

The Rule of Law Landscape in the Historical Mirror of China's Supervisory System

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Abstract

In the development process of China's national system, a rich supervisory system and governance ideas have been nurtured. As an important part of it, the supervisory system has always been highly valued by rulers of all dynasties. The ancient Chinese supervisory system germinated in the pre-Qin period, originated in the Qin and Han dynasties, matured in the Sui and Tang dynasties, and was perfected in the Ming and Qing dynasties, reflecting the distinctive colors of ancient Chinese indigenous legal culture. It was a political system established after the formation of a unified country. In the new development stage of the new era, to continue deepening the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system, we need to jump out of the "historical cycle" and give play to the contemporary value of traditional Chinese legal culture, providing a strong rule of law guarantee for the development of Chinese-style modernization.

Keywords: Ancient China; supervisory system; drawing lessons for innovation

Introduction

Throughout history, the quest for power and the need for its regulation have shaped civilizations. Nowhere is this more evident than in China's ancient supervisory system, a testament to the nation's rich cultural heritage and governance philosophy. Rooted in the fertile cultural soil of the Chinese nation, this system boasts a long history, distinct characteristics, and a rigorous, comprehensive structure. As an integral component of ancient China's national governance framework, it encapsulates the wisdom and ingenuity of the Chinese people.

The design of the ancient Chinese supervisory system eloquently reflects the Chinese culture's pursuit of balance and harmony. Its implementation and management transcend mere legal or administrative acts, embodying a profound cultural practice (Zhang Jinfan, 2018). However, it's crucial to recognize that this system primarily served to consolidate imperial power. While a few enlightened monarchs effectively utilized the checks and balances of supervisory organs during certain periods, the system often devolved into a tool for attacking political adversaries, silencing dissent, and supporting tyrannical rule.

Despite the stark differences between modern political systems and ancient China's, the core principles and governance ideas of the ancient Chinese supervisory system still offer valuable insights for enhancing contemporary national governance structures (Ma Jun, 2005). This enduring relevance underscores the timeless nature of the challenges and solutions in the realm of power supervision and governance.

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Content

1、Legislative Evolution of the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System

1.1 Legislative Changes in the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System The ancient Chinese supervisory system originated very early and was a part of the national system. Its basic task was to rectify officials, correct official evils, impeach violations, and maintain discipline. It was a national supervisory system established to ensure the normal operation of the country. This system accompanied the emergence and development of the ancient Chinese political system and was formed and established with the centralization of feudal power and the autocracy of feudal monarchs. Summarizing its historical experience, it roughly went through four historical periods.

1.1.1 The ancient Chinese supervisory system germinated in the pre-Qin period. The Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties were the initial stages of ancient Chinese civilization. Social organizations and political systems were in a relatively primitive state, and independent and clear legal supervisory institutions and systems had not yet developed. The supervisory system of this period was mainly reflected in moral constraints, behavioral supervision, and checks and balances on monarchical power. Its supervisory functions mostly relied on the worship of traditional personalities and lacked the systematic support of the law. The Xia Dynasty's "Political Code" recorded the provisions of "those who act before the appointed time shall be killed without mercy, and those who do not act on time shall also be killed without mercy" (Xunzi, "The Way of the Ruler"). Despite this, the supervisory system of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties showed signs in the military and criminal fields, and some criminal laws punishing the abuse of state power emerged. This reflected the basic exploration of early Chinese civilization to maintain social order and state authority. However, the forms of supervisory activities in this period were relatively simple, relying more on personal morality and clan norms, and had not yet formed a systematic and institutionalized supervisory system in a strict sense.

