CRIMINOGENIC GOVERNANCE: SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION RISKS AND CRIME IN THAILAND'S PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

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Abstract

Corruption in provincial governance is increasingly recognized as a systemic mechanism that enables crime, rather than merely an ethical or administrative failure. This study investigates how corruption risks function as crime-enabling structures within Thailand's provincial administration, situated within a broader Asian context marked by persistent governance weaknesses. Integrating Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), the Governance-Risk-Compliance (GRC) model, and Stakeholder Participation Theory, this research conceptualizes corruption as systemic vulnerabilities with direct crime-enabling effects. A qualitative comparative case study was conducted across four Thai provinces, utilizing 28 semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and field observations. Thematic coding, guided by ERM's structural, procedural, and behavioral risk dimensions, revealed that centralized authority and patronage networks foster limited oversight. Manipulation of procurement and discretionary regulations sustain collusion, while cultural tolerance of bribery normalizes corruption in bureaucratic routines. These interconnected risks transform corruption into a systemic mechanism facilitating fraud, money laundering, and organized crime. Comparative insights from Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines confirm this pattern across Asia, underscoring the urgency of integrated provincial governance reforms that combine risk-based monitoring, participatory oversight, and cultural change to prevent crime effectively.
Keywords: Corruption Risk, Provincial Governance, Crime Prevention, COSO-ERM, Thailand

Introduction

Corruption is widely recognized as one of the most critical threats to governance, economic development, and public trust. In recent years, scholars and international organizations have increasingly reframed corruption not merely as an ethical deficit or governance inefficiency, but as a direct enabler of crime. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2023 ranked Thailand at 36 out of 100, placing it below the global average and regional peers such as Malaysia (47) and Vietnam (42). This stagnation underscores how systemic weaknesses remain entrenched within Thailand's governance architecture, particularly in oversight and accountability mechanisms. Complementing these findings, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators highlight Thailand's persistent underperformance in "control of corruption," reinforcing concerns about institutional fragility in public integrity management.

At the regional level, corruption has been repeatedly linked with organized crime, illicit financial flows, and procurement manipulation. Empirical studies show that public procurement, bribery of state officials, and discretionary contracting serve as key channels through which criminal networks divert state resources (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020; Locatelli et al., 2017). In Indonesia, research demonstrates that weaknesses in procurement governance, particularly during infrastructure development, create opportunities for collusion, bid-rigging, and rent-seeking within local government contracting systems (Suardi et al., 2024). Taken together, these regional cases highlight that corruption operates not merely as an administrative failure but as a structural condition enabling the functioning of criminal enterprises (Gnaldi & Del Sarto, 2024)

The academic literature further illustrates that digital reforms and open government data initiatives can reduce, but not eliminate, these vulnerabilities. Systematic reviews of e-procurement reforms (Attard et al., 2015; Wirtz et al., 2018) show measurable gains in transparency but highlight the persistence of loopholes, especially when reforms are implemented in contexts marked by patronage and weak rule of law. Recent scholarship also points to the potential of artificial intelligence and advanced analytics to strengthen public oversight (Lyra et al., 2022; van Noordt & Misuraca, 2022). However, these technologies remain unevenly adopted across Southeast Asia. Consequently, corruption must be analyzed not as isolated misconduct but as a systemic risk that adapts to institutional and technological changes.

Against this backdrop, the present study contributes to two keyways. Theoretically, it integrates insights from contemporary enterprise risk management scholarship (Callahan & Soileau, 2017; González et al., 2020), the Governance-Risk-Compliance (GRC) model (Karthick et al., 2023), and the updated synthesis of Stakeholder Theory presented by Parmar et al. (2010), which expands the original propositions of Freeman's stakeholder concept into a modern governance framework. This integrated lens enables corruption risks to be conceptualized as systemic vulnerabilities with direct crime-enabling effects. Practically, it applies this integrated framework to Thailand's provincial administration, analyzing the interconnections among structural, procedural, and behavioral risks. By situating the Thai case within the broader Asian context, this research aims to generate comparative insights and actionable recommendations for shifting anti-corruption strategies from reactive, sanction-based enforcement to proactive, risk-based crime prevention.

