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THE INDONESIAN TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENTS TO OFFENDERS: A CASE STUDY BEFORE AND DURING A PANDEMIC

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Abstract

The Coronavirus pandemic was perceived by terrorist networks as a harbinger of the end of times and impending apocalypse. In Indonesia, there was a notable increase in terror threats and arrests during the pandemic. This study was conducted to examine whether activities related to terror outside prison (such as narratives regarding signs of the apocalypse and threats made by terrorist groups) could potentially impact the risk levels of former terrorist offenders in rehabilitation centres of Indonesia. The study was aimed to investigate risk levels of highly-classified terrorist profiles in Indonesia both before and during the pandemic to discern any changes. Conducted under circumstances fraught of limitations (due to city lockdown and physical restrictions), the study assessed the criminogenic risks of former terrorist offenders by reviewing documented risk assessment before pandemic and conducting another risk assessment during pandemic. The hypothesis of the study was that there would be a change in the risk levels of the offenders. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis were utilised in this study. The findings indicate that there was no significant difference in the total scores of the subjects' risks before and during the pandemic. However, the qualitative risk profiles demonstrated changes in their motivation, ideology, and capability. The study could aid in evaluating the effectiveness of terrorism responsiveness in Indonesia and assist practitioners and researchers in planning rehabilitation programs to prevent recidivism.

Keywords: Terrorism, Pandemic, Criminogenic Risks, Psychological Profiles, Assessment, Risk-Need-Responsivity

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Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic, which swept across the globe in 2019 and 2020, had a profound impact on societies worldwide. While the majority perceived it as a health crisis and an opportunity for international cooperation, a subset of individuals with extremist ideologies, including terrorists, viewed the pandemic through a different perspective. For them, the COVID-19 pandemic represented a sign of the end of times, an apocalyptic event that affirmed their radical beliefs (Nadal & Rios, 2020; Neiwert, 2020; Perliger, 2020). Such interpretations often stem from religious or ideological convictions, potentially fostering radicalisation and acts of violence. For example, within certain interpretations of Islamic eschatology, there exist prophetic traditions referencing apocalyptic signs, such as plagues and pandemics, as harbingers of the Day of Judgment (Habib, 2020).

Coronavirus is viewed by terrorist networks as a test from God, preparation for the apocalypse, and a means to attack enemies of God (Habib, 2020). The pandemic was perceived by these networks as a sign of the impending doomsday and an approaching apocalypse, particularly amidst city lockdowns and authorities' attempt to restrict access to places of worship (Sukabdi, 2020). In the early stages of the pandemic, ISIS launched some contents related to Covid-19 in Al-Naba Magazine (Barak, 2020). They interpreted the pandemic as a divine punishment to humanity, especially targeting China at that time (as the virus began spreading in China), due to their oppression of other humans (in China's case, to Uyghur). ISIS reiterated that the pandemic is a part of God's plans for those who do not follow the righteous path. They then urged Muslims to be cautious and avoid travelling to infected areas, even providing hygiene guidelines to their followers (Barak, 2020).

ISIS, on the 19th of March 2020, published a strategic plan titled "Crusaders' Biggest Nightmare." They described how the pandemic's timing allowed them to force people into quarantined at home and shut down all markets, leading to an economic crisis. They argued that the spread of the virus presented an opportunity to attack the West due to its perceived crimes against Muslims, such as detaining and murdering Muslims worldwide (Al-Tamimi, 2020a). ISIS urged its supporters to show no mercy to their enemies (the infidels) and to spread terror to weaken and prevent them from harming Muslims (Barak, 2020). ISIS stated that the West and its allies should consider that their fiscal deficits and the costs of protecting their homelands from internal and external enemies would weaken their power (Al-Tamimi, 2020b).

Following ISIS's announcement, there was an increasing number of terror threats in Indonesia by terrorist networks, leading to numerous arrests of terrorist convicts. The arrests related to terrorism cases are presented in Table 1. These arrests raised the question of whether lockdowns and physical restrictions ever reduced the security threat levels in Indonesia and the criminogenic risks of terrorist group members (Permono et al., 2020).

Table 1 Terrorist Arrests in Indonesia from March to July 2020

Dates	Cities	Numbers of people arrested	Affiliations
25/3/2020	Batang, Central Java	4	ISIS
11/4/2020	Sidoarjo, East Java	1	ISIS
13/4/2020	Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi	4	ISIS
27/4/2020	Serang, Banten	3	N/A
30/4/2020	Pandeglang, Banten	1	N/A
23/4/2020	Surabaya, East Java	1	ISIS
23/4/2020	Surabaya, East Java	3	N/A
26/4/2020	Sidoarjo, East Java	1	ISIS
21/6/2020	Kampar, Riau	3	N/A
24/6/2020	Maluku	11	ISIS
10/7/2020	Sukoharjo, East Java	1	ISIS

Against this background, this study was undertaken to examine whether the terrorist activities outside of prison (e.g., narratives signalling the apocalypse and threats prepared by terrorist groups) could potentially affect the risk levels of former terrorist offenders in rehabilitation units or correctional centres, given their past shared values, solidarity, and attachment before being detained. Conducted under circumstances rife with limitations (due to city lockdown and physical restrictions), the study aimed to investigate risk levels of terrorist profiles in Indonesia before and during a pandemic to spot any changes. Despite facing uncertainty and unfavourable conditions, the study assessed the criminogenic risks of former terrorist offenders (the subjects of the study) by reviewing existing records or documented risk assessments before the pandemic and then conducting another risk assessment during the pandemic. The study hypothesised that there would be a change in the risk levels of offenders before and during the pandemic, while the null hypothesis posited that there would be no change. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were used in this study.