During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, with the intensified competition among the vassal states and the rapid development of the social economy, the need to strengthen political order and law enforcement increased. The vassal states began to compile and implement laws and decrees, and the original document-managing censors also obtained corresponding legal supervisory powers. Guan Zhong once said to Duke Huan of Qi, "Those who offend the king's countenance and advance to remonstrate must be loyal, not avoiding death, not valuing wealth and rank. The minister is not as good as Dongguo Ya. Please appoint him as the Grand Remonstrator" (Lüshi Chunqiu, Volume 17, "Do Not Act in Person"). During this period, the states of Qi, Qin, Zhao, Wei, and Han all established the position of censor, responsible for supervising and impeaching the official duties of officials to maintain political discipline and legal order. The development of the supervisory system in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods significantly improved the efficiency of state governance and legal order, marking the transition of the ancient Chinese supervisory system from the primitive stage to a more mature and systematic direction.

1.1.2 The ancient Chinese supervisory system originated in the Qin and Han dynasties After the Qin dynasty unified the world, Qin Shi Huang established a central administrative management system with the Three Excellencies and Nine Ministers system as the core. The establishment of this system not only strengthened the central government's control over the localities but also promoted the further development and improvement of the supervisory system itself. During the Qin dynasty, "the world was divided into thirty-six prefectures, each with a governor, a deputy, and a supervisor." The "supervisor" here (Records of the Grand Historian, "Annals of Qin Shi Huang") is an abbreviation for the censor. The Censor-in-Chief "ranked above the ministers, with a silver seal and a green ribbon, and assisted the prime minister" (Book of Han, Ban Gu (Eastern Han)). During this period, the supervisory system integrated traditional supervisory mechanisms and emerging legal concepts, constructing a nationwide, independently operating state supervisory system. With the promotion of the standardized and unified "Qin Laws," Qin Shi Huang established the Censor-in-Chief system in the central government and dispatched censors throughout the country. This measure marked the substantial transformation of censors into "supervisory officials." Their responsibilities and powers to oversee officials were unprecedently expanded. The establishment of the Censor-in-Chief system not only strengthened the overall efficiency of state governance but also provided important historical experience for the development of the ancient Chinese supervisory system.

During the Han dynasty, the ancient Chinese supervisory system underwent a significant change. The highest supervisory organ in the central government, the Censore, separated from the original administrative system, forming an independent state supervisory organ parallel to the administrative system. It should be pointed out that during the Eastern Han dynasty, the Assistant Censor-in-Chief was "in charge of investigating and reporting illegal acts, receiving memorials from officials of prefectures and counties, and impeaching those who violated the law" (Book of the Later Han, "Treatise on Officials"). To regulate and guide the supervisory functions of the Censore, the central government specially formulated two sets of supervisory regulations: the "Nine Articles for Censors" and the "Six Articles for Inspectors." The Han dynasty also divided the world into thirteen supervisory regions and appointed full-time inspectors to supervise the responsible areas. With the instability of politics and the disintegration of centralized power in the late Han dynasty, corrupt governments and power struggles seriously weakened the independence and authority of supervisory organs. The censors at all levels were supposed to correct the misconduct of local officials in name, but in practice, they often overstepped their authority, intervened in local daily governance, and even engaged in the handling of administrative and judicial cases. The Censore completely became a pawn in the struggle for imperial power, leading to tense relations between the local and central governments and laying the groundwork for subsequent political turmoil.

1.1.3 The ancient Chinese supervisory system matured in the Sui, Tang, and Song dynasties During the Wei, Jin, Southern and Northern Dynasties, the imperial power and forces changed frequently, and the political situation was chaotic. The supervisory systems of each dynasty were different. To maintain political stability, most still followed the Han system. The Censore remained the highest supervisory organ, but there were also some changes. The most significant change was that during the Wei and Jin periods, the Censore gradually became a nationwide supervisory institution directly controlled by imperial power, thus realizing a supervisory system independent of the state administrative organs and laying the

foundation for the construction of the supervisory system in the future. This also basically ended the confusion between administrative power and procuratorial power.

