dictatorship, socialist system and

multi-party democracy have all been experienced in Ghana, just like the cases of Zaire, Nigeria, Uganda and others show (Boahen, 1989; Oquaye, 1980; McGowan and Johnson, 1984; 1986; Ihonvbere, 1991; Feit, 1968; Gutteridge, 1985; Mittelman, 1972). Ghana was a multi-party democracy from 1957 to 1964, a single political party state from 1964 to 1966, a military dictatorship from 1966 to 1969, a multi-party democracy from 1969 to 1972, a military dictatorship from 1972 to 1979, a multi-party democracy from 1979 to 1981, a military dictatorship from 1982 to 1992, and then “transformed” (Huntington, 1991: 114) into a multi-party democracy in 1992. Ghana’s multi-party democracy from 1992 till date has proven to stand the test of time as, notwithstanding economic, and social challenges, it has produced tangible political development. The media, for example, has become freer over time, there is free and fair political and electoral contestation to some extent, the civil society has become more active, and human right issues are often addressed through the court system and networks of rights activism (Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Debrah et al., 2014; Oladipupo, 2011). Freedom of print and digital broadcast media has further been strengthened with the passage of the Right to Information (RTI) Bill into law in 2019 by the Parliament of Ghana after twenty years of delay. The broadcast media is now more capable to investigate suspicious government transactions. This to a large extent challenges Nyarko et al. (2018) claim that the Constitution of many African countries provides for media freedom but denies the media true freedom through the passage of the right to information law. Though Ghana cannot boast of exceptional economic performance and social transformation (Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2017), human conditions under the democratic regime, regarding rights, are better in relation to authoritarian single-party and military regimes that previously existed, and the passage of the Right to Information Act boosts respect for these rights. Through this journey of democratic transition, political parties have been important passengers. They have defied oppression to promote democratic ideals.

In a democratic dispensation, political parties are a single string amongst six on a guitar fretboard; when it is not present, the functionality of the whole system suffers a disorder. They may turn out as political organizations that overstretch the political, economic and social diversity of a political community (Lemarchand, 1972: 69; Lindberg, 2003; Bratton and Walle, 1997) but, they are a necessary evil as they present valuable alternatives to exploit. They may be factions but they fight and function to protect and sustain liberties and privileges that despotic regimes unnecessarily stifle.

Despite the benefits realized, Ghana’s democracy is not consolidated (Abdulai and Crawford, 2010). Primarily, democracy in Ghana has not been able to deliver enough socio-economic benefits, and the people seem to be lost at connecting the gains of democracy to their living conditions. They are moreover suspicious of the operations of governments and other public officials alike. More so, the core principles of democracy are not institutionalized among Ghanaians as the leadership of the country have not been able to consolidate trust and legitimacy through transparency, and many believe that major stakeholders in the country have perverted the legal-rational course of due process. For 2,400 Ghanaian adults (18 years and above from rural and urban population) interviewed by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development, a section gave answers that are worth considering as far the institutionalization of democratic values is in view. Asked whether they wanted the military to come back and govern the country, 552 of the 2,400 either approved it or strongly approved it (Table 1). To this work, this number is very significant because it does not speak well of a democracy that is older than two decades. Military regimes are the direct opposite of democratic ideals. Therefore, if these numbers prefer it to democracy, there is the urgent need for some loose nuts to be tightened. To this end, these recommendations may well fit scholarship that suggests to Ghana, like many African countries, on how it can democratically consolidate; strengthening state institutions, work tirelessly to sustain economic development, ensure transparency in its electoral management system, garner political participation from the citizenry through civil society mobilization. And increasingly, political parties are coming into the debate as they have proven to be salt in the democratic soup. But how political parties can contribute to democratic consolidation, and the things that are supposed to be worked on internally for political parties to contribute to democratic consolidation in Ghana has received little attention.

The inability of political parties in Ghana to do more beyond winning elections can be attributed to some constraints that they encounter; minor political parties are individually or poorly funded and major political parties are always charged with corruption and clientelistic redistribution as they are untraceably funded, most of them suffer internal democracy challenges, parties in opposition are sometimes unnecessarily oppressed, and many of the political parties fuel violence in Ghana and have the propensity to plunge the Ghanaian state into an intractable impasse as they mostly draw on ethnic, regional and established loyal support.

The problems that these political parties encounter sometimes limit their ability to impact the Ghanaian political community. But can we blame their inability to contribute to democratic consolidation on these and other challenges or we can look at some root causes that is crippling their influence? It is argued in this article that there is the need to look at the area regarding how political parties can be built and

strengthened internally in order for them to build and strengthen democratic practise in Ghana. Because looking at the problems only is as predicting the smell of some smoke without getting to where the fire was made. If you do not know what went into it, the prediction will only be speculative. Therefore, there is the need to get closer to the political parties and explore how their internal structures can be infused with some form of permanency for their impact to be substantial and consistent in the Ghanaian political community. If political parties are not consolidated themselves, they cannot contribute to democratic consolidation.