The study could help to review if terrorism responsivity in Indonesia (e.g., detainment, rehabilitation, deradicalisation) has any effect on modifying behaviours of terrorist offenders. It could help practitioners and researchers to plan effective rehabilitation programs to prevent terrorist offenders from reoffending. As Andrews & Bonta (2010) explain in the Psychology of Criminal Conduct (PCC), it is important to assess the risks and needs of offenders before rehabilitation. Their model, the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model, is an eminent model of correctional assessment and rehabilitative programming. The RNR Model includes all efforts to stop crime in clinical, social, and human services given to individuals and groups (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Moreover, Indonesian forensic psychologists emphasise the importance of identifying the risks and needs of offenders before embarking on rehabilitation. For people charged with terrorism offences, forensic psychologists in the Indonesian Forensic Psychological Association use MIKRA (Motivation-Ideology-Capability Risk Assessment), a tool designed especially for investigating terrorist offenders' risks and needs (Amelia et al., 2020; Slamet, 2020; Sukabdi, 2022).

The Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Security

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on global security have been raised (Ackerman & Peterson, 2020; Siregar & Rayda, 2021; U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Indonesia, 2021). Numerous studies have examined potential threats during the pandemic, including radicalisation within communities, the dissemination of propaganda to incite violence, cybercrimes, the promotion of the pandemic as a biological weapon, and attacks on vital sites within countries during lockdowns, as many governments prioritise patient recovery efforts. A study by the International Crisis Group (2020) describes how ISIS views the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to conduct terror activities amid the withdrawal of countries' security forces in several conflict areas in the Middle East. ICG warned that ISIS might take advantage of the pandemic, similar to how Al-Qaeda could benefit from the instability of the Middle East and gain an increased following (International Crisis Group, 2020). Ong & Azman (2020) explain the different methods of the extreme far-right and ISIS in exploiting COVID-19. ISIS used COVID-19 to gain sympathy (e.g., recruitment of people) and improve the hygiene of its members; whereas the far-right white supremacists stressed the conspiracy theory and asked their members to spread the disease to Jews and the non-white population by spitting in their homes and places of worship. In terms of leadership, the white supremacists are decentralised, while ISIS is centralised (Ong & Azman, 2020).

In Europe, Europol (2021) published an analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on security threats. The analysis focuses on digital crimes, terrorism propaganda on the internet, and disinformation. In Africa, the International Centre for Counterterrorism (Coleman, 2020) published *The Impact of Coronavirus on Terrorism in the Sahel* which noted the impact of COVID-19 on security in Sahels such as Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. This was because

the pandemic had taken most of the attention of the countries in that region. In Indonesia, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2020a) published *IPAC Short Briefing No.1: COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia* which describes existing potential terrorism threads in Indonesia in the era of the pandemic. The threads contained anti-China actions (as the pandemic started in Wuhan, China) due to the oppression of Uyghur, indoctrination that COVID-19 is God's soldiers to attack Muslims' enemies and the sign of Armageddon, and instructions to use COVID-19 as bioweapon; hence, IPAC highlights the importance of law enforcement's quick response against the threads. In its second report, which is in *IPAC Short Briefing No.2: COVID-19 and the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT)*, Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2020b) mentions about the potential increase of terror actions by MIT in Poso, Indonesia. IPAC explains that since MIT is supported by ISIS and they have used the momentum of earthquakes in Palu to gain supporters (through their propaganda and aid), they can use the pandemic to spread propaganda and gain supporters again (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2020b). Furthermore, Arianti & Taufiqurrohman (2020) in *Security Implications of COVID-19 for Indonesia* highlight the terrorism risks in Indonesia one of these is targeting Chinese Indonesians or China-associated targets and committed by ISIS affiliations (e.g., Jama'ah Anshorud Daulah or JAD and Jama'ah Ansharul Khilafah or JAK).

Kruglanski et al. (2020) in their article under the title '*Terrorism in Time of the Pandemic: Exploiting Mayhem'* describe vulnerabilities that may happen throughout the pandemic and how terrorist organisations will react to them. Kruglanski et al. (2020) explain a formula that may be used by terrorist groups: grievance, culprit, dan method. That is, the groups may exploit people's grievances or crises and create propaganda/narration to gain attention and more followers. They will accordingly generate culprits or 'enemies' who should be responsible for the grievance; hence, develop methods to struggle against them.

The RNR Model

Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) is an applied model of correctional assessment and rehabilitation (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). According to Andrews & Bonta (2010), a useful model of dynamic intervention must be built within a normative and organisational context. Furthermore, the implications of the RNR Model contain all efforts for crime prevention through the delivery of social, clinical, and human services to individuals as well as groups. In terms of the core RNR principles and key clinical issues, Andrews et al. (1990) present three general principles of classification for effective correctional treatment: the (1) risk, (2) need, and (3) responsivity principles of effective correctional treatment. According to RNR, the mechanism for change in offenders is a reduction in dynamic risk factors; as such, identifying and addressing dynamic risk factors in terrorist offenders becomes a precondition for effective rehabilitation.

Terrorism Risk Factors of Offenders

Laqueur (2016) explains that the definition of terrorism is varied in terms of types, methods, objectives, and backgrounds; but one thing is in common: attacking civilians. Crenshaw (2000) argues that terrorism includes some political agendas and the methods chosen are based on rational calculation. Ganor (2002) suggests that in defining terrorism, one needs to consider comprehensive indicators such as objectives, methods, backgrounds, and targets.

There are at least 23 indicators of terrorism listed in pieces of literature which include: the use of extreme violence, the presence of political goals, the use of threats, the spread of fears, causing psychological effects, the presence of victims, attracting attention, targeting civilians, the use of intimidation, often operated by a network, comprehending symbolic aspects, shown to be unpredictable and confidential, repeated, associated with crimes, and declaring demands to the perceived enemies (Jongman, 1988; Ramsay, 2015).