Literature Review

Corruption has been extensively studied across disciplines, yet there is growing consensus that it should no longer be treated solely as a governance challenge or a matter of ethical misconduct. Instead, scholars increasingly conceptualize corruption as a systemic condition that enables a range of crimes, particularly in fragile governance environments (Gnaldi & Del

Sarto, 2024). This section reviews the key literature on corruption risks, their linkages to crime, and the frameworks that inform this study.

Research consistently demonstrates that corruption is not an isolated practice but part of a broader network of illicit activities. Transparency International (2023) underscores that high levels of corruption correlate with weak enforcement of criminal law and greater opportunities for organized crime. Evidence from recent procurement research shows that bribery and non-transparent contracting enable financial crime and transnational criminal activity, including money laundering and trafficking networks (Khorana et al., 2024). In this perspective, corruption functions both as a facilitator and multiplier of crime: it provides criminals with access to state resources, shields them from prosecution, and undermines the integrity of justice systems (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fazekas et al., 2016).

In Thailand, as in many parts of Asia, corruption in procurement and local governance has been directly linked with criminal outcomes. Studies of provincial procurement processes (Watcharothai, 2018) reveal how collusion between contractors and local officials not only inflates project costs but also creates opportunities for organized groups to secure contracts and launder illicit funds. These patterns align with international findings, including recent analyses showing that corruption within state institutions can serve as a structural enabler of organized crime and illicit financial flows (Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022; Attard et al., 2015).

Public procurement has been identified as one of the most vulnerable domains for corruption globally. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2020) estimates that procurement represents 12-15% of GDP in many countries, making it highly attractive to corrupt actors. Empirical research confirms this vulnerability. Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas (2020) studied donor-funded infrastructure projects and found that aid conditionality did not prevent collusion when local monitoring was weak. Jiménez et al. (2022) similarly show that digital procurement reforms improved transparency in some cases but failed to dismantle entrenched collusion networks, as manipulation shifted to earlier stages of procurement design. Comparable evidence from Italy indicates that red-flag indicators in procurement datasets can effectively detect collusion risks (Fazekas et al., 2016; Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022).

These findings are particularly relevant for Southeast Asia, where large infrastructure projects and emergency relief programs provide ample opportunities for corruption. In Thailand, disaster-relief budgets have repeatedly been manipulated by provincial officials working with private contractors, confirming that corruption in procurement processes operates as a crime-enabling mechanism rather than an isolated governance issue (Sharma et al., 2019).

In response to these vulnerabilities, scholars have increasingly turned to risk management frameworks as tools for anti-corruption. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) approaches have gained prominence in both corporate governance and the public sector. Research on ERM highlights its role in the systematic identification, assessment, and management of risks across organizational structures, making it particularly suitable for analyzing corruption risks (Callahan & Soileau, 2017). Mahama et al. (2022) found that higher levels of ERM maturity in public-sector organizations strengthened internal control functions and reduced opportunities for managerial misconduct, particularly when supported by integrated information systems. Marzuki et al. (2024) similarly demonstrated that mature risk practices correlate with lower tendencies toward fraud in public organizations in Malaysia. Recent comparative studies also show that ERM maturity contributes to stronger preventive mechanisms when linked with digital monitoring systems (van Noordt & Misuraca, 2022; Lyra et al., 2022)

Although Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) frameworks have been widely adopted and discussed in public-sector reforms and governance research, there remains a limited body of studies that explicitly examine the relationship between risk management structures and crime-prevention outcomes, particularly in provincial contexts in Asia. Most existing applications

focus on improving administrative efficiency or reducing financial mismanagement, rather than exploring how risk structures may either enable criminal activity or function as preventive mechanisms.

While COSO-ERM has been widely applied in corporate governance, its relevance to the public sector, particularly in provincial governance, requires further elaboration. In Thailand, risk management practices remain fragmented, often emphasizing compliance rather than proactive crime prevention. For instance, audit agencies and the NACC tend to focus on ex-post investigations rather than risk anticipation. This creates a gap in the use of ERM as a predictive tool for crime. Evidence from public-sector implementations shows that when ERM systems are integrated with digital monitoring tools, risk signals can be detected in real time, thereby strengthening preventive control mechanisms (Mahama et al., 2022). Similarly, in Malaysia, ERM maturity was shown to correlate with fraud prevention by reshaping organizational culture and internal controls (Marzuki et al., 2024). In Indonesia, provincial administrations that adopted ERM linked to procurement oversight witnessed a decline in contractor collusion, showing the direct crime-prevention benefits of integrated risk frameworks (Gnaldi & Del Sarto, 2024).