The Sui and Tang dynasties were a period of prosperity and flourishing in ancient Chinese history. The law of the Sui and Tang dynasties, along with the heyday of Chinese feudal society, also reached maturity and perfection. The remonstrance official system of the Sui dynasty inherited from the Southern and Northern Dynasties and was the most distinctive feature of the Sui dynasty's supervisory system. The Sui dynasty reformed the original supervisory system, moving the Censorate to the outer court, clarifying the nature of the Censorate, expanding the scale of supervisory institutions, establishing the Metropolitan Prefectural Censorate and the Attendant Censorate, abolishing the system of censors directly under the emperor, restoring the local inspection system, etc.

In the Tang dynasty, Chinese feudal society entered a prosperous period, with further development in economy, culture, and politics. During this period, the law was flourishing, and the supervisory law covered a wide range of content, involving administration, justice, society, economy, military, and other aspects. In addition, the Tang dynasty adopted a mechanism of "one office and three chambers" with separate jurisdictions, establishing three chambers under the Censorate: the "Main Chamber," the "Palace Chamber," and the "Investigation Chamber," further expanding the supervisory institutions and making the supervisory system more rigorous, organized, and systematic. At this time, the remonstrance system was also highly recognized. Censors were responsible for impeachment and correcting official evils, while remonstrance officials were responsible for remonstrance and direct admonition. The "Six Codes of the Great Tang" and "Six Laws of Supervision" and other local supervisory regulations specially formulated in the Tang dynasty provided an impetus for the gradual improvement of the supervisory system and played an important role in maintaining state discipline. They also laid the foundation for the establishment of the supervisory system in later generations (Fang Xuanling, Book of Jin).

In the Song dynasty, with the development of imperial power and under the influence of the "ancestral family law" of "guarding against ministers more than guarding against foreign invaders," the supervisory organs and supervisory system underwent creative transformation and innovative development, playing a pioneering role and value for the unification of the "Censorate and Remonstrance" system. During the reign of Emperor Taizu of the Song dynasty, Zhao Kuangyin, to strengthen centralized leadership, the status of the prime minister was weakened. The Song dynasty required the supervisory system to implement a vertical and horizontal grid-style supervision method from the central to local officials, and the functions of supervision became stronger and more rigorous. The History of the Song Dynasty states, "The founding of the Song dynasty lies in the Censorate and Remonstrance" (Tuotuo, 1985). However, this provision, during a certain period, fostered the phenomenon of censors abusing their power. For example, the "Censorate and Remonstrance" system initiated by the Song dynasty was responsible for supervising the words and deeds of the emperor and civil and military officials, widely opening channels for speech. However, with the changes in the political and historical direction of the Song dynasty, some Censorate and Remonstrance officials became morbid forces mutually excluding each other for different political forces, intensifying factional struggles and causing chaos in the Song dynasty's supervisory system. The case of Censor Lü E and Tang Jian impeaching Wang Anshi during the reign of Emperor Shenzong of the Song dynasty proves the mutual exclusion between the prime minister and the

Censorate in the Song dynasty. In the end, the censorial system was still a tool for feudal rulers to maintain their own power and political stability (Liu Jianlan, 1998).

1.1.4 The ancient Chinese supervisory system was perfected in the Ming and Qing dynasties In the Ming dynasty, feudal rule under the autocracy of the monarch reached its peak. During this period, the position of prime minister was abolished, and regional supervision began to be implemented nationwide. Through means such as specially setting up the Six Offices of Scrutiny to perform the functions of remonstrance officials, the functions of the supervisory organs were unprecedentedly strengthened. The direct control of imperial power over supervisory organs and local supervisory officials realized the emperor's control over the bureaucratic group and, to a certain extent, consolidated the imperial power and political stability of the Ming dynasty. In addition, the Ming dynasty formulated a large number of laws and regulations such as the "Regulations of the Guard Post," "The Great Ming Code," and "The Collected Statutes of the Ming Dynasty." The objects and scope of supervision were more extensive, covering not only administrative departments and government officials but also the fields of thought, culture, and academics (Long Wenbin, 1965).