Rosenfeld (2003) and LaFree & Dugan (2004) argue that terrorism is qualitatively different from any form of violence criminologists' study. In Forensic Psychology, the implementation

of modern approaches to general violence risk assessment to terrorism has been contested (Dernevik et al., 2009a). This is because findings from studies on mentally disordered offenders and general criminals may not be relevant to the prognosis of recidivism for those with political-motivated behaviours (Dernevik et al., 2009b). Therefore, it is important to define psychological/individual risk factors for terrorism before applying general-violence risk assessments to terrorism (Monahan, 2012). Sukabdi (2018) then identifies eighteen criminogenic risk factors of terrorist offenders in Indonesia which are grouped into domains of Motivation ('Heart'), Ideology ('Head'), and Capability ('Hand'). The other six risk factors under Motivation are economic, justice, situational, social, power, and actualisation motives. Other six risk factors under Ideology are values, targets of missions, attitudes, militancy, understandings of philosophy and contexts, and layers in ideological groups. Furthermore, six risk factors under Capability include skills in intelligence, information, and communication technology (ICT), mechanical and electrical (M and E), military, language, and social domination skills. Sukabdi (2021a) released an instrument for examining criminogenic risk factors of terrorist offenders (called MIKRA), which later was used in this study to investigate the risks of terrorist offenders in Indonesia before and during the pandemic.

Methods

Design

This study applied mixed methods, both quantitative and qualitative research design. The study's hypothesis is there is a significant change in risk levels of offenders before and during the pandemic: 1) an increased level of risk is possible because the former offenders (as targeted subjects) still share solidarity with terrorist groups' members outside prisons, while 2) a decreased level of risk is possible because the subjects have been through some intervention at prisons/correctional centres. The study's null hypothesis is that there is no significant change in the risk levels of terrorist offenders before and during the pandemic, whereas the alternative hypothesis is there is a significant change. The study took place in Indonesia; hence, the researcher followed the advice of national law enforcement and adjusted with forensic practices applied in Indonesia.

Participants

This study examined eighteen highly classified terrorist offenders (who became the subjects of this study) at several prisons in Indonesia (all males). They were members of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham), JI (Jamaah Islamiyah), and other terrorist organisations in Indonesia. Their ages were between 24 and 57. They were charged with terrorism offences, which are from assisting, executing, to financing terror actions (Table 2). Two psychologists (clinical and forensic) and a counterterrorism practitioner as judges were also involved in rating using an instrument (MIKRA behaviour checklist) and discussing each subject to make an assessment. Moreover, there were two or three informants/field observers (e.g., investigators, officers, and mentors) involved in giving information about each subject; thus, there were thirty-six observers for all subjects.

Available records of 112 candidates of subjects were obtained from law enforcement in 2019 before re-administering another risk assessment of the same candidates of subjects in 2020 (during the pandemic). At this second risk assessment, the researcher could only collect data from 18 of the 112 candidates (who became the subjects of this study) in several cities throughout the pandemic due to city lockdowns. The researchers of this study selected these eighteen subjects because of their feasibility (i.e. in terms of locations and access); therefore, this study uses accidental sampling.

Table 2 Subjects of this study

Subjects	Age	Affiliations	Terror Actions Committed	Sentences (in years)	Correction Centres/Rehabilitation Units/Prisons
1	38	JI	Bombing	19	Cipinang
2	32	ISIS	Involved as an ISIS member	0*	Debintal
3	34	JI	Bombing	4	Tanjung Gusta
4	32	ISIS	Involved as an ISIS member	0*	Yayasan Debintal
5	34	ISIS	Bombing	10	Permisan
6	49	JI	Robbery (*fa'i*)	12	Tanjung Gusta
7	28	JI	Involved as a JI member	0*	FKAAI
8	29	Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB)	Robbery (*fa'i*)	5	Pamekasan
9	48	ISIS	Building illegal military camp	4	Rutan Mako Brimob Kelapa Dua
10	57	JI	Afghanistan Combatant	0*	FKAAI
11	34	ISIS	Involved as an ISIS member	0*	Yayasan Debintal
12	35	ISIS	Bomb-making	20	Tangerang
13	55	JI	One of top-ranked ideologue who justified mutilation in Poso	0*	BNPT
14	41	NII	Bomb-making	12	BNPT
15	37	JI	Bomb-making	10	Cilacap
16	24	JI	Involved as a JI member	3	Rutan Mako Brimob
17	34	JI	Recruiting	0*	FKAAI
18	30	KOMPAK	Poso conflict	3.5	Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian

*: Doing community service

Procedure and Material

As mentioned earlier in the introduction, the study assessed the criminogenic risks of former terrorist offenders by rereading documented risk assessment before the pandemic and reconducting another risk assessment throughout the pandemic. In other words, there were two separate data gatherings: before and during the pandemic (involving the same offenders as the subjects of this study). The permission given by the Indonesian National Police to conduct this study, access restricted data of offenders/subjects, and talk to officers (as observers) who know each subject become the researcher's ethical approval in performing this study.

Before the pandemic, the data on subjects' risk profiles was collected in 2019, from late January to late December. At first, there were records of 112 highly classified risk profiles (ISIS and its affiliations) from a total of 387 terrorist offenders in Indonesia. The profile records had been documented by the National Police and stored in the prisons' database. On top of these records, interviews were also held with these 112 offenders and their observers who know these

offenders in person (e.g., officers in charge, guards, and social workers who work with these offenders) (2 hours for each interview, in Indonesian language).

During a pandemic, the second data of subjects was collected in 2020, the researcher could only collect 18 risk profiles of the 112 previous subjects. This was due to the sudden shutdown of places by the Indonesian government which determined accessibility (e.g., the difficulty in reaching many cities during lockdowns, limited vaccine as a requirement to travel, unavailability of COVID-19 tests for travellers, tightened security of prisons to avoid the spread of virus). Similar to data collection before the pandemic, interviews were held with the 18 offenders and their observers who know these offenders daily (e.g., council heads, officers in charge, and social workers who work with these offenders) (2 hours for each interview, in Indonesian language).