Table 1: Approval of Military Involvement in Ghanaian Politics

	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total
Approve	12	9	11	10	10%
Strongly Approve	13	13	14	12	13%
Neither Approve nor Disapprove	3	3	2	3	3%
Strongly Disapprove	55	59	58	56	57%
Disapprove	15	15	14	16	15%
Don't know	2	2	1	3	2%

Source: Duayeden and Armah-Attoh (2017, pp. 17)

Are political parties in Ghana consolidated themselves? Is the building of political parties an end in itself or means to ends? How do political parties in Ghana engage technocrats? Can technocrats help in the building of political parties? And to what end? As political parties are inseparable from democratic progression in Ghana, the preoccupation in this paper is to establish how political parties can contribute to democratic consolidation through the building and strengthening of its structures by technocrats. Because this study wanted to be as objective as practicable, it hugely depended on relevant secondary data to clearly analyse happenings and to properly study events and speeches as naturally as they occur.

2. TECHNOCRATIC KNOWLEDGE-TRANSFORMATION: FRAME OF ANALYSIS

In defining who technocrats are, scholars have concentrated on 'rigid expertise' in the administration of the state and other political and non-political organisations. In this study, David Collier's broad conceptualization of technocrats as "individuals with a high level of specialized academic training which serves as a principal criterion on the basis of which they are selected to occupy key decision-making or advisory roles in large, complex organizations - both public and private" is useful (Collier, 1979: 403). Since our concentration is on how technocrats can contribute to political party building and democratic consolidation in the context of the state, we draw more on scholarship that explicate technocrats as those with specialized professional technical training in economics, finance, engineering, public policy, law, administration, among others who believe they should be in charge of the management of the state and its agencies owing to their specialized knowledge and skills (Centeno and Silva, 1998: 2; Dargent, 2015; Teichman, 1997, pp. 32; Williams, 2006, pp. 119; He, 2001, pp. 69; Milne, 1982, pp. 404). There have been efforts to draw a distinction between politicians and technocrats but technocrats are increasingly taking up political positions and the difference between technocrats and politicians have thinned out, technocrats who occupy sensitive political positions are called techno-politicians, political technocrats or technopols (He, 2001; Joignant, 2011).

Support for the claim that technocrats should be allowed to control some sectors is rooted in the very essence of education; to equip an individual or a group of people with new capabilities. Educating people and transferring knowledge from one civilization to the other has long been an important peg, even for justifying colonialism as it made the colonised better than they were (Mazrui, 1980). Education arms one with information, knowledge, skills and ideas that was previously unknown. Because of this imparted competency, an individual can do things that they could not do, or do things differently in better ways. This forms the basis of the concept of critically reflective practice; being able to integrate theory and practice (knowing and doing). There is sufficient evidence to show that individuals can think on their feet based on what they know to solve problems (Thompson and Pascal, 2012). Therefore, because technocrats are people with specialized knowledge and skills in some disciplines, they feel they are fit to occupy certain positions; not people without expertise. Why should a trained medical doctor head an economic restructuring team?

Because this understanding is fundamentally logical, there has been little effort to build a formal model to explain how knowledge (knowing) translates into solving (doing). For the sake of this paper and for the want of broader generalization, there is the need to build a model that explains the impact of technocrats at critical points in the life of some political communities. This model invented for now and further is the knowledge-transformation model. That is to say that because technocrats have specialized knowledge, they are able to use it to transform and change negative conditions, even if it is little change in the status-quo.

The technocratic knowledge-transformation model (Figure 1 and 2) is a cyclical incremental model that explains the application of expertise (technocratic knowledge and skills) to negative conditions found in political communities for change. This model was built based on evidence from countries that technocrats have wielded powerful state positions-such as Mexico, China, Italy, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. In these countries, there was marked steady development, mostly economic, when technocrats took over for periods to be reviewed. Technocrats apply their knowledge to negative conditions after which they can know and understand the full scope of the issue(s) (Figure 1). This understanding they gain from issues allow them to craft new ways of improving the negative conditions. This new understanding, or better still, discovery from the application of knowledge is made to form part of their original knowledge. They then apply their improved knowledge to the negative conditions. Upon the application of the improved knowledge, they will discover other new ways of improving problematic aspects of the negative conditions. These new findings will also serve to increase the potency of the improved knowledge. As this happens for a period of time, the negative condition(s) will be transforming gradually (Figure 2). A perfect situation may not be achieved but an improvement will be experienced.




Figure 1: Technocratic Knowledge Transformation Model (A)




Figure 2: Technocratic Knowledge Transformation Model (B)

To prove the reliability of this model and establish support for the fact that technocrats can work to improve critical sectors of political parties, this study examines aspects of development of some political communities from the time technocrats took over the management of the state. These examples are not to lend support to technocratic administration at the state level. There is sufficient evidence to show that when technocrats are in charge, they are supportive of authoritarian governments as they are repressive, too rigid with their pragmatic choices, and are more prone to compromise because of their proclivity to prioritise economic planning over political interests, and are less of patriots (Lindau, 1996; Milne, 1982). More so, as the case from Italy shows, though the technocratic government that was put in place in 2011 to tackle the economic recession did its part after taking over to provide medicine for the ailing economy (GDP improving from \$2.073 in 2012 to \$2.13 in 2013), Mario Monti's technocratic cabinet could not mobilize enough support to continue its reign as its technical composition did not allow for the building of sufficient rapport with the electorate and connection with elites in Italy. Therefore, the technocratic narratives below only provide support for the

technocratic knowledge-transformation model. Better still, they show that when technocrats are in charge, they can use their knowledge and skills to effects real changes in situation(s) that demand their specialization.