The Qing dynasty inherited the Ming system. The central supervisory organ, the Censorate, was combined with the "Six Offices," and the Censorate remained the highest supervisory organ, known as the "combination of the Offices and the Circuit." This measure expanded the scope of supervision and established the special status of supervisory organs and supervisory personnel. Local supervision still followed the Ming system. During the Qianlong period, with the promulgation of the "Imperially Endorsed Regulations of the Censorial System," the supervision of miscellaneous affairs and officials became more effective. As the peak period of the development of ancient Chinese supervisory law, the Qing dynasty promoted an unprecedented integration of various supervisory forces. The supervisory system reached a high degree of rigor, providing great reference value for strengthening government supervision while granting greater power to the government. The ancient Chinese supervisory system thus also reached its peak (Tang Jianhua & Song Xiaohui, 2002).

1.2 Limitations of the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System

1.2.1 The problem of excessive intervention. The problem of excessive intervention by supervisory officials was a prominent issue in the practice of the supervisory system. Some supervisory officials exceeded their scope of authority and excessively intervened in the daily management of local governments and the handling of judicial cases. This not only eroded the autonomy of local governments but also undermined the independence and authority of the law. For example, in the late Eastern Han dynasty, although Censor-in-Chief Yang Biao attempted to maintain supervisory functions when facing the monopoly of power by eunuchs, in actual operation, the censorial power was often utilized by eunuchs, indirectly leading to excessive intervention in local affairs. Under such circumstances, although supervisory officials were nominally responsible for supervision, they actually became tools for eunuchs to interfere with local governance (Peng Bo & Gong Fei, 1989). This phenomenon of excessive intervention was particularly evident during periods when centralized power was relatively weak, and in severe cases, it could even lead to tense relations between the central and local governments and political instability.

1.2.2 The problem of power abuse. In the ancient Chinese supervisory system, some supervisory officials abused their power for personal gain or to gain an advantage in political struggles by taking advantage of their privilege of reporting directly to the emperor. The famous literati Qin Guan of the Song dynasty was once impeached by Censor Li Ding for speaking straightforwardly. Li Ding used his power as a supervisory official to make excessive accusations against Qin Guan, essentially using supervisory power for political attacks. Such abuse of power not only undermined the original intention of the supervisory system but also seriously eroded the stability of the political system and the fairness of the legal system.

1.2.3 The problem of inefficiency. The inefficiency of the supervisory system was due to insufficient resource allocation, limited staffing, and the limitations of ancient communication and transportation conditions. Supervisory officials often found it difficult to effectively supervise illegal acts in a wide range of governance areas in a comprehensive and timely manner. In addition, the rigid operation mode of the supervisory system also limited officials' rapid response to emergencies, slowed down the system's reaction speed, and affected overall governance efficiency. This inefficiency not only reduced the execution power of the supervisory system but also, to a certain extent, weakened the deterrent power of the law.

2、Drawing Lessons from the Past for the Present

2.1 Historical Experience I: Independence of the Supervisory Subject The evolutionary pattern of the ancient Chinese supervisory system from complexity to singularity reflects the authority of the supervisory system in the following ways. First, the ancient Chinese supervisory system implemented a system of vertical leadership and direct management. This management system ensured the independence of local supervisory organs, eliminating the influence of officials at the same level and guaranteeing sufficient time for supervisory organ cadres to perform their duties locally, to a certain extent maintaining national political stability and the centralized unity of imperial power. Second, a vertically managed supervision mechanism. For example, during the prefectural and county system in ancient China, when the central government appointed officials in various regions across the country, it would dispatch envoys to different regions to understand and investigate the actions of each official and exercise supervisory functions over them. The separated supervision system prevented collusion among officials to a certain extent. Third, the nature of the ancient Chinese supervisory system was also reflected in the fact that supervisory personnel had their own power of impeachment. Given that the power of impeachment continuously developed and changed in practice, this system was a very advanced one in the history of ancient China and the history of supervision (Ai Yongming, 2018).