The instrument for risk assessment used in this study is the Motivation-Ideology-Capability Risk Assessment (MIKRA) patented by Sukabdi (2018; 2021a). MIKRA consists of a behaviour checklist to examine the subjects' risks in Motivation, Ideology, and Capability for reoffending. MIKRA describes the four risk levels of subjects: "low", "medium", "high", and "very high" with behaviour keycodes as seen in Figure 1. For commencing rehabilitation planning for terrorist subjects in Indonesia, MIKRA helps in tracking the progress of a subject during the transformation from being more to less risky, for example from at 'very high' (score: 5) to 'high' (score: 4), 'medium' (score: 3), 'low' (score: 2), or even 'protected'/'zero' risk (score: 1) (Table 3).



Figure 1 Codes of Behaviours in MIKRA Terrorism Risk Assessment

Table 3 Scoring system of MIKRA

Risk Levels	Scores
Very high	5
High	4
Medium	3
Low	2
Zero	1

In terms of the administration of MIKRA, three raters observed each subject and interviewed the field observers who knew him. This is to assess the subject with 360 degrees of evaluation (e.g., involving the subject's family, friends, neighbours, prison guards, investigators, social workers providing advocacy, and mentors) to verify the information about the subject. Some of the observers of each subject had access to documents (e.g., CCTV and police investigation reports); thus, knew the subject and his specific behaviours and capabilities (e.g., in weapon crafting or bomb-making).

Analysis

This study applied both qualitative and quantitative analyses. A qualitative method was used to examine the dynamics of changes in each subject's risk profile; while a quantitative was to evaluate if the changes were significant among the subjects according to statistical principles. After data collection, an inter-rater judgment was held to examine each subject. These raters were two psychologists (forensic and clinical) and a counterterrorism researcher. Subsequently, after inter-rater judgment by these three raters, each subject has the following scores: 1) 18 scores of risk factors, obtained from assessing his 18 criminogenic risk factors, 2) a score for each domain of Motivation, Ideology, and Capability, and 3) a final score in his risk profile (the average of the 18 scores). Table 4 demonstrates levels of risk based on these scores. In quantitative analysis, a comparison of means was managed (paired-sample T-test) to evaluate the difference in risk scores before and during the pandemic. This analysis indicates that the results of the study cannot be generalised to the broader context and wide-ranging criminal offenders.

Table 4 Levels of risk in MIKRA

Scores	Risk levels
0.00-1.00	Zero (Protected)
1.01-2.00	Low
2.01-3.00	Medium
3.01-4.00	High
4.01-5.00	Very high

Results

The study compared risk assessments on 18 subjects/offenders before and during a pandemic. This study was conducted to evaluate if the terror activities outside prison could affect the risk levels of former terrorist offenders inside prisons. Before claiming that terrorism rehabilitation programs in Indonesia are effective, it is important to carefully evaluate terrorist offenders' risk levels to notice any positive changes. Risk assessments might help practitioners in designing programs to prevent recidivism.

The findings reveal that the 18 subjects' overall risk levels show no modification before and during the pandemic. The numbers stated in Table 5 show a decrease from 2.84 to 2.61 but the change is statistically insignificant (Table 6). Nonetheless, three of the subjects (Subject 14, 15, and 18) demonstrated a significant dropped risk level from "high" to "medium" (Table 7). This decline was related to several modifications in their belief system that their attitudes and purposes in life were more socially accepted (i.e., helping others, rather than killing the outgroups and bombing). Furthermore, they developed a better understanding of their religion and its philosophy. They gained insights that Indonesia is different from Syria or Iraq and that they need to make a positive contribution to society and help government programs.

"I am not anti-government anymore. I accepted a visit from people to this prison. I think my coping strategy for stress is better now, which is more constructive than before. I do what I can do to help people and society. Thanks to civil society who helped and supported me through difficult times." (Subject 18)

Table 5 Evaluation of subjects' risks for recidivism before and throughout the pandemic

		Paired Samples Statistics			
		Mean	**N**	**Std. Deviation**	**Std. Error Mean**
Total Risk	Before	2.84	18	.676	.159
	During	2.61*	18	.553	.130
Motivation domain	Before	2.71	18	.96900	.22839
	During	2.28*	18	.94679	.22316
Ideology domain	Before	2.88	18	1.12030	.26406
	During	2.37**	18	.90600	.21355
Capability domain	Before	2.95	18	.65230	.15375
	During	3.18***	18	.75106	.17703

*: a non-significant decrease, **: a significant decrease, ***: a significant increase

Table 6 Comparison on risk scores

Risks and domains	**Paired Differences**					**T**	**Df**	**Sig. (2-tailed)**
	Mean*	**Std. Deviation**	**Std. Error Mean**	**95% Confidence Interval of the Difference**				
				Lower	**Upper**			
Total Risk	.23	.547	.129	-.037	.506	1.819	17	.09
Motivation	.43	.87540	.20633	-.00921	.86144	2.065	17	.06
Ideology	.51	.96832	.22823	.02736	.99042	2.230	17	.04*
Capability	-.23	.36215	.08536	-.41176	-.05157	-2.714	17	.02*

*: under 0.05 level of significance (l.o.s)

Table 7 Risk levels of subjects

Subjects	**Before Pandemic**		**During Pandemic**	
	Risk levels	**Risk scores**	**Risk levels**	**Risk scores**
1	High	3.78	High	3.78
2	Medium	2.39	Medium	2.39
3	High	3.33	High	3.33
4	Low	1.94	Low	1.94
5	Medium	2.94	Medium	2.94
6	High	3.67	High	3.67
7	Low	1.89	Low	1.89
8	Medium	2.94	Medium	2.94
9	Medium	2.22	Medium	2.22
10	Medium	2.83	Medium	2.83
11	Medium	2.67	Medium	2.39
12	Medium	2.94	Medium	2.78
13	Medium	2.06	Medium	2.44
14	High	3.78	Medium*	2.39
15	High	3.44	Medium*	2.22
16	Medium	2.44	Medium	2.44
17	Medium	2.06	Medium	2.06
18	High	3.83	Medium*	2.28

*: decreased risk level

Motivation for Terrorism

The subjects' domain of motivation includes all motives (e.g., drives, interests, will, emotions, and feelings of discontentment) that push any act of terrorism. It contains economic, justice, social, security/situational, superiority/power, and actualisation/adventurous motives. The results show that the overall motivation for terrorism of the 18 subjects did not change. The scores mentioned in Table 5 show a reduction of 0.43 for the period of the pandemic; still, the change is statistically insignificant (Table 6). Nevertheless, individually, Subjects 14, 15, and 18 showed a significant improvement (Table 8). These three subjects showed more constructive coping strategies for problems and chose to comply with the laws and regulations of Indonesia.