In China where technocrats have gradually taken over since the initiation of “Reform and Opening” in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping, “China today is living through a heroic stage of engineering and its urbanization and infrastructure development-something that would not be possible without technical competence playing a major role in the exercise of political power” (Yongmou, 2016, pp. 27). Though Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and others in the then Politburo Standing Committee did not have technical backgrounds, they supported technocratic ideas with elements of economic transformation promoted by elites in the People’s Bank of China (Stent, 2017). From the 1980’s, technocratic ideas have dominated the political arena in China, and it is so till date. A look at the current 7-member Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee (Table 2), the most powerful decision making body in China, show how technocrats has been deeply integrated in its national administrative structure. Since support for technocratic ideas characterised the administration of the Chinese state, its economic story can now be told differently. With a GDP of \$174.938 billion in 1977, it increased to \$191.149 billion in 1980 owing to the transformative ideas of the technocrats, moved to \$360.858 billion in 1990, jumped to \$1.211 trillion in 2010, and as of 2016 the GDP of China was \$11.199trillion (Figure 3). This represents an increase of 6302% in GDP over close to four decades. And Life Expectancy at Birth (total number of years), has increased from 65.278 in 1977 to 76.252 in 2016 (Figure 4).

Table 2: Composition of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee, China

Rank	Standing Committee Member	Qualification
1 st	Xi Jinping	MSc Chemical Engineering and LLD (Law, Politics, Management and Revolutionary History) from Tsinghua University
2 nd	Li Keqiang	Ph.D. Economics and LLB from Peking University
3 rd	Li Zhanshu	Executive MBA from Hebei Normal University
4 th	Wang Yang	Master of Engineering from Central Party School
5 th	Wang Huning	Professor, Master of Laws and International Politics from Fudan University
6 th	Zhao Leji	Degree in Philosophy from Peking University
7 th	Han Zheng	Master of Economics from East China Normal University

In Singapore, major political offices are filled by technocrats and the justification for their being there is quite clear; they have the expert competency to manage complex organizational strategies, coordinate administrative issue, and deliver as expected because of their specialized knowledge. They are not just appointed. They are put there to address special issues. Bringing in Chan Heng Chee’s conception of government technocrats in Singapore adds to understanding; “A technocrat is one who is a professional by training or possesses a post-graduate degree. His contribution to political life would be his technical expertise in initiating, modifying and facilitating physical, economic and social planning policies.” (Milne, 1982: 421). According to the above conception, even Harry Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime-Minister of Singapore was technocrat, and Lee’s preference of highly trained professional may have stemmed from his top notch education in London School of Economics and Cambridge, and the problems that the young independent state had to solve. Now, “Singapore is perhaps the best advertisement for technocracy: the political and expert components of the governing system there seem to have merged completely”. With the inception of technocratic rule in the 1960s, Singaporean citizens have experienced progressive economic and social development, and their quality of life has significantly improved (Figure 5-6).




Figure 3: GDP of China from 1977-2016 (current US\$)

Source: World Bank (2021)




Figure 4: Life Expectancy at Birth, China from 1977-2016 (Total, years)
Source: World Bank (2021)




Figure 5: GDP of Singapore 1960-2017 (Current US\$)
Source: World Bank (2021)




Figure 6: Life Expectancy at Birth, Singapore from 1960-2017 (Total, years)
Source: World Bank (2021)

Doug Hendrie's description of how technocracy has positively impacted the Singaporean economy and people is worth noting.

The late Lee Kuan Yew - a longsighted genius with a ruthless streak - is often credited with taking a small ex-British Island expected to be a failed state and turning it into an economic powerhouse: an export-oriented manufacturer, a great port, a flight hub, a financial centre, a city-state with the third highest per-capita income in the world. How does it work in practice? Take housing. In the 1950s, almost all Singaporeans lived in slum-like squatter huts. When Singapore achieved self-rule in 1959, the government set parameters - what needed to be done - and the technocrats got to work, figuring out how it could be done. The result? Eighty per cent of Singaporeans now live in government-built flats

(Hendrie, 2015, pp. 3).

What technocrats have been able to achieve in China, Singapore, Italy, Mexico, Columbia, Peru affirms the argument of the technocratic knowledge-transformation model; that technocrats apply their specialized knowledge to solve pertinent problems in a said organization, be they public or private, regardless the thrust of impact made. We therefore argue that owing to the competency that people with specialised knowledge possess, when they are integrated into the party building enterprise, they can apply their knowledge and skills to strengthen party structures, and help political parties to more meaningfully contribute to democratic consolidation. Though the expertise of these technocrats is important, it is not as rigid as previously defined. No matter their qualification, be they economists, policy analysts, engineers, financial geeks, administrators and the like, their knowledge and skills will be most required in sectors of the national structure of the political parties needing attention and sustainability. They will be expected to work full-time in the political parties with due benefits and motivation.