2.2 Historical Experience II: Legalization of the Supervisory System

In ancient China, special attention was paid to the supervision of the censors themselves. Censors had to strictly implement legal supervision. If there was a failure to supervise or an omission of supervision, especially in cases of corruption and favoritism, the punishment would be more severe. This can be roughly divided into the following two aspects: First, clarifying supervisory power through the reform of the supervisory system and legislation. Second, establishing a multi-level supervision system to horizontally constrain supervisory organs. For example, the "Six Articles of Inquiry," the first local supervisory regulation in China, provided an important and complete legal basis for supervising local officials. The "Great Qing Code" also explicitly stipulated: "If censorial officials accept gifts or money from people, or if they take excessive profits, they can be punished with a penalty

two degrees higher than other officials" (Veritable Records of Shizu of the Qing Dynasty, 1985). Ancient Chinese supervisory codes such as the "Mutual Investigation Law of Supervisory Commissions in All Circuits" of the Song dynasty and the "Imperially Endorsed Regulations of the Censorial System" of the Qing dynasty had rich contents, involving many fields such as administration, justice, economy, personnel, and military, all providing us with valuable experience. In 2021, the National Supervisory Commission issued and implemented the "Regulations for the Implementation of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China," making discipline inspection and supervision work more practical and operational. This fully demonstrates the clear stance of China's discipline inspection and supervision departments to rectify discipline, combat corruption, and promote integrity with the idea and means of the rule of law, as well as their strong will to accept the strictest supervision and restraint (Wei Ran, 2022).

2.3 Historical Experience III: Expansion of Supervisory Functions Strict selection of supervisory officials is one of the important conditions for implementing the national supervisory system. As Mencius said, "Laws alone cannot carry themselves out." The conditions for selecting supervisory officials in all dynasties were, first, moral character. They had to adhere to principles, be clean and honest, not show favoritism, and dare to offend dignitaries to correct official conduct. Second, they had to be talents selected through the imperial examination system, which could promote the improvement of cultural qualities. Third, supervisory officials had to have work experience in local areas. For example, in the Ming dynasty, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang personally selected supervisory officials and dismissed those who were unqualified. It was precisely because of the strict selection of supervisory officials that ancient China produced a large number of upright, honest, and fearless supervisory officials. For example, Yang Jisheng of the Ming dynasty, who was imprisoned for impeaching the crimes of Yan Song and his son, said in his farewell poem: "Drinking and reading for forty years, with a black gauze cap on the head and a clear sky above. A man who wants to ascend the Lingyan Pavilion must put his first merit and fame above money." Article 14 of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China clearly legislates the rank, appointment and removal, evaluation, and promotion of supervisory officials. It also makes specific provisions for the supervision and punishment of supervisory officials (Zhou Xiang & Liu Mingle, 2023).

2.4 Historical Experience IV: Diversification of Supervisory Methods The establishment and improvement of a multi-level inspection system in ancient China were mainly reflected in the following aspects: First, the central government dispatched inspectors. Starting from the Han dynasty, the central government would send inspectors to local areas to inspect and examine the implementation of local officials, and they would also listen to the accusations and opinions of the people. Second, the local inspection system. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, a local inspection system was also established, such as judicial inspectors and provincial governors. They were responsible for inspecting the performance and integrity of officials at all levels, and they would also listen to the accusations and opinions of the people. Third, the spontaneous supervisory mechanism of the people. In ancient China, due to the blurred boundaries between officials and the people, the people would also spontaneously establish some supervisory mechanisms, such as supervising marriage, diet, clothing, and other rituals, as well as night watchmen in cities. Fourth, the censorial supervisory system. Censors were a special official position in the ancient Chinese official system, responsible for supervising court officials and local officials. They would also listen to the accusations and

opinions of the people, and their scope of supervision was relatively wide, with considerable power. Through these inspection systems, ancient China gradually established a relatively complete supervisory system, effectively maintaining social stability and official integrity, and providing reference and inspiration for later official supervisory systems (Bu Xianqun, 2023). Inspection work is both a sharp tool and a temporary measure of the state, as well as a fundamental strategy. By promoting high-quality and full coverage of inspections, advancing the reform of the inspection mechanism, and promoting the linkage of inspections at all levels, in January 1996, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 14th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection made arrangements to select ministerial-level cadres to conduct inspections in local areas and departments. In 2009, the term "Central Inspection Team" was officially named, and since then, a political term that makes party members who violate discipline tremble with fear was born. The new changes make the Central Inspection Team more influential and deterrent.