By contrast, Thai provincial agencies often adopt risk management in isolation from governance reforms, limiting their transformative potential. Thus, extending COSO-ERM from a compliance mechanism into a crime-prevention strategy requires both institutional integration and participatory oversight. This highlights the importance of situating ERM within broader governance structures that address structural vulnerabilities, rather than treating corruption merely as administrative inefficiency.

Beyond ERM, the Governance-Risk-Compliance (GRC) model offers a holistic approach that integrates governance mechanisms, risk assessment, and compliance processes (Karthick et al., 2023). The strength of GRC lies in its ability to connect risk management with institutional accountability. When combined with Stakeholder Participation Theory, which emphasizes the organizational responsibility to engage multiple affected actors rather than internal administrative control alone (Parmar et al., 2010), GRC provides not only technical mechanisms but also social legitimacy, as civil society and external oversight bodies play a role in monitoring risks and enforcing accountability.

Empirical evidence supports this integration. Research on digital procurement reforms shows that ICT-based systems are most effective when embedded in wider governance arrangements that incorporate risk-based oversight and citizen participation (Jiménez et al., 2022). In Indonesia, Tarjo et al. (2022) found that ERM-based fraud-prevention mechanisms yielded meaningful results only when complemented by external stakeholder monitoring. Similarly, open data and digital transparency tools have been shown to strengthen accountability in procurement systems when combined with participatory monitoring (Wirtz et al., 2018; Hochstetter et al., 2023). These studies confirm that anti-corruption efforts must go beyond technical reforms to include both governance integration and participatory accountability.

The literature review highlights several critical gaps that guide this study. First, a measurement gap persists, as most studies continue to rely on perception-based indices or national-level aggregates rather than systematic analyses of corruption risks at the provincial level (Lisciandra et al., 2022; Gnaldi & Del Sarto, 2024). This reliance on broad indicators limits the ability to capture local dynamics where corruption risks are most acute.

Second, a design gap emerges from the way reforms such as e-procurement are often implemented in isolation. While these initiatives may enhance transparency at the transactional level, they are rarely integrated into dynamic enterprise risk management (ERM) systems that would allow for real-time detection and adaptive responses to corruption risks (Attard et al., 2015; Lyra et al., 2022)

Finally, a contextual gap remains, particularly in Asian provincial bureaucracies. Although frameworks such as COSO-ERM, GRC, and Stakeholder Participation Theory have been widely applied in other regions, they remain underutilized in local governance across Asia. Moreover, there is little explicit focus on how these frameworks could be mobilized to strengthen crime prevention through procurement oversight (Marzuki et al., 2024).

Addressing these gaps, this study adopts an ERM-based analytical framework, drawing on recent public-sector research that conceptualizes risk management as an integrated, organization-wide system rather than a compliance tool (Mahama et al., 2022). This framework is combined with the GRC model and Stakeholder Participation Theory, positioning corruption risks not merely as governance deficiencies but as systemic vulnerabilities that enable crime. By applying this integrated model to Thailand's provincial administration, the study aims to provide both theoretical innovation and practical guidance for anti-corruption strategies in Asia.

Beyond addressing theoretical gaps, the review highlights the limitations of anti-corruption measures that focus narrowly on either regulatory compliance or technological reform. While COSO-ERM and GRC emphasize structured oversight, their transformative potential emerges only when combined with cultural change and stakeholder participation. This synthesis stresses that corruption should not be viewed as static; it adapts, mutates, and evolves in line with governance loopholes. Consequently, provincial-level analysis is vital because it captures these dynamic interactions more clearly than national indicators. The present study builds on this understanding by explicitly linking risk structures to crime outcomes, moving beyond administrative efficiency to examine the criminological implications of corruption in governance.

Research Method

This study adopts a qualitative research design with a comparative case study approach. A qualitative strategy is well-suited for examining corruption risks as socially embedded institutional practices rather than isolated events, reflecting arguments that bureaucratic corruption must be studied within its structural context (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). This approach enables the exploration of stakeholder perceptions and lived experiences, consistent with recent developments in reflexive qualitative analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2021). The comparative case study design also supports analytical rigor by allowing cross-case pattern identification in corruption risks, a method increasingly used in governance and risk-based procurement research (Lisciandra et al., 2022).