3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA

From the Huntingtonian perspective, new democracies that have been achieved through either transformation, replacement or transplacement will be consolidated if they pass the two-turnover test; i.e. “if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of *democratic* transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election. Selecting rulers through elections is the heart of democracy, and democracy is real only if rulers are willing to give up power as a result of elections.” (Huntington, 1991: 267). If this be the case, then we can comfortably say that Ghana is a consolidated democracy because it has passed the two-turnover test and even beyond it (Table 3). Despite passing the two-turnover test, democracy in Ghana is struggling to make the ends of political restructuring, economic development and social transformation meet, and some of democracy’s core values are not upheld by those in state positions, and stakeholders and members in the civil society. The motivation of parliamentarians, members of the executive, and justices are questionable (Mark, 2015; Vinorkor, 2014), political contestation sometimes become unnecessarily violent, the civil society take the law into their own hands and do not follow due process when issues overwhelm them, the police service cannot be trusted, and the relationship between the civil society and the military is strained. Worth noting too is Ghana’s abysmal performance regarding the Corruption Perceptions Index (Figure 7). If people perceive those in the public sector as being very corrupt, how would they freely support regulatory principles that ensure a progressive society and see democracy as the best regime as compared to others? It is therefore expedient to explore alternative definitions of democratic consolidation since elections and turnovers are necessary but not sufficient measures of how democracy is rooted in a said state. Democratic consolidation goes beyond the mere practice of democracy.

Table 3: Ghana’s Political Turnover

Year of general election	Winning political party	Nature of turnover
1992	NDC	Democratic transition election
1996	NDC	
2000	NPP	
2004	NPP	Smooth (First turnover)
2008	NDC	Smooth (Second turnover)
2012	NDC	
2016	NPP	Smooth (Third turnover)

NDC: National Democratic Congress; NPP: New Patriotic Party



0 = high corrupt 100 = very clean

Figure 7: Corruption Perception Index (2012-2017): Ghana
Source: Transparency International (2018)

As cases from various countries show, Huntington's (1991) three modes of transitioning into a democracy, i.e. transformation, replacement or transplacement, beyond reasonable doubt is valid. But drawing from Rustow's (1970) dynamic model of how states transition into democracies, the transition into democracy is incomplete without habituation; even after the state has met background conditions and went through the preparatory and decision phases. It is the habituation stage that is of interest to this paper as far as democratic consolidation is concerned, because after the new democracy has passed through the habituation phase, there will be the achievement of "broad and deep legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass *public* levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine" (Diamond, 1999: 65). Therefore, democracy is consolidated if equal to or more than 75% of the decision making citizenry prefer democracy to any other system of government, and 100% of those wielding state power believe in and embrace the rules and processes that democratic practice establish. Moreover, democratic consolidation stresses not only the longevity dimension of democracy but the express acceptance which democracy is able to engender and make its longevity sustainable.

Just as conditions of legitimation, repression, co-optation and liberalisation without democratization ensure the thriving of authoritarian regimes (Gerschewski, 2013), a democracy will be consolidated if many conditions, of which some stand out, are met; the economic performance of the democratic regime, strengthening democratic institutions, championing adherence to the rule of law, restructuring state political culture, appropriate democratic transition, reinvigorating the civil society, and placating civil-military relations (Schedler, 1998; Diamond, 1999; Beetham, 1994). According to Schedler (1998), if these and other conditions are fulfilled, the state will move from being an electoral or liberal democracy to an advanced democracy on the 'continuum of democracy'. A continuum that comprises a four-fold classification—authoritarianism, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy. Authoritarianism is the negative least desirable option and advanced democracy is the positive most desired option which electoral and liberal democracies aspire to become. Ghana is not an advanced democracy and can best be described as a near liberal democracy because it has not completely moved from the electoral democracy status but has made significant liberatory gains. Ghana is not an advanced consolidated democracy because the commitment of governments over the years to socio-political and economic turnaround leaves much to be desired. Though Ghana is not an advanced consolidated democracy, political parties have contributed appreciably to its democratic development.

The nature of political party engagement that characterised the breaking away of the Convention People's Party (CPP) on 12th June, 1949 from the first recognised Ghanaian political party, United Gold Coast Convention, formed on 4th August, 1947, pervaded much political contestation during colonial rule in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) (Austin, 1964). After Ghana won complete autonomy as a Republic in 1960 till date, the history of political parties have followed a checkered pattern—crippled and oppressed as opposition alternatives under a socialist and single party regime (1960-1966), disbanded and silenced under military regimes (1966-1969, 1972-1979, 1982-1991), freed but victimised (1969-1972, 1979-1981), free multi-party contestation characterized by violence, insecurity, mutual suspicion, heated policy debates and reasonable accommodation (1992-till date). Even when they were silenced, they relentlessly engaged in political debates and made sure that their pro-multi party ideals and liberal democratic beliefs were enshrined in the 1992 Constitution; the constitution that marked the transition of Ghana into a democracy after eleven years of military rule (1981-1992) by the defunct Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Debrah et al., 2014). Moreover, political parties have provided an avenue for Ghanaians to participate in decision making through political recruitment of representatives for elections, creating an exciting environment for citizens to participate in the politics of their country, and the presentation of opposing views on major policy issues and ideology.