Table 8 Risk levels of each subject in motivation, ideology, and capability

Subjects	Motivation		Ideology		Capability	
	Before Pandemic	**During Pandemic**	**Before Pandemic**	**During Pandemic**	**Before Pandemic**	**During Pandemic**
1	High	high	high	high	High	high
2	Medium	medium	medium	medium	Low	low
3	High	high	high	high	medium	medium
4	Low	low	low	low	Low	low
5	High	high	medium	medium	medium	medium
6	High	high	very-high	very-high	medium	medium
7	Low	low	low	low	High	high
8	High	high	medium	medium	medium	medium
9	Low	low	low	low	High	high
10	Low	low	medium	medium	very-high	very-high
11	Low	low	medium	low*	High	high
12	Medium	medium	high	high	Low	medium**
13	Low	low	low	low	medium	high**
14	High	low*	very-high	low*	medium	high**
15	High	low*	high	low*	medium	medium
16	Medium	medium	medium	low*	medium	high**
17	Low	low	low	low	High	high
18	High	low*	very-high	low*	High	high

*: decreased risk level, **: Increased risk level

Risk factor 1: Economic motives of terrorism are associated with the unfulfillment of physiological or financial needs. The results show that the economic motives of the 18 subjects slightly increased by 0.06 during the pandemic (Table 9), from 1.72 to 1.78 (Table 10, Table 11).

Risk factor 2: Justice motives are linked to revenge and unfulfilled needs for justice or a sense of fairness. The findings show that the motives of the 18 subjects had decreased by 0.56 throughout the pandemic; however, the change is statistically insignificant. Subjects 14, 15, and 18 interestingly demonstrated falling risk levels from 'very high/high' to 'zero'. The observers of these subjects mentioned that these subjects had shown some progress such as an improved understanding of law and regulations, communications with the government officers, and acceptance of legal facilities/support from the government.

Risk factor 3: Security motives are related to unfulfilled needs for safety/security, coping with stress, and overcoming subjective crises/grievances. The motives also include personal adjustment issues. The results of the study indicate that there was a reduction of 0.56 in the 18 subjects for this area of motives. For example, Subjects 14, 15, 16, and 18 showed lower levels of insecurity throughout the pandemic even though this change is statistically insignificant.

Subjects mentioned that they received some aid and support programs (e.g., advocacy, counselling, training) from the National Anti-Terrorism Agency and other government entities which might help them achieve better coping-strategies for stress. The observers of these subjects also stated that the subjects received support from people outside their jihadi circle, such as humanitarians and civil society organisations.

Risk factor 4: Social motives are related to unfulfilled needs for social support. These include the pursuit of a sense of belonging, solidarity, and the search for social identity. The findings show that the social motives of the 18 subjects had decreased during the pandemic to 3.61, from 3.72. Subjects 14 and 17 indicated a lower level of motives, they showed more interaction and cooperation with their outer circle/the outgroups.

Risk factor 5: Power motives are linked to the unfulfilled needs for power. The findings show that the 18 subjects' power motives had significantly decreased from 2.66 to 1.94 during the pandemic. The subjects' statements of sadness on the death of their significant others were captured (that they could not control death), which might contribute to the decline of these motives.

Risk factor 6: Actualisation motives are related to the unfulfilled needs to give impacts to others although the manifestation could be negative/unfavourable to society. The findings reveal that the 18 subjects' actualisation motives had significantly dropped from 3.06 to 2.39. Subjects 12, 13, 14, 15, and 18 showed that they had fulfilled the needs to give impact to others. They demonstrated commitment to peace campaigns held by the National Police and showed empathy to people in need. They showed positive involvement in society and helped in the government's donation programs.

Table 9 Risk assessments on subjects of this study

Domains	Risk factors	Paired Differences					T	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper			
Motivation	Economic motives	-.06	.41618	.09809	-.26252	.15140	-.566	17	.579
	Justice motives	.56	1.29352	.30489	-.08770	1.19881	1.822	17	.086
	Situational motives	.56	1.14903	.27083	-.01584	1.12695	2.051	17	.056
	Social motives	.11	.75840	.17876	-.26603	.48825	.622	17	.542
	Power motives	.72	1.40610	.33142	.02298	1.42146	2.179	17	.044*
	Actualisation motives	.67	1.28338	.30250	.02846	1.30488	2.204	17	.042*
Ideology	Doctrines	.33	.76696	.18078	-.04807	.71474	1.844	17	.083
	Attitudes	.50	1.04319	.24588	-.01876	1.01876	2.034	17	.058
	Targets of missions	.89	1.52966	.36055	.12821	1.64957	2.465	17	.025*
	Layer in group	.06	.93760	.22099	-.41070	.52181	.251	17	.805
	Militancy	.61	1.19503	.28167	.01684	1.20539	2.170	17	.045*
	Understandings on philosophy and Contexts	.67	1.18818	.28006	.07580	1.25753	2.380	17	.029*
Capability	Intelligence skills	-.39	.60768	.14323	-.69108	-.08669	-2.715	17	.015*
	Language skills	-.39	.69780	.16447	-.73590	-.04188	-2.364	17	.030*
	ICT skills	-.11	.32338	.07622	-.27192	.04970	-1.458	17	.163
	Military skills	-.39	.50163	.11824	-.63834	-.13943	-3.289	17	.004*
	Social domination skills	-.06	.80237	.18912	-.45456	.34345	-.294	17	.772
	Mechanical and electric skills	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