The rationale for adopting a qualitative approach is grounded in the recognition that corruption is rarely documented in official statistics. Quantitative surveys may capture perceptions, but they often miss the nuanced ways in which rules are bent or negotiated in everyday governance. A qualitative design allows the study to capture not only formal practices but also informal strategies that sustain corruption. By incorporating interviews, documents, and observation, the research design reflects the principle of triangulation, ensuring that findings are not dependent on a single source of evidence but emerge from the convergence of multiple perspectives (Attard et al., 2015).

Four provinces in Thailand were purposively selected based on three criteria: (1) exposure to large-scale public investment projects in the past five years; (2) the frequency and seriousness of corruption-related complaints as recorded by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and the Office of the Auditor General; and (3) diversity in governance contexts, including urbanized provinces, rural provinces, and those with significant political competition. This selection was intended to capture variation in corruption risks while allowing meaningful comparison across different administrative environments (Lisciandra et al., 2022).

Participants were identified through purposive and snowball sampling to ensure representation from multiple stakeholder groups. In total, 28 key informants were interviewed: 12 provincial officials responsible for budgeting and procurement, five representatives from auditing and anti-corruption agencies, six members of civil society organizations, and five journalists reporting on governance issues. This distribution reflects the need to triangulate perspectives across both state and non-state actors (Palinkas et al., 2015).

Data was collected between March and October 2023 using three complementary approaches. Semi-structured interviews with key informants, each lasting 60-90 minutes, followed a flexible guide that encouraged open discussion. Respondents described common corruption risks in procurement, discretionary interpretations of regulations, and the monitoring roles of local communities and media. To substantiate these perspectives, documentary analysis was conducted on audit reports, NACC investigation records, provincial budgets, and policy documents. This provided empirical grounding and enabled triangulation with interview data (Wirtz et al., 2018; Hochstetter et al., 2023). Field observation further enriched the dataset. The researcher attended procurement committee meetings, community forums, and local press events, documenting both formal procedures and informal interactions. Field notes captured practices that revealed how corruption risks are embedded in everyday governance, ensuring consistency and depth across data sources (Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022).

Data were analyzed using thematic coding, following Braun and Clarke's reflexive thematic analysis framework, which outlines structured phases for identifying qualitative patterns and constructing themes (Braun & Clarke, 2021). Codes were initially developed deductively from the COSO-ERM framework (structural, procedural, behavioral risks) but refined inductively as new patterns emerged from interviews and documents.

Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Kasem Bundit University. All participants provided informed consent and were assured of anonymity; pseudonyms are used throughout the findings. Interview data were recorded with permission and securely stored. Sensitive materials were treated with strict confidentiality to avoid risks to participants. The study also followed the principle of "not harm," ensuring that participants could withdraw at any time without consequence (Moriña, 2021).

Research Result

The results of this study are organized around three interrelated dimensions of corruption risk-structural, procedural, and behavioral-identified through analysis of interviews, documents, and field observations. Together, these findings illustrate how corruption risks function as crime-enabling mechanisms within Thailand's provincial governance.

Structural risks emerged most clearly in the concentration of authority and the persistence of patronage networks. Provincial officials often held overlapping positions in procurement committees and budget allocation boards, creating a cycle of limited oversight. One interviewee, a civil society activist, explained, "The same group of officials who decide on the budget is also sitting on the procurement board. It means they monitor themselves. There is no real independence in the system."

This structural entanglement reflects broader critiques of centralized bureaucracies in Asia, where discretionary authority and weak oversight mechanisms create systemic conditions for corruption (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). Similar findings have been documented in European and Asian contexts, where centralized procurement systems enabled collusion and limited independent monitoring (Lisciandra et al., 2022). Provincial governors often act as gatekeepers of resources, while audit institutions lack sufficient presence or independence at the local level. Such centralization allows political patrons to direct contracts to loyal networks, embedding corruption into the structure of governance itself.

Procedural risks were observed in the manipulation of procurement processes and the discretionary interpretation of regulations. A procurement officer admitted, "Regulations are very detailed, but in practice, committees interpret them differently. Sometimes we adjust terms of reference to fit a pre-selected contractor."