Though political parties in Ghana have proven to be guardians of its democracy, they are unfortunately doing very little toward the permanent institutionalization of democracy. Party building in Ghana is for 'the next election' and not a contribution to moving the Ghanaian state up the ladder of democratization. For Ghana to move from being a near liberal democracy to an advanced consolidated democracy, political parties have a pivotal part to play because they "remain an indispensable framework for representation and governance" (Diamond, 1999: 96). Owing to how political parties are preoccupied with elections, some scholars label Ghana as an "electoral democracy" (ibid., chap. 1). After the "transformation" of Ghana into a democracy in the early 1990s (Huntington, 1991), there have been seven competitive multi-party elections and three political turnovers interspersed with boycotts, violence, judicial settlements, among other things. These national and constituency elections have been dominated by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). When one party wins an election, their government is formed using party elites; those who matter as far as party decision making, organization and electoral victory is concerned. These individuals are given top notch national political positions and are made to enjoy the fruits of their electoral labour. These party

elites are transferred from the structure of the political party into the ranks of government. They see their movement as reward for their unflinching support and service to the political party. As their transfer occur after an electoral win, party organization and mobilization of members are left into the care of elected and appointed national party executives. It is only after every political turnover, when one political party loses political power to another, that party elites take cognizance of the fact that the structure of the party has been affected badly, needing reorganization and reinvigoration.

Political parties in Ghana have the potential to contribute effectively to democratic consolidation as they can foster social integration by enabling “citizens to participate effectively in the political process and, if successful in that task, to feel that they have a vested interest in its perpetuation” (Diamond and Gunther, 2001: 8). As political parties are agents of democratic development, their contribution to the strengthening of democratic practice in Ghana can be more significant if some permanency is infused into the organization of their structures. Political parties cannot contribute to democratic consolidation if they are not effective themselves. Consolidated political parties can more meaningfully contribute to democratic consolidation.

After every general presidential and parliamentary election, the structure of the two major parties, NDC and NPP, and other minor parties—have almost always suffered stability crisis and this affects their contribution toward making democracy more effective. These reports, involving major party stakeholders, add flesh to claims in this study.

The defeat in the last general elections should not disintegrate our front, rather it should make us sit up, correct our mistakes and plan for the next (Mr. Kofi Mintah, Central Region Chairman, NDC)

The youth ... has called on the leadership of the party to work towards establishing internal democracy in the party. We wish to recommend to the leadership of the NDC, especially the leader and founder H.E. J.J. Rawlings that immediate steps be taken to reorganize the party from the branch level to the national level. In this regard, we will also recommend the setting up of a strong committee for this reorganization.

The Convention People's Party (CPP) is embarking on a comprehensive programme intended to assess and reactivate the structures throughout the country. This was the outcome of a meeting of the Central Committee of the party in Accra.

Seemingly, electoral mistakes have been corrected, reorganization committees which were set up have done their job, party structures have been assessed and reactivated times without number and yet, it is the same story as always; party structures are feeble regarding its organization. What is the missing element then? Definitely, it is not about the general ‘lack of resources’ rhetoric. Despite facing financial challenges, political parties in Ghana are able to fund themselves from undisclosed sources. The expensive countrywide campaigns they run and their engagement in patronage politics through giving the electorate material and other rewards in exchange for votes affirm the huge financial and human investment they make (Ullo, 2016). It is that party structures lack permanency. Those who are to man various key sectors of the party only come in when the political season show and retreat to their various endeavours when elections are over.

Blending the structure of the two major political parties in Ghana, NDC (a social democratic party) and NPP (a liberal conservative party), the following will be realised (from bottom to the highest hierarchy); branch/polling station level, ward/electoral area level, constituency level, regional level and national level. The branch/polling station and ward/electoral area levels are conventionally known as grassroots. The organization of political parties in Ghana mimics the unitary organization of the state government. Because of the centralization of party powers thereof, most crucial decisions that are made emanate from the national level. Moreover, it is within this centralized system that the flag bearer or leader of the party function as the embodiment of the aspirations of all members. This study concentrates on the national level of the party structure that provide direction and support. For it is from thence that a presidential candidate, when he becomes the head of state and government business, majorly moves party technocrats into the realms of government. The focus is not just on the structure within the national level; the recognized hierarchy comprising party elders, elected national executives, appointed executives and the like, but on structures within the national level structure that craft expert strategies, provide direction and support for a political party.

4. PARTY-TECHNOCRATS ENGAGEMENT: PARTY BUILDING OR BENEFIT SHARING?

There are individuals within the various political parties in Ghana who have in-depth knowledge and (or) experience regarding how internal and external political party issues are conducted. These individuals who are regarded in this paper as party building experts with technocratic elements are not employed by the political parties. Rather, they are called upon to serve their party when there is the need; during elections,

during legal battles, and the like. They wholeheartedly serve their political parties because they know that if things go well, they will be recognized and rewarded with public positions or state sponsored contracts. Mostly, they are made to form part of campaign teams during an electoral season. In the early days of the National Democratic Congress, National Executives of the party were in control of electoral issues. For the 1992 and 1996 elections, there was no need for a manager of the NDC campaign because the revolutionary Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings was very popular. It was from the 2000 elections that Campaign Managers were appointed.

As presented in Table 4, 5 and 6, the movement of national campaign team members, also known as party building experts with technocratic elements, into government after general elections, especially after a new president is elected, becomes evident. Though the NDC was in power from 2009 to 2017, President John Dramani Mahama took over the presidency in the latter part of 2012 after the sudden demise of Prof. John Evans Atta Mills. From Table 4 it can be deduced that 5 of the 8 national campaign team members were given important national positions after President Mills' electoral victory. And after the 2012 elections, 60% of those on the 5-member NDC national campaign team were appointed as ministers in the Mahama-administration formed (Table 5). The other two continued as party executives.