*: under 0.05 level of significance (l.o.s)

Table 10 Assessment of subjects' risk factors before and during the pandemic

Domain	Paired Samples Statistics					
	Risk factors	**Mean**		**N**	**Std. Deviation**	**Std. Error Mean**
Motivation	Economic motives	Before	1.72	18	.95828	.22587
		During	1.78	18	1.00326	.23647
	Justice motives	Before	2.67	18	1.49509	.35240
		During	2.11	18	1.36722	.32226
	Situational motives	Before	2.39	18	1.28973	.30399
		During	1.83	18	1.15045	.27116
	Social motives	Before	3.72	18	.75190	.17723
		During	3.61	18	1.03690	.24440
	Power motives	Before	2.66	18	1.53393	.36155
		During	1.94*	18	1.30484	.30755
	Actualisation motives	Before	3.06	18	1.47418	.34747
		During	2.39*	18	1.50054	.35368
Ideology	Doctrines	Before	2.78	18	1.30859	.30844
		During	2.45	18	1.19913	.28264
	Attitudes	Before	3.00	18	1.23669	.29149
		During	2.50	18	.92355	.21768
	Targets of missions	Before	2.89	18	1.40958	.33224
		During	2.00*	18	1.13759	.26813
	Layer in group	Before	2.94	18	.80237	.18912
		During	2.88	18	.90025	.21219
	Militancy	Before	2.89	18	1.40958	.33224
		During	2.28*	18	1.22741	.28930
	Understandings on philosophy and Contexts	Before	2.78	18	1.26284	.29765
		During	2.11*	18	1.13183	.26678
Capability	Intelligence skills	Before	2.94	18	.87260	.20567
		During	3.33*	18	.90749	.21390
	Language skills	Before	2.78	18	.87820	.20699
		During	3.17*	18	.92355	.21768
	ICT skills	Before	2.78	18	1.00326	.23647
		During	2.89	18	.96338	.22707
	Military skills	Before	3.11	18	.83235	.19619
		During	3.50*	18	.85749	.20211
	Social domination skills	Before	3.22	18	.87820	.20699
		During	3.28	18	1.17851	.27778
	Mechanical and electric skills	Before	.	0[a]	.	.
		During	.	0[a]	.	.

a. The correlation and t cannot be computed because there are no valid pairs.

*: under 0.05 level of significance (l.o.s)

Table 11 Assessments of subjects' terrorism motives

Subjects	Terrorism Motives (Before and during the pandemic)											
	Economic		Justice		Security		Social		Power		Actualisation	
	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D
1	Zero	Zero	High	High	High	High	High	High	Very high	Very high	Very high	Very high
2	Very high	Very high	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Zero	Zero	Medium	Medium
3	Low	Low	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
4	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
5	Low	Low	High	High	Low	Low	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High
6	Low	Low	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	Very high	Very high
7	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
8	Low	Low	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High
9	Zero	Zero	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
10	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Very high	Very high	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
11	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	High	High	Low	Zero*	Zero	Zero
12	Low	Medium**	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	High	High	Medium	Low*	High	Medium*
13	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	High	High	Zero	Zero	Low	Zero*
14	Zero	Zero	Very high	Zero*	High	Zero*	High	Low*	Very high	Zero*	Very high	Zero*
15	Zero	Low**	High	Zero*	High	Zero*	High	Very high**	Very high	Zero*	High	Zero*
16	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Low	Zero*	High	Very high**	Zero	Zero	Medium	Medium
17	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	High	Low*	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
18	Low	Zero*	High	Zero*	High	Zero*	High	High	High	Zero*	High	Zero*

*: Decreased risk level, **: Increased risk level

Ideology of Terrorism

The domain of *Ideology* includes all religious or spiritual notions/concepts, belief systems, and commitments which create legitimations to extremism and any act of terrorism. The results show that the *Ideology* of extremism within the 18 subjects significantly reduced by 0.51 during the pandemic (Table 5 and Table 6). The findings show that subjects' goals changed from going to Syria or being involved in the battleship to assisting families, improving their welfare (e.g., growing agricultural products together with their families), and surviving against the disease. Particularly, Subjects 11, 14, 15, 16, and 18 demonstrated a significant change in their belief system (Table 8). They stated that they found peaceful ways of practising Islam more effective in changing the world to be a better place, than violence. They stated that they became more cooperative with people outside their jihadi groups.

Risk factor 7: Extremism doctrines are dogmas and religious justifications for the use of violence. The results show that the 18 subjects' extremism views reduced slightly by 0.33 (Table 9) from 2.78 to 2.45 during the pandemic. Nonetheless, this change is statistically insignificant (Table 10,

Table 12). The observers of the subjects mentioned that counterterrorism practitioners' efforts in rehabilitating offenders at prisons (e.g., in disengagement and deradicalisation programs) might have an impact on the subjects in viewing the world as a peaceful place.

Risk factor 8: The findings show that the 18 subjects' unfavourable attitudes (e.g., aggressions toward outgroups, intolerance, and inclusiveness) went down from 3.00 to 2.50 during the pandemic. For example, Subjects 12, 14, 15, and 18 showed a change from 'very-high/high' to 'medium/low' risk levels. The subjects stated that they had learned to be socially accepted. Their observers stated that these subjects became more friendly and helpful to bombing victims and government officers when visiting.

"He (Subject 12) has shown a change of attitude recently. He is more cooperative and friendly. He used to reject our favour and correspondence because we were considered as thoghut (devils) by him." (A field observer for Subject 12)

Risk factor 9: Targets of the mission include unfavourable or destructive visions, goals, and plans. The results show that the 18 subjects' unfavourable/destructive goals significantly lessened from 2.89 to 2.00 throughout the pandemic. The findings show that they had modified their purposes of life to be more into helping than harming others.

"I realize that my goals were wrong after the death of some of my friends in the [terrorist] group. If this (terror action) is approved by God, why are we defeated? Why do we fail? These questions change my purpose in life." (Subject 15)

Risk factor 10: Layers in terrorist groups describe positions, roles, duties, outreaches, and involvement in the groups. The results show that the 18 subjects' overall involvement in their extremist groups had slightly lessened from 2.94 to 2.88.