This finding echoes Jiménez et al. (2022), who noted that collusion adapts by shifting manipulation to earlier stages of procurement design. Even with digital reforms such as e-bidding, loopholes remained. For example, officials could design project requirements so narrowly that only one contractor was eligible. In another province, interviewees described how disaster-relief budgets were allocated through emergency procedures with minimal scrutiny, allowing fraudulent invoicing to pass undetected. Comparable procedural vulnerabilities have been highlighted in India and Malaysia, where procurement ambiguity facilitated favoritism and fraud (Sharma et al., 2019).

The discretionary interpretation of regulations also created uncertainty for private contractors. A small business owner remarked, "We never know how rules will be applied. If you do not have the right connections, you lose the bid-even if your price is lower."

Such procedural ambiguities sustain collusion and exclusion, reinforcing the perception that corruption is normalized within procurement practices (Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022).

Behavioral risks involved cultural norms that tolerated bribery and informal payments. Interviewees across all provinces indicated that such practices were viewed as "part of the system." A local journalist observed, "Everyone knows that envelopes are exchanged during the bidding process. People do not even call it corruption anymore; it is just how business is done."

This normalization of bribery reflects behavioral risk factors emphasized in the COSO-ERM framework, where organizational culture can either enable or deter corruption. Similar cultural entrenchments have been observed in procurement practices in Southern Europe, where bribery was normalized as part of administrative routines (Neu et al., 2015). Younger officials interviewed during the study expressed frustration, with one saying, "When I tried to follow procedures strictly, I was told I would never get promoted. The culture pressures us to comply with informal expectations."

Behavioral risks, therefore, not only perpetuate corruption but also discourage reform-minded actors from challenging the system (Lisciandra et al., 2022).

Taken together, the findings show that structural, procedural, and behavioral risks are mutually reinforcing. Centralized authority structures enable procedural manipulation; procedural loopholes create opportunities for bribery; and behavioral norms legitimize these practices as routine. This convergence transforms corruption into a systemic mechanism that enables crime, rather than isolated misconduct.

These findings illustrate that corruption risks converge into a cycle in which structural entrenchment sustains procedural manipulation, and procedural manipulation legitimizes the behavioral acceptance of bribery. For example, in one province, procurement committees consistently awarded contracts to the same group of companies, a pattern enabled by centralized authority and reinforced by cultural acceptance of "envelope practices." This cycle generates not only inflated costs but also opportunities for illicit networks to recycle funds through state contracts, effectively laundering money under the cover of public works. Similar patterns are reported in international studies, where public works contracts became key channels for laundering illicit capital (Fazekas et al., 2016; Lisciandra et al., 2022).

In another case, emergency procurement during flood relief was manipulated through ambiguous regulations, allowing fraudulent invoices to be submitted with minimal scrutiny. These real-world examples demonstrate that corruption risks do not simply reduce efficiency; they create systemic vulnerabilities that criminal actors exploit, transforming governance

failures into crime-enabling infrastructures (Sharma et al., 2019; Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022).

For example, collusion in procurement not only inflates project costs but also creates channels for money laundering, as contractors recycle illicit gains through state contracts. Similarly, bribery of law enforcement officers protects illicit businesses, linking governance failures directly to organized crime. These dynamics confirm the argument that corruption in provincial governance must be analyzed through a crime-prevention lens rather than limited to administrative reform (Neu et al., 2015).

Overall, corruption risks stem from systemic weaknesses rather than individual misconduct, aligning with critiques of centralized bureaucracies and the emphasis on risk structures in ERM frameworks. This perspective is illustrated in Figure 1, which synthesizes structural, procedural, and behavioral dimensions of corruption risks (Gans-Morse et al., 2018; Decarolis & Giorgiantonio, 2022; Attard et al., 2015).