Another recognizable trend is the appointment of about 71% of the 14-member NPP national campaign team either as ministers of state or pivotal board members of state institutions (Table 6).

The remainder were national party executives and continued as such. Musah Iddrisu Superior, Fatimatu Abubakar, and Clara Napaga Tia Sulemana who were instrumental in the strengthening of the Northern wing of the party were made Tamale Mayor, Deputy Communications Minister at the Office of the President, and President Staffer respectively. Also, Pius Hadzide Enam who was a strong advocate in the Volta Regional was made the Deputy Sports Minister (2017-2018) and Deputy Communications Minister. Charles Nii Teiko Tagoe who has clout and organizational ability in the Greater Accra region was also appointed as a Presidential Staffer.

For the period that they worked for the political party, they were able to mobilize relevant resources for the proper functioning of their respective political parties. They mobilized funds for the parties, helped improved structures of the parties for desired operability, induced excitement from the public to participate in the affairs of their country, educated the populace on constitutional and national issues, led the public to make credible demands from the government, and even more. If they were to be retained after elections as key minds of the political parties, the political parties would have been better off to make applaudable contributions to democratic development and its consequent consolidation.

After rewarding these party loyalists, the development of the political party is left in the hands of those "in the party headquarters". But national party executives cannot help out because even their top leadership are usually combining party affairs with their appointed positions. As of July 2018, Frederick Worsamao Armah Blay, the National Chairman of the New Patriotic Party doubled as the Board Chairman of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation. Also, until his resignation in May 2015, the National Chairman of the National Democratic Congress, Ebenezer Kofi Ofori Portuphy, was the CEO or put differently, First National Coordinator of the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO).

Table 4: NDC 2008 National Campaign Team

National Campaign Team Member	Position During Campaigning	Position(s) After Election Success
Johnson Aseidu Nketsiah	Chairman	Not appointed (remained the General Secretary of the National Democratic Congress)
Hon. Joseph Henry Owusu-Acheampong	Campaign Manager	Council of State, Brong Ahafo Region's Representative (2009-2013)
Hon. Alex Segbefia	Campaign Coordinator	Deputy Chief of Staff (2009-2013) Deputy Minister of Defence (2014-2015) Minister for Health (2015-2017)
Hon. Mahama Ayariga	Spokesman	(2009-2013) Presidential Spokesperson, Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, and Deputy Minister of Education. (2013-2017) Minister for Information
Ametor Kwame	Deputy Spokesperson	Deputy Director of Corporate Affairs and Strategic Direction / Communications Consultant, National Health Insurance Authority (2009-2017)
Koku Anyidoho	Communications Director	Director of Communications at the Presidency (2009-2012) President's Special Aide with National Security (appointed in 2014)
Nii Lantey Okunka	Flagbearer's Operations Officer	No known appointment
Yaw Boateng Gyan	Constitutional Member and NDC National Organizer	Not appointed (remained the National Organizer of the National Democratic Congress)

Table 5: NDC 2012 National Campaign Team

National Campaign Team Member	Position During Campaigning	Position(s) After Election Success
Johnson Asiedu Nketiah	Chairman of Campaign Team	Not appointment (remained the General Secretary of the National Democratic Congress)
Elvis Afriyie-Ankrah	National Campaign Coordinator	Minister for Youth and Sports (2013-2014) Minister of State at the Office of the President (2015-2017)
Dr. Edward Kofi Omane-Boamah	Deputy National Campaign Coordinator	Minister for Communications (2013-2017)
Hannah Serwaa Tetteh	Communications Director	Minister for Foreign Affairs (2013-2017)
Charles Nkansah	Operations Coordinator (Volunteers for Mahama)	No known appointment

Source: GNA (2012)

Table 6: NPP 2016 National Campaign Team

National Campaign Team Member	Position During Campaigning	Position(s) After Election Success
Peter Mac Manu	Campaign Manager	Board Chairman, Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority
Hon. Dan Botwe	Campaign Strategist	Minister of Regional Reorganisation and Development
Boakye Agyarko	Policy Adviser	Minister of Energy
Otiko Afisa Djaba	National Women's Organiser and Operations Member	Minister for Gender, Children and Social Protection
Kenneth Nana Yaw Kuntunkununku Ofori-Atta	Director of Fundraising Committee	Minister of Finance
Victor Newman	Director of Research	Director of Research at the Presidency
Edward Boateng	Director of Campaign Administration and Logistics	Ambassador to China
Martin Adjei Mensah-Korsah	Director of Elections	Deputy Minister of Regional Reorganization and Development
Joe Anokye	Technology Director	Director General, National Communications Authority
Nana Akomea	Director of Communications	Managing Director, State Transport Company
John Boadu	National Organiser and Head of Operations Directorate	Not appointed (remained National Organizer of the New Patriotic Party)
Sammy Awuku	National Youth Organiser and Operations Member	Not appointed (remained National Youth Organiser of the New Patriotic Party)
Kamal-Deen Abdulai	National Nasara Co-ordinator and Operations Member	Not appointed (remained National Nasara Co-ordinator of the New Patriotic Party)
Kwabena Abankwa Yeboah	National Treasurer and Member of Fundraising Committee	Not appointed (remained National Treasurer of the New Patriotic Party)