3、Basic Paths for Deepening the Reform of the National Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision System in the New Era

3.1 Basic Characteristics of China's Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision System Reform

3.1.1 Establishing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the National Supervisory Commission, and local commissions for discipline inspection and supervision. In deepening the reform of the national disciplinary inspection and supervision system in the new era, the most important measure is to establish the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the National Supervisory Commission, and local commissions for discipline inspection and supervision. This measure is a major reform based on the original disciplinary inspection and supervision system, integrating the functions of discipline inspection and supervision into a unified system. The responsibility of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission is to supervise state public officials, state organ staff, and other personnel exercising public power, ensure the integrity and efficiency of state power organs, and maintain the implementation of the constitution and laws. Local commissions for discipline inspection and supervision, under the leadership of party committees and governments at all levels, supervise public officials and staff at their respective levels (Li Yang, 2020).

3.1.2 Expanding the scope of supervisory power. In promoting the reform of the national supervision system, the supervisory power of supervisory organs has indeed been expanded. The new supervision system expands the targets of supervision to state public officials, state organ staff, and other personnel exercising public power, while the original discipline inspection organs only supervised party member leading cadres. This means that the scope of supervision by supervisory organs is broader, and the targets of supervision are more diverse, which is of great significance for strengthening the supervision of public power and safeguarding the interests of the people. At the same time, the means of supervision by supervisory organs have also been expanded, and they can adopt various methods such as inquiry, investigation, search, freezing, seizure, investigation, and evidence collection to comprehensively and deeply understand the disciplinary and illegal behaviors of the targets of supervision. The expansion of these means of supervision not only improves the efficiency and accuracy of supervision work but also helps combat corruption and maintain national political security.

3.1.3 Implementing the linkage of discipline and law, investigation and examination, punishment, and accountability. The new disciplinary inspection and supervision system requires the linkage of discipline and law, investigation and examination, punishment, and accountability, which means that disciplinary inspection and supervisory organs and judicial organs should cooperate and link with each other to form a linkage mechanism for supervision, examination, investigation, punishment, and accountability. Specifically, disciplinary inspection and supervisory organs should, while exercising their supervisory duties, take necessary investigation and examination measures in accordance with the law to investigate public officials suspected of disciplinary and illegal behaviors. For verified disciplinary and illegal behaviors, they should implement corresponding punishments in accordance with laws and regulations, and at the same time, strengthen accountability for relevant responsible persons to form a closed loop of comprehensive and strict party governance.

3.1.4 Promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system. In the reform of the national disciplinary inspection and supervision system, promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system is one of the very important characteristics. With the expansion of the responsibilities and the strengthening of the power of the National Supervisory Commission, it is necessary to establish a more complete and sound legal system to regulate and ensure the effective development of supervision work. Therefore, promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system has become an important aspect of the reform.

For this purpose, the Supervision Law, as the core of the reform of the supervision system, was passed at the National People's Congress on March 20, 2018, and officially implemented on July 1 of the same year. In addition, to adapt to the new characteristics and new tasks of supervision work after the reform of the national supervision system, relevant supporting regulations of the Supervision Law are also being continuously improved. In promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system, the following aspects should be emphasized: First, strengthening the protection of the constitution. Supervision work must be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and laws, and the authority of the constitution and laws must be ensured. Second, strengthening the crackdown on job-related crimes. Strengthening the crackdown on and prevention of job-related crimes will be an important aspect of national supervision work in the future. Third, promoting the comprehensive rule of law. Strengthening the construction of the legal system and the promotion of the rule of law, while strengthening legal supervision and evaluation of supervisory organs, to ensure that national supervision work continues to advance on the track of the rule of law (Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, 2018).