The field data also revealed how corruption risks generated tangible social harm at the provincial level. In one province, manipulation of flood-relief budgets led to inflated invoices that diverted resources away from affected households, leaving communities with insufficient recovery support. This not only represents procurement fraud but also demonstrates how corruption acts as a crime-enabling infrastructure by creating entry points for illicit financial flows (Lisciandra et al., 2022). In another province, interviewees described how patronage-based contract allocation was linked to money laundering activities, as construction companies recycled illicit capital through legitimate public works. Such practices illustrate how provincial governance, when weakened by corruption, becomes a direct channel for criminal economies. Comparative analysis reinforces these findings. In Vietnam, centralized licensing processes not only generated bribes but also enabled companies with ties to organize networks to launder profits under the guise of legal operations (Nguyen et al., 2017). In the Philippines, collusion in disaster-relief contracting similarly diverted resources, echoing Thailand's experience of fraud during emergencies (Sharma et al., 2019). These parallels highlight that corruption-related risks cannot be reduced to inefficiency; they must be recognized as systemic vulnerabilities that amplify social harm, criminal infiltration, and long-term erosion of trust in governance.

Conclusion and Discussion

This study examined corruption risks in Thailand's provincial administration through the lens of COSO-ERM, the Governance-Risk-Compliance (GRC) framework, and Stakeholder Participation Theory. Drawing on data from four provinces, the analysis identified structural, procedural, and behavioral dimensions of risk that, collectively, transform corruption into a systemic mechanism that enables criminal activity. Structural risks, such as centralized authority and entrenched patronage, limit oversight and self-monitoring. Procedural risks arise in the manipulation of procurement regulations and the discretionary interpretation of rules, which foster collusion even under e-procurement reforms. Behavioral risks reflect cultural norms that tolerate bribery and informal exchanges, thereby embedding corruption within bureaucratic routines. Taken together, these findings highlight corruption not as isolated misconduct but as a crime-enabling condition that fuels fraud, money laundering, and organized infiltration (Neu et al., 2015).

These patterns resonate with regional evidence. In Indonesia, procurement corruption facilitated criminal infiltration of infrastructure projects despite risk management reforms (Jiménez et al., 2022). In Vietnam, centralized licensing processes sustained bribery and collusion (Nguyen et al., 2017). While in the Philippines, patronage politics undermined the integrity of digital procurement reforms. Such cases demonstrate that systemic corruption risks are embedded in governance structures across Asia, with oversight weaknesses and

discretionary authority providing fertile ground for crime. What varies is the extent to which risk management and participatory mechanisms are institutionalized. (Lisciandra et al., 2022) Theoretically, this study advances scholarship by framing corruption as a criminogenic factor rather than an ethical lapse or administrative inefficiency. By integrating COSO-ERM and GRC with Stakeholder Participation Theory, it shows how governance risks translate directly into crime risks (Karthick et al., 2023). This reconceptualization underscores corruption as both a driver and multiplier of illicit economies.

In practice, the findings underscore the need for risk-based monitoring, participatory oversight, and cultural change. International experiences highlight the value of digital dashboards and real-time risk scoring (Transparency International, 2014) as well as predictive analytics using artificial intelligence to detect procurement anomalies (Lyra et al., 2022; van Noordt & Misuraca, 2022). Equally important is empowering civil society, watchdog groups, and local media with access to procurement data (Wirtz et al., 2018). Training programs, integrity incentives, and whistleblower protections are essential to shifting bureaucratic culture away from tolerance of bribery (Neu et al., 2015; Hochstetter et al., 2023).

Limitations must be acknowledged: the study examined only four provinces and relied on qualitative evidence without longitudinal or big-data measures. Future research should incorporate quantitative tools such as procurement analytics to track corruption risk dynamics (Fazekas et al., 2016; Gnaldi & Del Sarto, 2024) and comparative analyses across Asian countries to refine cross-regional insights.

In conclusion, corruption in provincial governance functions as a systemic enabler of crime. Addressing it requires more than technical fixes such as e-bidding; it demands integrated governance strategies that combine structured risk management, participatory accountability, and cultural transformation. Linking reforms to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals strengthens their legitimacy: SDG 16 emphasizes reducing corruption as a prerequisite for inclusive governance, while SDG 11 underscores the risks posed when procurement corruption undermines community resilience. For Thailand and Asia alike, combating corruption means recognizing it not simply as maladministration but as a criminogenic factor undermining development, stability, and social trust. Embedding risk-based and participatory frameworks in provincial procurement is thus not only a governance imperative but also a strategy for crime prevention and sustainable development.


Figure 1 From Corruption Risks to Crime Prevention: An Integrated Model for Provincial Governance

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