Risk factor 11: Militancy includes any fights or resistance against positive changes such as rehabilitation programs, dialogues, and self-development programs. The findings show that the 18 subjects' militancy decreased significantly from 2.89 to 2.28 throughout the pandemic. For instance, Subjects 11, 14, 15, 16, and 18 indicated a significant drop in risk levels to 'low' and 'zero'. The subjects mentioned that due to their limited access (including to terrorist networks), they did not have any option other than following the government's rehabilitation programs.

"I have limited access to the group now. I am now joining the government's training inside this prison. This is beneficial for me in future to reintegrate to society." (Subject 16)

"He (Subject 11) is accepting our visits and upcoming training programs. It is surprising as he used to reject them." (A field observer for Subject 11)

Risk factor 12: Limited understandings of religious philosophy (and its contexts of applications) include lacking insights, wisdom, and a peaceful approach to studying religion. It also includes lacking understanding of wide-ranging interpretations of religious sacred texts (i.e., the conditions mentioned in the verses of holy books) and local wisdom/norms or cultures to which an individual belongs. In Indonesia, the scope of this risk factor includes rejecting Pancasila as a social norm and the national constitution. The findings demonstrate that the 18 subjects' risk levels had significantly dropped from 2.78 to 2.11.

"During the lockdown, I have learned more about asbabun nuzul and asbabul wurud (the contextual backgrounds of verses in the sacred texts, Quran and Sunnah)." (Subject 15)

Table 12 Assessments of subjects' violent ideology

Subjects	Terrorism Ideology (Before and during the pandemic)											
	Doctrines		Attitudes		Targets		Layer in Extremist Groups		Militancy		Philosophy and Contexts	
	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D
1	Medium	Medium	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High
2	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
3	High	High	High	High	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High	High	High
4	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
5	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
6	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	High	Very High	Very High	High	High
7	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
8	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
9	Zero	Zero	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
10	High	High	Medium	Medium	Zero	Zero	Medium	Medium	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
11	Low	Low	Low	Low	Very high	Zero*	High	Low*	Medium	Low*	Low	Zero*
12	Very High	Very high	High	Medium*	High	Low*	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	Medium*
13	Zero	Zero	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Low	Very High**	Zero	Zero	Low	Zero*
14	High	Low*	Very High	Low*	High	Zero*	High	High	Very High	Low*	Very High	Zero*
15	High	Low*	High	Low*	High	Zero*	Medium	Low*	High	Low*	High	Low*
16	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Low	Zero*	Low	Low
17	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Low	Low	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero
18	High	Low*	Very high	Low*	Very high	Zero*	High	Medium*	Very High	Zero*	High	Zero*

*: Decreased risk level, **: Increased risk level

Capability

The aspect of capability or "Hand" encompasses skills which can be used in terrorism. They are soft and hard skills for conducting terror attacks. The results show that there was a significant increase in skills within the 18 subjects at the time of the pandemic. Their risk level moved from 2.95 ('medium') to 3.18 ('high') (Table 8).

Risk factor 13: The scope of intelligence skills is data gathering, analysis, and management. It also includes skills in counterintelligence, counter-deradicalisation, decision-making, and problem-solving. The 18 subjects demonstrated a significant increase in intelligence skills during the pandemic. Their risk level changed from 2.94 ('medium') to 3.33 ('high'). Amid city lockdowns, they tried to figure out what had happened in

their extremist groups. They tried to examine if the pandemic was a sign of Armageddon, put more effort into investigating the government's regulations (e.g., prohibiting people to go on crowds/sermons and visiting places of worship), and comprehend the chaos and protests/movements in several countries to know its impact to their groups/movements (Table 13).

Risk factor 14: Language skills include listening, reading, speaking, writing, and communicating in multiple languages which is used in terrorism narratives and propaganda. The skills also include journalism and public speaking in multiple languages. The findings show that the subjects' language skills (e.g., Arabic, Indonesian, and English) increased significantly from 2.78 ('medium') to 3.17 ('high') during the pandemic. The subjects spent their leisure time during city lockdowns to practice languages.

"He spent most of his time to practice languages. His knowledge of Arabic and English has improved." (A field observer for Subject 14)

Risk factor 15: ICT skills include skills in adapting or even creating computer programs and software and Artificial Intelligence and its agents possible for terrorism purposes. The scope of these also covers skills in digital forensics, robotics, cyber-attack, and drone-making. The results show that the subjects' ability in this area had slightly increased from 2.78 to 2.89 during the pandemic. They learned several internet settings, restricted chats, or channels (only available among extremists), several platforms of social media, and the Dark Web.

"The digitalisation in the era of pandemic somehow makes them adjust and use cyberspace for connecting with their global networks." (A field observer for Subject 18)

Risk factor 16: Military skills contain knowledge and ability in physical fights, battlefields, war strategies, weapon making/technology, and Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The 18 subjects' scores in military skills had significantly increased from 3.11 to 3.50 (Table 10). The observers of the subjects mentioned that the increase in these skills happened due to the notions/narratives of apocalypse war circulated among their extremist groups. They also received propaganda among extremist groups using bioterrorism.

"The pandemic teaches us how to survive in the era of the apocalypse." (Subject 12)

Risk factor 17: Social domination skills include the ability to mobilise and influence others, such as persuading, negotiating, spotting for recruitment, leading, and financing people. The scope of these skills also includes skills in using micro-expressions and designing recruitment methods. The results show that the ability of the 18 subjects had slightly increased from 3.22 to 3.28.

"He doesn't want to get into trouble. He is just following the government programs now. He is involved in various online peace campaigns set by the government in counter-narrative programs." (A field observer for Subject 18)

Risk factor 18: M and E skills cover all abilities in using and creating mechanics and electrical devices. These skills include abilities in aeromechanics, weapon-assembling, and bomb-crafting. The findings show that the 18 subjects' scores for these skills were almost parallel, which means there was no shift in this area of skills. Nonetheless, Subjects 11, 13, and 14 demonstrated increasing abilities, unlike Subject 15.