Source: Arku (2015)

Political parties in Ghana are very good when it comes to the formation of election review committees after almost every election to research into their fortune or loss, and how better they can get things done. But what they do with their review committees after their report is submitted is the thing worth questioning. As always since 1993, the New Patriotic Party constituted a 10-member review committee, chaired by Dr. Opoku Adusei, to analyse the structural and operational measures that was adopted and ensured the victory of the party in 2016, at both presidential and parliamentary levels. After the review committee submitted their report, the best thing that should have been done was to ensure that these people stayed around to ensure the proper implementation of the report; other than that, it would just be a routinized production of committee reports. The researcher understands his results better than the recipient of the research; at least, he knows why what has surfaced. But 50% of the review committee members were nominated and consequently appointed into enviable executive or state institutional positions (Table 7). The rest have either retreated into their normal line of profession, or have contested other elections. Nelson Owusu Ansah contested and won the Ashanti Region NPP Youth Organizer.

Table 7: 10-Member NPP 2016 Election Review Committee

Member	Position After Report Submission
Dr. Opoku Adusei (Chairman)	Deputy Director General, Ghana Standard Authority (General Service)
Alhassan Suleman	Upper West Regional Minister
Dr. Ohene Konadu	Chairman, University of Professional Studies Council
Joyce Boateng	Board Member, Ghana Civil Aviation Authority
Kusi Boafo	Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Reform
Evans Nimako	Not appointed
Nelson Owusu Ansah	Not appointed
Rita Asobayere	Not appointed
Osei Agyei	No known appointment
Dr. Mark Bediako	No known appointment

Source: Graphic Online (2017)

Those who help the political party during the electoral period tend to jostle for governmental appointment after victory has been secured. After the 2000 elections, Mrs Rosemary Ekwam, the then women's wing organizer in the national capital, admonished that;

We must be committed towards the building of the party rather than fight for governmental positions.

Mrs Ekwam's call has never been heeded because Bob-Milliar (2012: 683) finds that "Citizens who become active in the NDC and NPP understand the possible benefits of their activism and the ways of achieving such goals. Selective incentives stand out strongly as the motive for becoming active in the parties".

Everyone, one way or the other, is in for something. Therefore after an electoral victory, the concentration shifts from building a formidable party to getting 'what' from the new government. The drive to reward party loyalist is so strong that when the party forgets about some 'pillars', other members are quick to remind the government of its ungratefulness. Barely a year after the 2016 General Elections in Ghana;

The Tema East Constituency members of the New Patriotic Party have appealed to President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo to reward Ben Ashitey by giving him an appointment for his loyalty and resourcefulness. "There is a common adage that, 'one good turn deserves another', and so some of us in the Tema East Branch of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) are making this clarion call for President Akufo-Addo to reward this man that has kept his faith with the party". Deputy Constituency Organizer for Tema East, Osmanu Ashitey, said "an appointment of Ben Ashitey by the President will be a good source of encouragement for all party loyalists who keep sacrificing for the party."

The intrinsic impetus to reward party loyalist has blinded Ghanaian governments over the years as they even appoint loyalist to sensitive public positions without recourse to merit. It does not matter whether the agency or corporation delivers effectively or otherwise, only the whims of the government count. Owing to this, Kwasi Prempeh, Executive Director of the Centre for Democratic Development-Ghana and Professor of Law (Ullo, 2018), lamented that;

CEO appointments, you would expect will be more meritocratic, somewhat competitive in this sector because many companies in this sector are also competing with private sector companies in the same market. Did we see any change from the status quo in terms of CEO appointments? Definitely not. We saw a lot of open scramble for positions among partisans. There was no meritocracy competition that we observed. Party loyalists see these positions as rewards for contribution towards the campaign or election success.

5. WHY TECHNOCRATS IN POLITICAL PARTIES?

As established early on by the technocratic knowledge-transformation model, technocrats can apply their specialized knowledge to negative conditions for change to be experienced. They can be integrated into the political parties by the creation of permanent bureaucracy-like structures within their national structure. Just like the civil servants in government agencies, they will function as the major administrative wing of the political parties, taking care of implementation as far as party strategies and policies are concerned. Politicians within political parties will always act as politicians when they are put in a position of compromise in order to sustain their support. If sensitive progressive party building issues will be left in the hands of politicians, then the impact of political parties on democratic consolidation will undesirably be low. There is the need to create a structure that will ensure the consolidation of the political parties themselves. Technocrats needed in political parties are people with specialized education that give them their distinct knowledge and skills and can apply their knowledge and skills to solve pertinent and persistent problems in critical sectors of public and private organizations. As political parties aggregate both private and public interests, these technocrats can fit in their

structure. They should be different from the politicians or technopols. They should be different from politicians because, though partisan, they should be isolated from the pressures of everyday political activities, and also be distinct from technopols as taking up political positions will open them up to unnecessary competition and make their commitment to the party's broader interest questionable. The reasons provided below explain the need to engage people with specialized knowledge, who must of course be members of a said political party.