In summary, promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system is an important part of the reform of the national disciplinary inspection and supervision system and a necessary requirement for achieving comprehensive and strict party governance and comprehensive rule of law. Building a complete supervision legal system can provide a strong institutional guarantee for the work of disciplinary inspection and supervision and improve the fairness, authority, and efficiency of supervision work. At the same time, promoting the construction of the national supervision legal system can also provide a solid legal foundation for building an efficient, authoritative, and fair national supervision system. This is of great significance for maintaining party and state discipline, promoting comprehensive and strict party governance, and ensuring long-term peace and stability of the country (Guo Xulei, 2022).

3.2 Room for Improvement of the Supervision System in the New Era The room for improvement of the supervision system reform in the new era is mainly reflected in the following aspects:

3.2.1 Strengthening supervision over the exercise of power. Through the establishment and improvement of power lists, power operation records, power supervision systems, and other means, standardizing the exercise of public power, preventing the abuse of power and the occurrence of corruption, and ensuring fair and just social governance.

3.2.2 Strengthening supervision over the allocation of public resources. In the process of public resource allocation, supervisory organs should strengthen supervision and inspection to prevent the illegal occupation and waste of public resources and ensure the fair distribution and effective use of resources.

3.2.3 Improving the ability to supervise public officials. Supervisory organs should continuously strengthen the supervision of public officials, including strengthening the training and supervision of the quality, ability, and moral level of public officials, and increasing the intensity of cracking down on illegal and disciplinary behaviors of public officials.

3.2.4 Strengthening supervision over state-owned enterprises and financial institutions. State-owned enterprises and financial institutions play an important role in economic development. Supervisory organs should strengthen supervision over these institutions to ensure their lawful and compliant operation, prevent corruption and illegal behaviors, and maintain stable economic development.

3.2.5 Promoting international anti-corruption cooperation. In the era of globalization, corrupt behaviors have crossed national borders, and international anti-corruption cooperation has become increasingly important. Supervisory organs should actively participate in international anti-corruption cooperation, strengthen cooperation and exchanges with international supervisory institutions, jointly combat cross-border corrupt behaviors, and maintain the stability and development of global anti-corruption efforts.

To promote the room for improvement of the supervision system in the new era and the high-quality development of work, it is necessary to closely focus on the "two upholds," strengthen the supervision of democratic politics, promote the expansion of supervisory power and the construction of the legal system, so that the improved supervision system can be naturally integrated into the overall situation of party and state development, and promote China's new journey of comprehensively building a modern socialist country.

Conclusion

The ancient Chinese supervisory system, with its rich history and profound cultural roots, offers valuable insights for modern governance and anti-corruption efforts. From its germination in the pre-Qin period to its perfection in the Ming and Qing dynasties, this system evolved to address the perennial challenges of power regulation and official accountability. Despite its limitations, such as excessive intervention, power abuse, and inefficiency, the system's core principles of independence, legalization, functional expansion, and methodological diversification continue to inform contemporary supervisory practices.

The reform of China's disciplinary inspection and supervision system in the new era draws inspiration from this historical legacy while adapting to modern challenges. The establishment of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, the expansion of supervisory power, the implementation of a linkage mechanism, and the promotion of a comprehensive legal framework for supervision all reflect a commitment to learning from the past while innovating for the future.

However, there remains room for improvement in areas such as strengthening supervision over power exercise, public resource allocation, and state-owned enterprises. The system must also adapt to the challenges of globalization, particularly in the realm of international anti-corruption cooperation.

As China continues on its path of modernization, the evolution of its supervisory system serves as a testament to the enduring relevance of traditional Chinese legal culture. By balancing historical wisdom with contemporary needs, China's supervisory system aims to provide a robust framework for ensuring accountability, promoting integrity, and supporting the nation's development in the new era. This ongoing process of reform and improvement underscores the dynamic nature of governance systems and the importance of continual adaptation in the face of evolving societal needs and global challenges.

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