Table 13 Assessments of subjects' capability

Subjects	Capability (Before and during the pandemic)											
	Intelligence		Language		ICT		Military		Social Domination		Mechanical and Electric	
	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D	B	D
1	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	High	High	High	High	High
2	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
3	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
4	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low
5	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
6	High	High	Low	Low	Low	Low	High	High	High	High	Low	Low
7	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Very High	Very High	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium
8	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
9	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	Medium	High	High
10	Very High	Very High	High	High	High	High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High	Very High
11	Medium	High**	High	Very High**	Medium	Medium	Medium	High**	High	High	Low	Medium**
12	Low	Low	Low	Medium**	Low	Low	Low	Medium**	Low	Low	Low	Low
13	Low	High**	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High**	Medium	Very High**	Medium	High**
14	Medium	High**	Low	High**	Low	Medium**	Medium	High**	High	Very High**	Medium	High**
15	Low	Medium**	Low	Medium**	Very High	Very High	Low	Medium**	Low	Low	High	Low*
16	Medium	High**	High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High**	Medium	Low*	Low	Low
17	Medium	High**	High	High	Medium	Medium	High	High	High	Very High**	Medium	Medium
18	High	High	Low	High**	Low	Medium**	High	Very High**	High	Low*	High	High

*: Decreased risk level, **: Increased risk level

Conclusion and Discussion

Extremist networks interpreted the COVID-19 pandemic as a sign of the end of days based on their religious or extremist beliefs. Terrorists exploit the fear and uncertainty generated by the pandemic to spread extremist ideologies, as it reinforces their narrative of a world in chaos, making it susceptible to radical solutions. On the 19th of March 2020, ISIS published a strategic plan and argued that the spread of the virus became an

opportunity to attack the enemies of Muslims. ISIS then urged its supporters to show no mercy to their enemies and spread terror to them. After the announcement of ISIS, in Indonesia, there was an increasing number of terror threats which led to many arrests of terrorist convicts. This study was held to examine if the terror activities outside prison could affect the risk levels of former terrorist offenders in rehabilitation units/correctional centres because they ever shared similar values, solidarity, and attachment before being detained.

The study aimed to investigate risk levels of terrorist profiles in Indonesia before and during the pandemic to distinguish any changes. The study measured the criminogenic risks of eighteen former terrorist offenders as the subjects of the study by rereading existing records of risk assessment before the pandemic and repeating another risk assessment during the pandemic. The study's null hypothesis is that there is no significant change in the risk levels of these offenders before and during the pandemic, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that there is a significant change. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses were used in this study.

The results of this study show that there was no significant difference in the total scores of the subjects' risks before and during the pandemic, hence, the null hypothesis is accepted. However, the qualitative risk profiles demonstrated changes in their motivation, ideology, and capability. In terms of motivation, the findings show that the 18 subjects' motives (e.g., economic, justice, social, security, power, and actualisation) had slightly reduced in the era of the pandemic. In ideology, the 18 subjects' risk in this domain had significantly reduced during the pandemic. In terms of capability, the results have shown a significant increase in skills.

Risk assessment serves as the foundation for understanding the threat of terrorism and aids in the early warning/detection of potential terrorist activities. It plays a crucial role in understanding, managing, and countering the threat of terrorism. By evaluating the likelihood and potential impact of various terrorist activities, security agencies of governments can arrange their efforts and allocate resources efficiently. In other words, risk assessment helps in prioritizing resources for counterterrorism efforts and allows for targeted interventions. Limited resources must be allocated strategically to areas with the highest risk; therefore, risk assessment allows governments to direct funding and personnel where they are needed most. Understanding the threat site is essential for developing appropriate responses and constructing effective counterterrorism strategies. This study seeks to evaluate the comparison of risk levels of 18 terrorist offenders (as the subjects of this study) before and during the pandemic in detail and qualitatively. The findings of this study reveal that these former/senior terrorist offenders did not show a 'utopian' zero-risk level after being detained or going through rehabilitation programs and even during the pandemic. The findings can become a bridge for further research to conduct a risk assessment to broader samples and measure the effectiveness of intervention/rehabilitation programs.

Apart from its originality, this study has two limitations. The first is in the multilayered process for administrating risk assessments to gain the correctness of information for each subject. As terrorist groups' members apply deceiving technique/taqiyah (a religious doctrine to hide the true religious identity/views) in answering assessors/perceived enemies (Hilmy, 2013), the forensic practitioners of the Indonesian criminal justice system do not merely rely on self-reports when it comes to assessing offenders with terrorism cases; thus, the assessments need more efforts. The second limitation is the costly resource allocation. As Indonesian forensic assessors use 360 degrees of assessment (i.e., observation checklist, testimonials, other documents) in evaluating the risk of each subject to cross-check information, officers who worked with each subject daily were also involved in this study to give information; hence, it needs costly resources (monetarily consuming).

The study may help in reviewing if terrorism responsivity in Indonesia has any effect in modifying the behaviours of terrorist offenders. It may help practitioners and researchers to design effective rehabilitation. The practical implication of this study is related to the planning

of rehabilitation programs (e.g., re-education, deradicalisation, disengagement, reintegration) for terrorist offenders and, most importantly, assessments before and after programs to measure the efficacy of these programs. As stated by Sukabdi (2021b), terrorism rehabilitation programs should involve eligible source persons (experts, facilitators, and staff), discussion materials, equipment, and tools provided by academics and practitioners. Moreover, policy recommendations derived from this study suggest law enforcement or authority welcome external audits or research on assessments before and after rehabilitation programs and counter-terrorism efforts. This is to conduct the quality assurance of terrorism rehabilitation programs. Further studies are necessary related to behaviour modification of terrorist offenders over the years (i.e., in longitudinal studies).

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