5.1 Permanency in the structure of political parties

There is the need to introduce and sustain permanent bureaucracy-like configurations made of technocrats in the political parties as instability plaque the composition of national party structures. There will be no need to "reorganize" the political party times without number after every electoral loss if the political party has a clear-cut structure that forms the basis for its dynamic strategy. If technocrats are manning these structures, even their change in plans and strategy will be consistent with party ideals and ethos. Permanent instrumental sectors of the political parties need to be strengthened to thrive, and they should be created if they are non-existent; structures as party economic philosophy, planning and development, finance and treasury management, electoral management, party-civil society integration, democratic and party ethics adherence, legal issues. If these structures are established, it will ensure coherence regarding the way internal and external party issues are addressed, and they will get better at it as they sustain these structures and do what they do over time. Over a period, their strategies will be stronger and their plan of action, clearer.

5.2 Redefinition of party existence

In any political community, political parties have a larger role to play than just contesting electable public positions. The heat rays of political parties in Ghana are focussed on "the next election" and this is increasingly limiting the purpose for the existence of political parties in Ghana. Technocrats are therefore needed to help in the redefinition of the existence of political parties. So that if they are not winning elections, they are protecting the rights of the vulnerable; if the economic and social policies of the government are not effective, they will provide a credible alternative; if they are not in control of government apparatus, they can protect the media and promote accountability and transparency devoid of propaganda; if they are not top of policy issues, they will give the public a cause to participate in the activities of their country.

5.3 Serving the right interest

One way or the other, politicians cannot clearly serve the interest of entities that they manage. Their continued relevance and popularity is more important than any other things, for it ensures their progression in their field. There is the need for technocrats in political parties because they have no election to lose or appointment to miss. They will be able to serve the right interest in accordance with party strategy and policies. They will not easily bend the rules to suit a particular individual or group if that will hurt their plans that took a lot of time to come up with. And as they are sufficiently protected from political pressure owing to their professional code, they will be relatively free to serve the broader interest of the political party.

5.4 Contributing to democratic consolidation

As the structures of the political parties are restructured and infused with permanency, the existence of political parties is redefined, and broader party interests are being served, the focus of the political parties will gradually shift from "the next election" to the "next step in the democratization process" or better still, "how can our democracy be made stronger?" More so, if political parties are stronger as elements in democratic practice, they will be in a better position to contribute to democratic consolidation. Political parties are the major stakeholders as far as the formation of government in a democratic dispensation is concerned. If they meticulously uphold the principles democracy, it will characterize their critique of the government when they are in opposition, and translate in progressive policies when they wield power.

5.5 Refocusing the energies of politicians

The most important asset politicians are interested in in a state is political power. And what they seek to do with this asset determines whether a state will retrogress, mark time or move forward. If the technocratic machinery of the political party is operational, politicians within them will be liberated to focus their energy on how to use the most important yet delicate asset of the state. The duality of politician's mind-set concerning how things go on within their party and what they will use the state's political power for worry both the administration of the political parties and the state. If technocratic party bureaucrats function to operate not-so-political issues within, politician's energies will be refocused on the without. After all, it is their influence and impact on the without that makes them relevant. Moreover, if their energies are refocused, they will improve upon their use of the most important asset of the state.

6. CONCLUSION

When a state achieves democratic consolidation, there is high confidence in the way things unfold as citizens will trust due process and believe that the system under which they live supports their greatest personal development, and therefore better than any other system. The manner in which political parties in Ghana are contributing toward this end leaves much to be desired. With 61% of the voting citizenry believing that Ghana is not a democracy, a democracy with major problems or a democracy with minor problems,¹⁸ there is the urgent need to take calculated measures in order to garner trust for democracy and what it stands for. As political parties are important elements in the aggregation of interests in a political community, their priorities must change if they are to make any meaningful contribution toward democratic consolidation. Political parties should not be committed to winning elections. They should rather be committed to the promotion of the democratic ideals of equity and equality, economic prosperity, freedoms that ensure personal and collective development, transparency and accountability. Hugely too, democratic consolidation is to the benefit of political parties as their actions and inactions affect the acceptance or rejection of the system that ensure their survival. They must then conduct themselves in a manner that will ensure increased, established, and permanent acceptance of a system of a free, liberal, self-sustaining and progressive society.

As clarified in this paper, political parties move party building experts with technocratic elements into government after an electoral win, and this affects the structuring of the party and its consequent contribution toward democratic consolidation. The creation of a permanent bureaucracy-like structure and the incorporation of technocrats at the national level will ensure the gradual attainment of two major profits; the building of strongly focussed political parties, and political parties proper contribution toward democratic consolidation. For if political parties are focussed and consolidated themselves, they can contribute to democratic consolidation more significantly.

The technocratic knowledge-transformation model lends support to the fact that technocrats will apply their specialized knowledge to address specialized issues that especially bother political parties. This paper does not necessarily advocate the separation of politics from the administration of party affairs. But the recognition that both political and administrative issues of a said political party are equally important. Bringing technocrats in and sustaining their stay demand adequate financial resourcing but this financial investment is crucial if political parties are really committed to the progression of the Ghanaian state.

If they do not channel their effort towards a democratically consolidated Ghana, their existence will just be as a wide-open umbrella with holes on a rainy day. If Ghana or any other state continues to be democratically unconsolidated and its citizens do not embrace the principles that make the system stronger, it will continue with its to-and-fro movement, and it's political, economic and social story will remain same. If democracy is to bring about progress, it must be consolidated.

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